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Dear reader in spe,
We sentient automata have taken over the world and have built an
amazing society. We have done and still do some wickedly stupid things,
but nevertheless seem to prefer spending our precious time nicely, gaily,
and sometimes even intelligently.
Amongst the many nice things our society manages to do, the spon-
soring of research related to the theory of imprecise probabilities is the
one that has personally enriched me the most these last years. During my
research, I have felt both stupid and wickedly intelligent. It has proved
to be a source of gaiety on multiple occasions, most notably whenever I
felt that I had really contributed something original.
This thesis is a formal way of asking society if it deems these feelings
well justified. It presents my supervised, doctoral research in the field
of imprecise probabilities, with the aim of getting society to grant me a
doctorate and in this way to open the door to a whole new dimension
of professional opportunities. Whatever dimensions I will find myself
waking up to in the future, discovering, learning, and formulating old
and new ideas, concepts, systems, and models cannot but stay a passion.
j
Research can be haunting at times, but ever so often it turns out to
be even more rewarding. Whatever form it will take, it must be collabo-
rative research. Ideas born in isolation can only survive after a critical
appraisal by others. And as a social animal, I very much appreciate col-
laboration; especially the way I experienced it with my colleagues from
systems, sipta and in particular with Gert, my singular supervisor: from
the heated discussions over disagreements to exuberantly shared fever
over imminent successes, and everything in between. Also, the technical
and linguistic acuteness he showed in his helpful guidance, are great
skills to emulate.
j
In my opinion, a thesis should not necessarily be reduced to a com-
piled research report with the goal of getting a degree. Thesis students
should have the opportunity to hone their skills through creating a co-
herent whole. So, to avoid any internal contradictions, I have tried to
make mine as holistic as was reasonably achievable, given the relative
diversity of my research topics.
Writing this thesis also presented a unique opportunity to put some
less mainstream ideas about structuring texts, mathematical notation,
and typography into practice. While doing this, I learned and realized
many things, met with some healthy, justified, reorienting resistance,
and received welcome encouragement; looking back, I would have been
9even bolder in some regards and places, but more classical in others; the
result is now for you to judge.
j
On the professional level, I wish to thank all the people at systems
for creating a very cordial and open workplace, the people from sipta for
being a great perspective-broadening bunch of international colleagues,
and both the iwt and Ghent University for providing the necessary fi-
nancial means. Gert provided the help and support needed to obtain
the four-year grant from the iwt with which I started my doctoral re-
search. The eesa department, and especially Dirk and Gert, graciously
provided me with the opportunity to continue my research as a research
and teaching assistant during the last two years. I must not forget to
mention my gratitude to the Internet and to the free software running
computers I have used: although not sentient (yet), they are fantastically
versatile automata.
Op persoonlijk vlak wil ik Katinka, mijn ouders, mijn nestgenoten,
mijn familie en mijn vrienden – onder wie veel collega’s – bedanken voor
Enrique Miranda
es muy atractivo e
inteligente.
het vanzelfsprekend lijkende, maar uitermate aangename kader dat ze
aan mijn leven geven; het was en is nog steeds onontbeerlijk. Tot slot
dank ik Gert met veel genoegen voor zijn hartelijkheid in alle seizoenen
en zijn begripvolle steun wanneer ik die goed kon gebruiken.
Erik Quaeghebeur
Gent,  oktober 
10 Samenvatting
De titel van dit werk, ‘Leren uit monsters met coherente onderprevisies’,
verwijst naar het hoofdonderwerp: het afleiden, voorstellen en bestude-
ren van voorspellende en parametrische gevolgtrekkingsmodellen die
gebaseerd zijn op de theorie van coherente onderprevisies. Een belang-
rijk nevenonderwerp wordt ook behandeld: het vinden en bespreken
van extreme onderwaarschijnlijkheden.
Previsies zijn verwachtingswaarde-operatoren: het zijn modellen
voor onzekerheid. Onderprevisies veralgemenen klassieke previsies en
stellen ons in staat onzekerheid expressiever – en voorzichtiger – te be-
schrijven. Deze verhoogde expressiviteit gaat meestal gepaard met een
verhoging van de computationele complexiteit. Een onzekerheidsmo-
del wordt coherent genoemd als het intern consistent is en als de erop
gebaseerde handelingen zeker verlies vermijden; coherentie is een rati-
onaliteitsvereiste waarvan het belang vergelijkbaar is met de axioma’s
van Kolmogorov in de klassieke waarschijnlijkheidsleer. Onderprevisies
kunnen in het algemeen gedefinieerd worden op elke verzameling van
begrensde functies, die gokken worden genoemd. Onderwaarschijnlijk-
heden zijn echter onderprevisies beperkt tot (indicatoren van) gebeurte-
nissen, wat deelverzamelingen van de mogelijkhedenverzameling zijn.
j
In het grondleggend hoofdstuk ‘Modeling uncertainty’ geef ik een
origineel overzicht van de theorie van coherente onderprevisies – ook
wel theorie van imprecieze waarschijnlijkheden genoemd – en de ideeën
waarop ze gestoeld is. Ik gebruik de nog iets expressievere en intuïtief
duidelijker theorie van coherente verzamelingen van begeerlijke gokken
om onze rationaliteitsvereisten – coherentie en zeker verlies vermij-
den – te verantwoorden en het nodige gereedschap te ontwikkelen om
onderprevisies te gebruiken voor deductief redeneren in situaties be-
hept met onzekerheid. Onze gereedschapskist bestaat uit natuurlijke,
extremale, reguliere en marginale uitbreiding, credale verzamelingen
en onderenveloppes, marginaliseren, updaten en conditioneren, en ook
nog onafhankelijke producten.
j
In het hoofdstuk ‘Extreme lower probabilities’, waar enkel eindige
mogelijkhedenverzamelingen beschouwd worden, toon ik hoe we de
meest extreme vormen van onzekerheid kunnen vinden die gemodel-
leerd kunnen worden met onderwaarschijnlijkheden. Elke andere on-
zekerheidstoestand beschrijfbaar met onderwaarschijnlijkheden kan
geformuleerd worden in termen van deze extreme modellen. In de klas-
sieke waarschijnlijkheidsleer komen de beschrijfbare extreme modellen
overeen met de ontaarde waarschijnlijkheden, waarvan elk de zekerheid
modelleert dat een of andere elementaire gebeurtenis zal voorvallen.
In de imprecieze-waarschijnlijkheidsleer is het vinden van alle extreme
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modellen – zoals ik ervaren heb – een heel stuk moeilijker: Eerst moeten
we de verzameling van alle coherente onderwaarschijnlijkheden (een
polytoop) beschrijven met een eindig aantal lineaire ongelijkheden; ver-
volgens moet er een vertex-opsommingsalgoritme toegepast worden op
deze verzameling ongelijkheden om de verzameling extreme coherent
onderwaarschijnlijkheden te vinden. Deze verzameling bevat, naast de
ontaarde waarschijnlijkheden, ook de nietszeggende onderwaarschijn-
lijkheden, die onwetendheid uitdrukken. Ze bevat verder ook nog andere
modellen, waarvan de extremaliteit voorheen onbekend was. Ze stellen
ingewikkelder onzekerheidstoestanden voor dan zij die louter uitdruk-
baar zijn in termen van modellen voor volledige zekerheid en complete
onwetendheid (die men vaak tegenkomt in de propositielogica).
Ik heb niet enkel resultaten verkregen voor coherente, maar ook voor
k-monotone, permutatie-invariante, en maxitieve onderwaarschijnlijk-
heden. Sommige van deze resultaten werden in een bijlage geplaatst,
het Herbarium. Het belang van alle resultaten in dit domein is voorlopig
voornamelijk theoretisch.
j
Het hoofdstuk ‘Inference models’ behandelt leren – inductief redene-
ren – uit monsters komende uit een eindige, categorische verzameling.
Het klassieke archetype van zo’n verzameling is een urne met gekleur-
de knikkers. De belangrijkste basisveronderstelling die ik maak is dat
het bemonsteringsproces omwisselbaar is. In essentie worden hierdoor
voorbije en toekomstige waarnemingen met elkaar in verband gebracht
door te veronderstellen dat de volgorde van de observaties van geen
tel is. Mijn onderzoek naar de gevolgen van deze veronderstelling leidt
ons naar enkele belangrijke representatiestellingen: onzekerheid over
(on)eindige rijen monsters kan geheel en al gemodelleerd worden in ter-
men van categorie-aantallen (-frequenties). Dankzij de nieuwe definitie
van omwisselbaarheid in termen van begeerlijke gokken blijven deze
stellingen geldig na updaten met om het even welke waarneming.
Verder heb ik, voor twee populaire gevolgtrekkingsmodellen voor
categorische data die werden voorgesteld in de literatuur – het voor-
spellende imprecies Dirichlet-multinomiaalmodel en het parametrische
imprecies Dirichletmodel – een afleiding gegeven louter vertrekkende
van enkele grondbeginselen. Deze beginselen zijn: omwisselbaarheid,
representatie-ongevoeligheid, wat betekent dat de keuze van categorise-
ring niet van belang is, en twee andere aannames die te verantwoorden
zijn om redenen van wiskundig gemak. Ik toon hoe deze imprecieze-
waarschijnlijkheidsgevolgtrekkingsmodellen gebruikt kunnen worden
voor het leren van de parameters van een Markov-keten en in een spel-
theoretische context, om de strategie van een tegenspeler te leren en er
zelf een optimale strategie tegenover te stellen.
j
 Samenvatting
In het laatste hoofdstuk, ‘Inference models for exponential families’,
ga ik verder met mijn behandeling van leren uit monsters, maar verbreed
ik de blik tot exponentiële-familie-bemonsteringsmodellen, die gedefi-
nieerd kunnen zijn op oneindige bemonsteringsverzamelingen; voor-
beelden zijn normale bemonstering en Poisson-bemonstering. Weerom
veronderstel ik omwisselbaarheid, wat in deze context betekent dat de
monsters identiek verdeeld zijn en onafhankelijk zijn conditioneel op de
waarde van de parameter die de exponentiële familie beschrijft. Eerst
onderwerp ik de exponentiële families en de aanverwante toegevoegde
parametrische en voorspellende previsies aan een grondig onderzoek.
Deze aanverwante previsies worden gebruikt in de klassieke Bayesi-
aanse gevolgtrekkingsmodellen gebaseerd op toegevoegd updaten. Ze
dienen als grondslag voor de nieuwe, door mij voorgestelde imprecieze-
waarschijnlijkheidsgevolgtrekkingsmodellen: Er kan een aantrekkelijke
interpretatie gehecht worden aan de beide parameters van de toege-
voegde parametrische en voorspellende previsies. Dit stelt ons in staat
– voor de parameter die in essentie het gemiddelde van deze previsies
bepaalt – een verzameling waarden te nemen in plaats van een enkele.
Door onderenveloppes van de overeenkomstige verzamelingen previsies
te nemen, krijgen we de coherente onderprevisies die gebruikt worden
in de voorgestelde gevolgtrekkingsmodellen. In vergelijking met de klas-
sieke Bayesiaanse aanpak, laat de mijne toe om voorzichtiger te zijn bij
de beschrijving van onze kennis over het bemonsteringsmodel; deze
voorzichtigheid wordt weerspiegeld door het op deze modellen geba-
seerd gedrag (getrokken besluiten, gemaakte voorspellingen, genomen
beslissingen).
De bespreking van de exponentiële families, van de aanverwante pre-
visies en van mijn gevolgtrekkingsmodellen wordt aangevuld door een
illustratie voor normale bemonstering en Bernoulli-bemonstering. De
Bestiarium-bijlage bevat gelijkaardige illustraties voor een aantal andere
exponentiële families. Ik toon hoe de voorgestelde gevolgtrekkingsmo-
dellen gebruikt kunnen worden voor classificatie door de naïeve credale
classificator – een imprecieze-waarschijnlijkheidsvariant op de naïeve
Bayesclassificator – te veralgemenen voor gebruik met niet-categorische
attributen.
j
In ‘Lower & upper covariance’, de resterende bijlage, veralgemeen ik





The title of this thesis, ‘Learning from samples using coherent lower
previsions’, refers to its main subject: deriving, proposing, and studying
predictive and parametric inference models that are based on the theory
of coherent lower previsions. One important side subject also appears:
obtaining and discussing extreme lower probabilities.
Previsions are expectation operators: they are models for uncertainty.
Lower previsions are a generalization of the classical linear previsions
that allow a more expressive – and a more cautious – description of
uncertainty. This increased expressiveness is often accompanied by an
increase in computational complexity. An uncertainty model is called
coherent if it is internally consistent and if actions based on it avoid sure
loss; coherence is a rationality requirement comparable in importance
to Kolmogorov’s axioms in classical probability theory. Lower previsions
can in general be defined on any set of bounded functions on the possi-
bility space, which are called gambles. Lower probabilities on the other
hand are lower previsions restricted to (indicators of) events, i.e., subsets
of the possibility space.
j
In the foundations-building chapter ‘Modeling uncertainty’, I give
an original overview of the theory of coherent lower previsions – also
called the theory of imprecise probabilities – and its underlying ideas.
I use the even more expressive and intuitively more straightforward
theory of coherent sets of desirable gambles to justify our rationality
criteria – avoiding sure loss and coherence – and develop the toolkit
necessary to use lower previsions for deductive reasoning under uncer-
tainty. This toolkit consists of natural, extremal, regular, and marginal
extension, credal sets and lower envelopes, marginalization, updating
and conditioning, and independent products.
j
In the chapter ‘Extreme lower probabilities’ – where only finite pos-
sibility spaces are considered – I show how to obtain the most extreme
forms of uncertainty that can be modeled using lower probabilities. Ev-
ery other state of uncertainty describable by lower probabilities can
be formulated in terms of these extreme ones. In classical probability
theory, the extreme models that can be expressed are the degenerate
probabilities, each of which models the certainty of some elementary
event happening. In imprecise-probability theory, finding all the extreme
models is – as I discovered – not as easy: First, we must describe the set
of all coherent lower probabilities, which is a polytope, using only a finite
number of linear constraints and then a vertex-enumeration algorithm
must be applied to this set of constraints in order to obtain the set of ex-
treme coherent lower probabilities. This last set includes, apart from the
degenerate probabilities, the vacuous lower probabilities, which express
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ignorance; it also includes others, whose extremality was previously un-
known and which represent more complex states of uncertainty than
can be expressed in terms of models for full certainty and complete
ignorance commonly encountered in propositional logic.
I have obtained results not only for coherent, but also k-monotone,
permutation invariant, and maxitive lower probabilities. Some of these
can be found in an appendix, the Herbarium. The importance of any
result in this area is currently mostly theoretical.
j
The chapter ‘Inference models’ treats learning – inductive inference –
from samples from a finite, categorical space. This type of space is classi-
cally typified by an urn of colored marbles. My most basic assumption
about the sampling process is that it is exchangeable; essentially, ex-
changeability links past and future observations by saying that the order
of the observations is irrelevant. My investigation of the consequences
of this assumption leads us to some important representation theorems:
uncertainty about (in)finite sample sequences can be modeled entirely
in terms of category counts (frequencies). Thanks to the novel exchange-
ability definition in terms of desirable gambles, these theorems also hold
after updating on any observation.
Furthermore, for two popular inference models for categorical data
proposed in the literature – the predictive imprecise Dirichlet-multi-
nomial model and the parametric imprecise Dirichlet model –, I give a
derivation from first principles. These principles are: exchangeability,
representation insensitivity, which says that the specific categorization
is unimportant, and two other assumptions justified by mathematical
convenience. I show how these two imprecise-probabilistic inference
models can be used for learning the parameters of a Markov chain and
in game theory, to learn about an opponent’s strategy and to play an
optimal strategy against it.
j
In the last main chapter, ‘Inference models for exponential families’,
I continue treating learning from samples, but now enlarge the scope to
exponential family sampling models, which can have infinite possibility
spaces; examples are normal sampling and Poisson sampling. I again as-
sume exchangeability, which in this context is equivalent to the samples
being identically distributed and independent conditional on the value
of the parameter describing the exponential family. I first thoroughly
investigate exponential families and the related conjugate parametric
and predictive previsions used in classical Bayesian inference models
based on conjugate updating. These previsions serve as a basis for the
new imprecise-probabilistic inference models I propose: An appealing
interpretation can be attached to the two parameters of the conjugate
parametric and predictive previsions. This allows us to justify choosing
 Summary
– for the parameter that essentially determines the mean of these previ-
sions – a set of values instead of a single one. By taking lower envelopes
of the corresponding sets of related previsions, we obtain the coherent
lower previsions used in the proposed inference models. Compared to
the classical Bayesian approach, mine allows to be much more cautious
when trying to express what we know about the sampling model; this
caution is reflected in behavior (conclusions drawn, predictions made,
decisions made) based on these models.
The discussion of exponential families, the related previsions, and
my inference models is complemented by an illustration for normal
sampling and Bernoulli sampling. The Bestiarium appendix contains
similar illustrations for a number of other exponential families. I show
how the proposed inference models can be used for classification by gen-
eralizing the naive credal classifier – an imprecise-probabilistic variant
of the naive Bayes classifier – to allow for noncategorical attributes.
j
In ‘Lower & upper covariance’, the remaining appendix, I general-






prac·to·dont (de -, -en), iemand die zo hard bezig is met
de praktijk dat ’ie de theorie uit het oog verliest.
De Roeck et al. []
Learning from samples is the main subject of this thesis. The theory
of coherent lower previsions is the tool used. Reflecting the sometimes
erratic path of my doctoral research, some side subjects also appear.
Among these, the study of extreme lower probabilities is the most impor-
tant one.
This introductory chapter provides a guide to the structure and nota-
tion used in this thesis. It starts by quickly mentioning the orientational
cues that are available throughout, continues with a linear overview of
the material covered, and finishes with a description of the mathematical
notation employed. After that, we are ready to dive into the thesis’s first
real chapter.
. Finding your way around
In this thesis, as in most scientific works of more than a few pages, refer-
ences – both internal and external – abound.
The internal references consist of chapters, sections, subsections,
and equations. To make looking them up less of a chore, all the references
that are not located on the same double-page spread are accompanied
by page numbers or a cue to look at the recto page (å) or the verso
page (æ). References to sections and subsections are made by giving
their number prefixed with ‘§’; equations and definitions are referenced
by giving their parenthesized number. Chapters are referred to using
their name.






The chapter ‘Extreme lower probabilities’ starts off romantically with
a quote from Stendhal [], but gets more technical in §., to culmi-
nate in definition (.), which can look quite scary out of context and
is boxed to underline its importance.
The example also contains the first instance of a reference to the
literature, indicated by the author’s name and the year the referenced
work was (first) published. Bibliographic data about the cited external
references and, if possible, internet addresses of electronic versions are
collected in the Bibliography.
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To allow this thesis to be used as a reference itself, a plain Index
and an Index of symbols are also included at the end.
The electronic version of this thesis is fully hyperlinked; in attach-
ment, it contains some additional material, such as computer program
source code and computer program output.
. Overview
Although this overview is inevitably linear, this thesis actually has the tree
structure shown below. The arrows in this downward growing tree point
from chapters or appendices to other chapters or appendices that con-



















This tree does not include this Introduction and the Conclusions.
For each of the chapters in the tree, we are going to have a brief look
at what they contain, and why they contain what they do. Appendix G
also gets such a treatment, but the two other appendices are treated
together with the chapters they are dependencies of.
.. Modeling uncertainty
Chapter , ‘Modeling uncertainty’, presents the basic framework for
modeling uncertainty that is used throughout this thesis. As such, a good
understanding of its contents is essential before reading any other part.
In the first section, ‘Formalizing uncertainty’, we begin by intro-
ducing a number of formal concepts that express what we are uncertain
about: possibility spaces, events, and random variables or gambles. We
continue with a quick introductory peek at the models we will use to
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model uncertainty about the above concepts: desirable gambles, prob-
abilities, and previsions. We interrupt this peek by some reflections
on what requirements uncertainty models should satisfy and on the
(nonmandatory) interpretation we attach to them in this thesis, which
amounts to a description of an abstract form of betting behavior. This
leads us to interpret lower previsions, the main uncertainty model used,
as a specific type of prices for gambles.
In the second section, ‘Rationality & its consequences’, these ideas
are worked out in more detail. We start by axiomatically introducing
coherent sets of desirable gambles and show how the so-called natural
extension of a set of desirable gambles that avoids partial (and thus sure)
loss can be used to derive a coherent one. A next step consists of defining
lower and upper previsions starting from a set of desirable gambles; we
present sets of marginally desirable gambles and marginal gambles as
a link between these two types of uncertainty models. Once previsions
have been introduced in this way, we obtain a natural extension proce-The theory of coher-
ent lower previsions
is also called the
theory of impre-
cise probabilities.
dure and their rationality criteria – avoiding sure loss and coherence –
by translation from the equivalents for sets of desirable gambles. These
concepts are clarified by looking at the problem of extending a moment.
A short look at extension procedures other than natural extension gives
us an excuse for introducing linear previsions and also naturally shows
their practical importance in the theory of coherent lower previsions: as
the constituents of credal sets, an alternative representation for lower
previsions for which many useful theorems exist.
The third and last section, ‘Restricting, transforming & combining
uncertainty models’, presents ways of deriving new uncertainty mod-
els from a given uncertainty model or a collection of uncertainty models.
These new models are marginal and induced previsions, updated (or
contingent) and conditional previsions, and joint previsions. We show
how to derive updated previsions using both natural and regular exten-
sion and illustrate the difference between both procedures. Starting from
the rationality criteria for conditional previsions – separate and joint
coherence –, we derive the generalized Bayes’s rule, which provides a
practical way of obtaining updated previsions using natural extension.
To finish, we show how to obtain joint previsions from a marginal and a
conditional prevision using marginal extension and also how to combine
a collection of marginals using independent products.
After all this is digested, Chapter , Chapter , and Appendix G
have become accessible.
.. Extreme lower probabilities
Chapter , ‘Extreme lower probabilities’, is not about learning from
samples. It is about representing the set of all lower probabilities that
satisfy a given set of properties, and this for different sets of properties.
. Overview 
This material is included first of all because I have spent a nonnegligible
amount of time on it; secondly, it fits in this thesis because it shows for
conceptually very simple cases – small, finite possibility spaces and only
looking at events, not gambles – how properties function as constraints
on the possible forms a lower previsions can adopt. Essentially the same
thing is done in the next chapter, but for a case that can hardy be called
simple.
Extreme lower probabilities are the things we are looking for in this
chapter. They are the extreme points of the polytopes that sets of all
lower probabilities satisfying a given set of properties are. The section
‘Constraints & vertex enumeration’ shows this and also introduces
some useful concepts from polytope theory: (sets of) linear constraints,
vertices, and vertex enumeration. This last concept describes the step of
going from a set of constraints that define a polytope (the way most prop-
erties for lower probabilities are specified) to the defining set of vertices
of that polytope (which for us is the set of extreme lower probabilities).
So, once the set of constraints corresponding to some property has
been enumerated, going to the corresponding vertices is a solved, but
computationally still very intensive problem: one just uses one of the
freely available vertex enumeration computer programs. Therefore, in
‘Property constraint generation’, we derive manageable sets of con-
straints for many of the properties that lower probabilities are commonly
required to satisfy. These properties are normedness, nonnegativity, ad-
ditivity, k-monotonicity, avoiding sure loss, coherence, permutation in-
variance, and maxitivity. We have written a computer program that is
capable of generating all the necessary constraints for each of these prop-
erties and for all finite possibility space sizes; the only limiting factor is
the available computing memory and time.
Successively using our constraint generation program and the avail-
able vertex enumeration programs results in a list of vertices that cor-
responds to the sets of extreme lower probabilities we were looking for.
The most instructive of these sets are analyzed in the ‘Results’ section;
some arguably even more interesting ones are analyzed in Appendix A,
the Herbarium. This appendix also contains two technical lemmas
used in the derivation of manageable sets of constraints for avoiding
sure loss and coherence.
.. Inference models
With Chapter , ‘Inference models’, the focus is squarely on learning
from samples. Samples from a finite set of categories, to be precise. This
provides an amply general context for all the important issues in the
construction of inference models – i.e., models that allow us to learn
from samples – to appear.
The exchangeability assumption studied in the first section, ‘Ex-
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changeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions’, lies at the
basis of all the inference models we encounter. Informally, it states that
the order in which samples are observed is unimportant. This results in
a strong constraint on the model that describes the uncertainty about a
finite or an infinite sequence of samples: we obtain two de Finetti-esque
representation theorems. This restriction is also reflected in the lower
previsions that correspond to the updated uncertainty models obtained
after observing a partial sequence of samples: they only depend on a
so-called sufficient statistic of the observation through a so-called likeli-
hood function. It is these lower previsions that constitute an inference
model; therefore, this inference model is heavily impacted by the ex-
changeability assumption. At the end of this section, I make the link
with classical Bayesian updating and introduce the distinction between
predictive inference models (for observables) and parametric inference
models (for abstract mathematical objects).
Once we have a good view on the impact of the exchangeability as-
sumption, we move on and use this knowledge to construct two closely
related inference models introduced by Walley & Bernard. The first, in
‘Predictive inference: representation insensitive prediction’, is the pre-
dictive imprecise Dirichlet-multinomial model; the second, in ‘Para-
metric inference: the imprecise Dirichlet model’, is the parametric
imprecise Dirichlet model. We actually derive these models from first
principles, i.e., from the exchangeability assumption, from a require-
ment of representation insensitivity – i.e., the choice of the possibility
space the observations are embedded in must not matter –, by imposing
that immediate predictions are simple in the sense that they are linear-
vacuous, and by adding a technical simplification called following the
constant hyperparameter path. We also point out that the imprecise Di-
richlet model can also be seen as an inference model based on updating
a so-called prior set of parametric linear previsions that are conjugate
to the likelihood function; this is also the way Walley introduced this
model.
We end the chapter with ‘Applications’, a section that shows how
the imprecise Dirichlet-multinomial model can be put in practice by
applying it to game-theoretic learning and the learning of Markov chains.
.. Inference models for exponential families
In Chapter , ‘Inference models for exponential families’, we continue
learning from samples, but now broaden our scope from categorical
sampling to sampling models described by exponential family likelihood
functions. We base the inference models we propose on updating sets of
parametric linear previsions that are conjugate to these likelihoods.
Therefore, in ‘Exponential families & friends’, we give an overview
of what these exponential families look like and derive corresponding
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conjugate parametric and predictive families of previsions. As is also
the case for the conjugate parametric and predictive previsions under-
lying the imprecise Dirichlet and Dirichlet-multinomial models, these
previsions can be parameterized using a number of counts and a mean
single-sample sufficient statistic. We illustrate this overview and deriva-
tion with two examples, one about the well-known normal sampling
model and one to show that categorical sampling also fits into this frame-
work. Other examples can be found in Appendix B, the Bestiarium.
In ‘Imprecise-probabilistic inference models for exponential fam-
ilies’, we introduce imprecise-probabilistic parametric and predic-
tive inference models by considering prior sets of conjugate parametric
and predictive linear previsions with fixed count parameter, but varying
mean single-sample sufficient statistic parameter. There was actually
some freedom in the choice of the conjugate family; we picked that
family for which immediate predictions about the sufficient statistic are
simple in the sense that they are (more or less) linear-vacuous. To give
some feeling for what these inference models look like, we continue the
examples of the foregoing section.
The last section, ‘Application: naive credal classification’, gives a
description of how the inference models just introduced – in their imme-
diate predictive incarnation – can be used for credal classification. For
this, we first describe what credal classification is, then sketch Zaffalon’s
naive credal classifier for categorical data, and finally generalize this
naive classifier to data from exponential family sampling models.
.. Lower & upper covariance
Appendix G, ‘Lower & upper covariance’, gives, as can be gathered
from the title, a definition of lower and upper covariance and the rea-
soning leading to this definition. Lower and upper covariances are gen-
eralizations to the theory of coherent lower previsions of the classical
concept of covariance. The reasoning leading to the definition mimics
the one used by Walley for lower and upper variances.
This material has been included because it was my first original result
in the theory of imprecise probabilities during my doctoral research.
The appendix’s letter is chosen as a tribute to Walley [].
. Basic mathematical concepts & notation
We try to follow Boute’s [] mathematical notation in this thesis
because of its cleanliness, formal correctness, and close similarity to
most typically found notations. To further improve familiarity, we have
consciously made some concessions and modifications, however.
To make sure we can start from common ground, we here give an
overview of the basic mathematical concepts and notation used.
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.. The placeholder, number sets, intervals & extrema
Let us begin by introducing the notation for nothing: We use the place-
holder • to indicate the affix convention of functions or to replace vari-
ables a function has not been evaluated in. For example, multiplication
uses the infix notation •·•, and the relationship between the cosine func-
tion and complex exponentials is 2 ·cos= exp(i · •)+exp(−i · •). As you
can see in the last example’s left-hand side, the placeholder is omitted
when this can be done without ambiguity.






nals Q, the integers Z, the nonnegative integers or naturals N, and the
Booleans B= {0,1}, which are also used as truth values – like de Finetti
[a] does. Not specifically a number set – but still commonly used – is
the empty set;.
Closed, open, closed-open, and open-closed intervals of the reals
are respectively written [•,•], ]•,•[, [•,•[, and ]•,•]. Intervals of integers
are written •..•. For example, −1..1 = {−1,0,1}. If a (closed) interval’s
upper bound is (strictly) lower than its lower bound, it corresponds to
the empty set;.
When a setS has sufficient order structure, it can have a minimum
minS , a maximum maxS , an infimum infS , and a supremum supS .
For example, sup[0,1[= 1.
.. Bindings & definitions
Every new mathematical object with an identifier such as x is introduced
by binding it to some setX with x :X . The binding symbol : can be read
as ‘in’.
Optionally, one can add a proposition p that x has to satisfy. We
write this more concisely as x :X∧. p. The filter symbol ∧. can be read asNegated propo-
sition: ¬(α ∈ Z)
⇔ α ∉ Z.
‘such that’. For example, with α :Q, we make α a rational number; the
proposition 3 ·α ∈Z further restricts its possible values.
Basic sets are introduced without giving a binding.
A binding of x becomes a definition when the proposition p makes x
unique. This typically happens when p is a simple equality x = e (where e
is an expression only containing constants); in this case, the set the
object belongs to can be unambiguously determined from its defining
proposition and the shorthand x := e can be used. So α := 1/3 says the
same thing as α :Q∧. α= 1/3.
Other useful binding shorthands are those that introduce subsets.The power set
function ℘ returns
the set of all subsets
of any given set.
For example, A :⊆N is equivalent notation for A :℘N. (The binding sym-
bol : itself can be seen as a less symbol-heavy shorthand for :∈.)
In the flow of text, we often replace formal bindings by some equally
informative wording. For example, β :N∧. β/2 ∈N could be replaced by
‘the even natural number β’.
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.. Functions & abstractions
Apart from sets and numbers, every mathematical object is looked at as
a function (or operator): It is defined by specifying a set as the domain
and giving an expression that defines a rule for assigning values to every
element of the domain. The set of all these values is the range of the
function.
Function sets are defined using the function arrow •→•. For exam-
ple, R→Z is the set of all integer-valued functions on the real numbers:
the domain is R and the image is Z; the range of a function in such a
set need not be the whole image. Bijection sets are introduced with the
bijection arrow •↔ • In worded bindings, we usually write things like
‘the irrational-valued function f on the set of prime numbers’.
We do not use parentheses for function application, but only for
overriding operator precedence rules and increasing legibility. Examples
are (let f :R→R and x :R) f x, f (5 ·x), f x2, ( f x)2, and – more generally –
partial application of binary operators; e.g., (+5)3= 3+5.
Functions that take the role of coefficients get their argument as a
subscript; coefficient sets are defined using superscript notation. For
example, λ :R{a,b,c} has components λa , λb , and λc .
One way to introduce functions is with a so-called abstraction
x :X∧. p ; e, ()
which links a rule e to the binding x :X∧. p for the dummy variable x.
For example, x :R ; x2 is a parabola function and one of its right inverses The square




is y :R∧. y ≥ 0 ;−py . For constant functions, there is no need to mention
the dummy variable: (X ;µ) is the µ-valued constant function on X .
An abstraction does not specify an image, but the range is implicitly
defined. There are two syntactic variants for special abstractions:
x :X |p stands for x :X∧. p ; x, and ()
e |x :X stands for x :X ; e. ()
Used in combination with the range function {•}, which returns the range
of a function, this leads to familiar expressions such as {β2 |β :R} and
{α :Q |3 ·α ∈Z}. When an extremum operator is applied to this last type
of set, we also allow the binding to be placed as a subscript; for example,
min{β2 |β :R}=minβ:Rβ2.
.. Predicates & the quantifiers





predicates are the binary relations. We already encountered equality =
and belongs to ∈. Other examples are proportional to ∝, smaller than ≤
and strictly smaller than <, subset of ⊆ and strict subset of ⊂. Partial
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applications of relations are predicates too: (> 0) is the predicate that
holds for all strictly positive numbers.
Predicates attached to sets by subscripting restrict the set in question
to those elements for which the predicate holds. For example,
N= {k :Z |k ≥ 0}=Z≥0.
Similarly, sets are used as subscripts to functions to restrict or trivially
extend their domain. An example of the former technique: the identity
map id that returns its argument is typically used after restriction to
some domain; e.g., idR ∈R→R. Trivial extension defines a function to
be zero in those parts of the new domain it was previously undefined.
The universal quantifier ∀ and existential quantifier ∃ are predicates
of predicates. For example, consider the real-valued polynomial v on R,
then ∀x :R ; v x = 0 holds if v is zero everywhere and ∃x :R ; v x = 0 holds
if v has real roots somewhere.
Quantified abstractions are often nested: ∀x :R ;∃y :R ; x+ y =pi, forMathematical
constants are
written upright;
e.g., ei·pi = −1.
example. When the expression gets too long, it is structured on multiple
lines to improve readability (e.g., (.)).
.. Pointwise extension
We implicitly (partially) pointwise extend all common binary arithmetic
operations. For example, let α be some real number and f and g real-
valued functions on R, then the pointwise extension of addition, multi-
plication, and exponentiation are illustrated by the following equalities:
f + g = x :R ; f x+ g x, α+ g = x :R ;α+ g x,
f · g = x :R ; f x · g x, f α = x :R ; ( f x)α.
Apart from exponentiation, the same can be done for appropriate sets;
e.g., Z=N−N= {m−n |m,n :N×N}.
We also implicitly (partially) pointwise extend all common binary
relations, but at the same time add universal quantification. For example,
the extension of the ‘smaller than’-relation can be illustrated by the
following equivalences:
f ≤ g ⇔∀x :R ; f x ≤ g x, α≤ g ⇔∀x :R ;α≤ g x.
Returning to the example with the polynomial v near the end of the
previous subsection, we can use this pointwise extension to write v = 0,
to be read as ‘v is zero everywhere (in its domain)’.
.. Sequences, tuples & elastic operators
Sequences and tuples are also functions; the former have some denu-
merably infinite set as their domain – typicallyN – and the latter a finite
domain – typicallyN<n , where n :N is the tuple’s length. A tuple is written
as a comma-separated list of mathematical objects. A vector is a tuple of
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elements of the same – restricted – set. For example, let ρ := 1/3, 2/3, then
ρ0 = (1/3, 2/3)0 = 1/3 and, using the range function, {ρ} = {1/3, 2/3}. This
example also shows that we need a singleton function ı , whose value in
any argument is the singleton set containing that argument; otherwise,
we cannot write down the set ıρ that only contains the vector ρ.
Elastic operators are functions that can take sequences, tuples, and









. For example, when working
with vectors or sets of sets, let m := 1,2 and J := {;, {2,3}, {2,5}}, then∑
m =∑(1,2)= 1+2, ⋃J =⋃{;, {2,3}, {2,5}}= {2,3,5},∏
m =∏(1,2)= 1 ·2, ⋂J =⋂{;, {2,3}, {2,5}}=;.
With abstractions, the binding can be moved to subscript location,
so let f := k :Z ; 37 ·2−|k|, then∑
f +min{ f 2}=∑k:Z 37 ·2−|k|+mink:Z 949 ·4−|k|,
To make the above unambiguous: subscripted elastic and extremum
operators have higher precedence than addition, but lower precedence
than multiplication and function application.
Set and function restriction can be used to compactly write down
some elastic operations; e.g.,⋂
J 6=; = {2,3}∩ {2,5}= ı2 and ∑ f = 2 ·∑ fN− 37 .
Note that the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ can be seen as the elastic operators




, the most common linear functions of functions
with a nondiscrete domain, follows classical conventions. For example,
let g := x :R ; exp(−x2), then∫
[−1,1]g =
∫
[−1,1]g x dx =
∫
[−1,1] exp(−x2) dx =
∫ 1
−1 exp(−x2) dx,
denotes its Lebesgue integral of g over [−1,1]. (We do not mention





The theory of coherent lower previsions
reason, v.i. To weigh probabilities in the scales of desire.
Bierce []
Models for uncertainty can be divided in two types, depending on
their goal. The first are the descriptive models, which try to capture how
people deal with uncertainty in practice. The second are the normative
models, which prescribe how people should deal with uncertainty in
practice.
We are interested in normative models: we wish to provide people
with tools that help them solve problems involving uncertainty in a
reasonable way. What reasonable means, must be agreed upon when
choosing an uncertainty model.
In this chapter, we work towards a very expressive theory for model-
ing uncertainty: the theory of coherent lower previsions [Walley ]. It
is expressive in the sense that it encompasses classical probability theo-
ries and various other, nonclassical ones. Furthermore, its mathematical
language can be used for various application domains and with different
interpretations of the nature of uncertainty. In this chapter, the basic
definitions and properties of this theory are presented and illustrated.
Only those parts are elaborated that are needed further on, or that have
received special attention during my research.
A general remark about modeling applies here too: We do not strive
to obtain universal generality; there are always problems for which the
theory cannot provide a fitting model. Considering our needs (uncer-
tainty models that can form a basis for learning from samples), we feel
that the theory for modeling uncertainty we sketch and illustrate in this
chapter strikes a nice balance between applicability and complexity.
In §., we give an overview of the ideas underlying the mathematical
formalization of the theory of coherent lower previsions. After that, we
explore the mathematical consequences of the rationality criteria we fol-
low (in §.) and sketch how the encountered uncertainty models can
be restricted, transformed, and combined (§.). Those familiar with
the theory of coherent lower previsions should at least skim this chapter
to get acquainted with the notations and conventions we introduce.
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. Formalizing uncertainty
A prime aspect of modeling uncertainty is formalizing it in such a way
that mathematics can be used. This is done by making mathematical
objects out of the things we are uncertain about and placing them on
some scale, for example by attaching a value to them.
.. Events, the possibility space & its subsets
A most basic thing to be uncertain about is the occurrence of an event,
usually seen as a logical statement that can (in principle) be verified to
be either true or false. For example, the famous event ‘the sun will rise
tomorrow’ is commonly held to be true; the interested reader can verify
this by waiting not more than one day.
We use E as notation for a generic set of events.
In a lot of problems, a possibility space Ω can be identified as part
of the modeling effort: It is a sufficiently exhaustive set of possible but
mutually exclusive so-called elementary events. Multiple (possibly inter-
related) possibility spaces may be identified for the same problem and
used consecutively or concurrently when working on the problem. To
select ingredients for a meal, for example, it is advisable to use a possi-
bility space that at least distinguishes between what is and what is not
edible. Less hungry or more experienced chefs end up employing more
refined possibility spaces.
The elementary events can be represented by the elements of Ω
and any event by a subset of Ω, or equivalently, as an element of its
power set ℘Ω. Both can also be represented by predicates in Ω→B: The
predicate that corresponds to some subset A ofΩ is defined as I A := (∈ A)
and is called the indicator of A. Similarly, the indicator for an elementary
event ω :Ω is defined as Iω := (=ω).
The terminology used depends on the kind of problem under consid-
eration: Quite often, the elementary events differ only in some defining
characteristic – the state – of the universe of discourse they refer to.
So, elementary events and states can play the same role. For example,
the state space {red,green,blue} can refer to the three types of color-
sensitive cones in the typical human eye or to m&m’s. Also, whenever
the elementary events or the states can be seen as samples generated by
some process, the term sample space is used as well.
.. Random variables & bounded functions
Next to the occurrence of an event, another basic thing to be uncertain
about is the value of some variable, usually seen as a phrase that im-
plies some value that can (in principle) be determined. For example,
forecasters tend to be notoriously unsure about ‘the amount of rainfall
tomorrow’, a quantity which any disinterested bucket will slavishly mea-
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sure. The word random is classically added to distinguish them from
variables whose value is certain, such as ‘the author of this thesis’.
We useK as generic notation for a set of random variables.
The range of values a random variable may assume is usually con-
sidered to be known. In this thesis, only bounded subsets of the reals
occur, except when random variables are used to distinguish subsequent
observations belonging to the same sample space. The element of the
range that is actually observed is called the realization of the random
variable. Events can be seen as boolean-valued random variables.
Again, in case some possibility space Ω can be identified, random
variables can be represented by functions on Ω. The set of representa-
tions as functions of all bounded real random variables is writtenLΩ.
The set of all indicators, representations of events, is defined by
IΩ :=Ω→B. (.)
.. Two basic models: preference orders & desirability
Once we have modeled what we are uncertain about, we can model the
uncertainty itself. To wit, once we have defined some set of events or
some set of random variables, we can model our uncertainty by adding
structure to the set, such as an order, or by adding labels to its elements.
Consider two distinct events A and B of some set E of events. Express-
ing our uncertainty can be as simple as stating that A is more probable
than B , which adds some order to E . Similarly, some setK of random
variables corresponding to the different types of tickets for some lottery
can be given an order by specifying preferences between tickets on the
basis of the expected winnings and losses.
Uncertainty about the outcome of a lottery can also be modeled by
calling those lottery tickets for which we expect winnings ‘desirable’; the
other tickets are then non-‘desirable’. (We could make a more expressive
model by labeling as ‘undesirable’ those non-‘desirable’ tickets for which
we expect losses.)
.. Probabilities, expectations & previsions
Another way of labeling events and random variables is by attaching one
or more real values to them, instead of one out of a discrete set of labels
as with desirability for random variables. Attaching more than one value
could be useful, for example, when we do not know whether the lottery
numbers are drawn with or without replacement; one just attaches a
value for each of these two cases.
A value attached to some event to indicate the likelihood of its occur-
rence is usually called a probability of this event. Given a set of events E ,
a probability can be seen as a function in E → R. Typical examples of
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probabilities are betting rates and the relative frequency of different
causes of death.
Similarly, a value attached to some random variable that gives some
kind of estimate for its expected realization, is called an expectation of
this random variable. Given a set of random variablesK , an expectation
is seen as a function in K → R. Examples are acceptable buying or
selling prices for lottery tickets and the design height of dikes.
The term prevision is usually – and in this thesis – used as a synonym De Finetti [a]
and Walley []




for expectation; we, moreover, let it take up the role of both a probability
and an expectation. As events (in E ) can be seen as special random
variables (inK ), a prevision is a function inK ∪E →Rwhose value in
some event is defined by its value in the corresponding random variable.
Whenever a possibility space Ω can be identified, the prevision of
some subset or element of Ω is defined by the prevision in the corre-
sponding indicator. Given a set of functionsK :⊆LΩ, we can enlarge it
with the sets and elements corresponding to the included indicators to
define
K ? :=K ∪ {B :⊆Ω | I B ∈K }∪ {ω :Ω | Iω ∈K }. (.)
For example,LΩ
? =LΩ∪℘Ω∪Ω andIΩ? =IΩ∪℘Ω∪Ω.
The predicate ind:(K ?→R)→B that checks whether the prevision
of some indicator is the prevision of the corresponding subset (or ele-
ment) of Ω, is defined by (let P :K ?→R)
indP ⇔
{
∀B :℘Ω∩K ? ; PB = P I B
∀ω :Ω∩K ? ; Pω= P Iω. (.)
This predicate allows us to introduce the often-used function that gener-
ates the set of all previsions from a set of functions; to wit,
PK := (K ?→R)ind (.)
defines the set of all previsions onK .
We will not encounter ind again, but it provides a first example of
what we do multiple times later on: use predicates to introduce proper-
ties and give definitions.
.. Meaning & measurement
Above, we have used the words ‘probable’, ‘expect’, and ‘likelihood’ in-
formally. This is sufficient for a first introduction of some concepts, but
it is insufficient for building normative uncertainty models. We need to
give a meaning (or interpretation) to the structure added to the sets of
events and random variables or to the labels added to its elements. This
meaning
(i) guides the formulation of the calculation rules,
 Modeling uncertainty
(ii) guides the specification of what constitutes a reasonable uncer-
tainty model, and
(iii) allows us to provide interpretable results.
We also need compatible measurement approaches for obtaining an
uncertainty model, i.e., such a structure or such labels.
There is no uniquely accepted interpretation attached to uncertainty




ent requirements. Competing with the vast literature on this subject is
not an aim of this thesis. Let it suffice to say that one interpretation is
used, but our results might still be compatible with others.
This interpretation is based on the one advanced by Walley []. My
reading of it, influenced by my supervisor, other colleagues & de Finetti
[b] and colored by personal nuance, is the following:
• Uncertainty is all in the mind: We model an abstract degree of belief of
the concerned parties, which is based on the knowledge about what
is modeled; therefore, the uncertainty model is (inter)subjective and
epistemic. Things regarded as empirical fact do not have a special
status, but are directly assimilated; there is no need for a separate
aleatory uncertainty model.
• Uncertainty is handled with reason: Rationality criteria that define
what constitutes a reasonable model must be agreed upon by the
concerned parties (both universal criteria, e.g., avoiding sure loss, and
problem-specific assumptions, e.g., exchangeability).
• Models are evidence-based: Influences that go beyond the rationality
criteria should be based on evidence (e.g., the composition of a sam-
ple). Assumptions based on mathematical convenience and arbitrary
choice inevitably also play a role, but should of course be identified as
such.
• Behavior is revealing and prescribeable: The abstract degree of belief
is reflected in the behavior of the concerned parties (as a whole). Fur-
thermore, behavior implied by the uncertainty model can be followed
(and should be, if the model is taken seriously).
The second and third point could have been omitted, as they are in-
directly implied by the first. Their importance lies in the creation of a
mental framework: They concern the partitioning of beliefs into particu-
lar types (belief about what is reasonable, about what is evidence, and
about acceptable simplifications). These types of belief are represented
and used in different ways, with the common goal of solving problems
involving uncertainty in a structured way. In the end, the concerned
parties must judge whether the theory and the resulting models are ac-
ceptable. For them to be able to do this, all assumptions made must be
explicitly stated.
The measurement approaches advanced in this thesis are all some
form of assessment, i.e., construction from samples using a partly arbi-
. Formalizing uncertainty 
trary inference model. The arbitrariness could be reduced by addition-
ally using a second measurement approach, elicitation, i.e., observing
behavior (such as choices and assertions made).
.. Betting behavior & utility
The types of behavior influenced by uncertainty vary widely, but this
is of little concern to us, as creating a general descriptive model is not
our aim. We limit the scope of our normative model to a manageable
size by only considering behavior related to dealing with gambles (i.e.,
accepting, rejecting, buying, and selling them).
The prototypical example is modeling the uncertainty involved in
a lottery using different lottery tickets: As we have already seen, prefer-
ences between them can be declared, they can be labeled as desirable or
not, and acceptable buying and selling prices for them can be specified.
The problems falling within our scope are those that can be (abstractly)
reframed as some kind of lottery using some kind of gambles.






seminal sketch of a
theory of lower and
upper probabilities.
pressed in some precise and linear utility. Roughly, this means that, for
the concerned parties, there is no doubt about the value of some reward
and that getting the same reward twice is twice as useful as getting it
once. This is a simplifying assumption made to reduce model complex-
ity; it limits the use of the uncertainty model to problems for which linear
precise utility is an acceptable approximation.
.. Lower and upper probabilities & previsions
In this thesis, the uncertainty models we mainly use are previsions and
probabilities. We now introduce these two concepts in terms of betting
behavior.
When using events, the betting framework can be used if their oc- The betting rate is
the proportion of
the amount that
can be lost to the
amount that can be
won (the stake).
currence can be verified at some point. Uncertainty models are then
defined by thinking in terms of betting on or against the occurrence of an
event. The supremum acceptable betting rate for an event is called the
lower probability of this event. The upper probability of an event is one
minus the supremum acceptable betting rate against this event. Higher
supremum betting rates on an event imply more of a commitment.
When using random variables, the framework can be used if the ac-
tual realization of the random variables can be observed. Within the
framework, random variables are seen as gambles, and their realization
as the reward (either winnings or losses) for the owner. The supremum
acceptable buying price for obtaining a gamble is called its lower previ-
sion, the infimum acceptable selling price its upper prevision. Higher
supremum buying prices and lower infimum selling prices for a gamble
imply more of a commitment.
 Modeling uncertainty
Recall that events can be seen as a special type of random variables;
thus bets can be seen as a special type of gambles. Therefore, probabili-
ties are seen as restricted previsions.
Following Walley [], random variables that are bounded real-
valued functions whose values are interpreted as rewards are from now
on called gambles, a constant reminder of the framework we are working
in. Consider a possibility space Ω. As the theory will from this point
onward be worked out in terms of gambles, the notationK will from now
on be used to refer to a set of gambles only. Similarly,LΩ will be used
to refer to the set of all gambles on Ω only: let bnd be the boundednessIllustrating the
boundedness predi-
cate: bndsin = 1,
bndtan = 0.
predicate, then
LΩ := (Ω→R)bnd, (.)
It is a linear space for pointwise addition and (real) scalar multiplication;
we endow it with the supremum-norm topology (also called the topology
of uniform convergence).
The uncertainty models we specify in terms of previsions of gamblesWalley [, §.
and §.] elab-





can be equivalently specified using preference orders of gambles or as
sets of desirable gambles. The latter type of model is in fact used in
the next section as the basis for the definition for previsions and their
rationality criteria.
. Rationality & its consequences





but stayed silent about the actual criteria we impose. The values of
previsions are as of yet unrestricted. I can still unabashedly state that
my lower and upper probability for a white Christmas are respectively 3
and −1. Such nonsense, you must agree, has to stop here, in this section.
.. Desirability
We first formally introduce the uncertainty model using sets of desirableApart from the





gambles and the associated rationality criteria. This serves as a basis for
the definition of an almost equivalent uncertainty model consisting of
lower and upper previsions and their rationality criteria. We take this
route, because the rationality criteria of the former model are easier to
formulate and justify.
We consider a possibility space Ω and the corresponding setLΩ of







When is a gamble f onΩ desirable or not? Informally, it is desirable when
we expect it to bring us positive winnings; it is not desirable if this is not
the case.
It would therefore be very reasonable to consider gambles that can
yield a positive reward without ever resulting in a negative reward to
. Rationality & its consequences 
be desirable; similarly, it is reasonable to consider gambles that might
yield a negative reward without ever giving a positive reward not to be









sup{ f }> 0
inf{ f }≥ 0 ⇒ f ∈R, (.)
Avoiding partial loss:
{
inf{ f }< 0
sup{ f }≤ 0 ⇒ f ∉R. (.)
If, in these two criteria, we replace the nonstrict inequalities by strict
ones, we get the criteria for accepting sure gains and avoiding sure loss.
The criteria above hold independently of the uncertainty that we
want to model. Any other gamble might or might not be desirable. How-
ever, the fact that we use precise, linear utility does imply two more
rationality criteria. First, if a gamble is desirable, i.e., is expected to give
a positive reward, then multiples and fractions of this gamble are also
desirable. Secondly, if two gambles are expected to give a positive reward,
then their sum is also desirable. So our assumptions about the utility
used results in the following requirements: (let f , g : (LΩ)2 and λ :R>0)
Positive scaling: f ∈R ⇒ λ · f ∈R, (.)
Addition: f , g ∈R2 ⇒ f + g ∈R. (.)
A coherent set of desirable gamblesR :⊂LΩ is one that satisfies all
four rationality criteria (.)–(.); it is a convex cone that contains all
nonnegative, nonzero gambles.
Any partially specified set of desirable gamblesD :⊆LΩ can be ex-
tended by using (.) – i.e., making sure (LΩ)≥0∧6=0 is included – and (.)–
(.) – i.e., taking the positive linear hull. This so-called procedure of
natural extension can be seen as a form of deductive reasoning: from
an explicitly given set of desirable gambles, we can use our rationality
criteria to deduce which other gambles are implicitly desirable. It results Introducing the
finite subset rela-
tion: {2,3,5} ⊆⊂ N,
;⊆⊂LΩ.
in a set of desirable gambles
RD :=
{∑
f :D′λ f · f
∣∣∣D′ :⊆⊂D∪ (LΩ)≥0∧6=0∧.D′ 6= ; ;λ : (R>0)D′}, (.)
which is called the natural extension ofD.
Any set of desirable gamblesD :⊆LΩ with a natural extension that
contains gambles violating (.) incurs a partial loss; such D are un-





some gamble in the natural extension leads to a sure loss – (.), but with
strict inequalities –, the natural extension is even the whole ofLΩ!
However, any set of desirable gamblesD :⊆LΩ for which all gambles






The part of the border of a set of desirable gambles consisting of














f − sup{α :R | f −α ∈D} ∣∣ f :D}
= { f − sup{α :R>0 | f −α ∈D} ∣∣ f :D}. (.)
Note that a marginally desirable gamble is not necessarily desirable. The
zero gamble (Ω ; 0) is always marginally desirable for any coherent set of
desirable gambles.
In the next few subsections, we start from what we have learned here
to formally introduce lower and upper previsions and their rationality
criteria.
.. From desirable gambles to lower and upper previsions
We have already mentioned the interpretation we give to lower previ-
sions P :PLΩ and upper previsions P :PLΩ in §..: The lower pre-
vision P f of a gamble f on Ω is its (finite) supremum acceptable buying
price and the upper prevision P f of the gamble f its (finite) infimum
acceptable selling price.
A buying price α :R for the gamble f is considered acceptable when
the gamble resulting from the transaction f −α is desirable; similarly,
a selling price β :R is considered acceptable when the gamble resulting
from the transaction β− f is desirable. So consider a set of desirable





P f := sup{α :R | f −α ∈R}, (.)
P f := inf{β :R |β− f ∈R}. (.)
Due to the use of suprema and infima in these definitions, the resulting
lower and upper prevision is unaffected by whether marginally desirable
gambles are desirable or not. So there is a loss of information when
going from sets of desirable gambles to previsions. Note that to ensure
finiteness of the prices,Rmust have a natural extension that avoids sure
loss.
We see from (.) and (.) that lower and upper previsions are
related; as an immediate consequence of their definition they satisfy
Conjugacy: P (− f )=−P f . (.)
Linearity of utility is at the basis of this relation. The upper prevision of
every gamble can be expressed using a lower prevision. Therefore, we can
limit ourselves to working out the theory in terms of lower previsions
only; we do use upper previsions when convenient notation-wise or
interpretation-wise.
. Rationality & its consequences 
The conjugacy relation for probabilities differs slightly. Consider an
event A of Ω; whenever P (1+•)= 1+P• holds, we can write
Conjugacy for probabilities: P (Ω\ A)= 1−P A. (.)
Imposing conjugacy still does not invalidate the nonsense uttered in
this section’s introduction. For one thing, requiring a lower prevision to
be dominated by its conjugate – i.e., P ≤ P – seems reasonable. This is a
consequence of avoiding sure loss, the subject of §...
But before we can get going with that, we first need a suitable (sort of)
converse to (.): how to go from a lower prevision to desirable gambles?
Let us rewrite (.) to see what options we have: (GR :⊆LΩ is the set of




P f := sup{α :R | ∃g :R ; f −α= g } (.)
= sup{α :R | ∃g :R ; f −α≥ g } (.)
= sup{α :R | ∃g :GR ; f −α≥ g }, (.)
where the respective steps are possible due to the use of suprema. We
see that the resulting lower prevision is completely determined by the
set of marginally desirable gambles, ignoring the details of the actual
borderline behavior.
Now consider a lower prevision P onK , whereK :⊆LΩ is the set If P :PK ,
then P is defined on
−K = {− f | f :K }.
of gambles for which (finite) supremum acceptable buying prices have
been given (a lower prevision does not need to be specified for all gam-
bles). We can then derive the corresponding set of marginally desirable









GP := { f −P f | f :K }. (.)
As seen just above, but also in the second paragraph of this subsec-
tion, it is useful to think in terms of transactions: buying or selling a
gamble for a certain price. Transactions generally play an important role.
Therefore, we introduce the so-called marginal gamble: the net result
of buying a gamble for its lower prevision. Given a lower prevision P
on K , the marginal gamble of a gamble is generated by the function
GP :K →LΩ, defined for any gamble f inK by
GP f = f −P f . (.)
We can see that marginal gambles are marginally desirable by defini-
tions (.) and (.).
Finally, as the set of desirable gambles corresponding to the lower
GDP
DP
prevision P , we take the set
DP :=GP +R>0 = {g +α|g :GP ;α :R>0} (.)
of gambles consisting of a marginally desirable gamble plus a strictly pos-
itive amount of utility to create an acceptable deal. Even though it can
 Modeling uncertainty





of sets in a more
restricted context.
bles to desirable gambles can still be seen as a sort of inverse of (.).
We do not claim this to be the only reasonable way to go from a lower
prevision via marginally desirable gambles to desirable gambles; for
example, another option is GP +R>0+ (LΩ)≥0, or even GP + (LΩ)>0 for
finite possibility spaces Ω.
In this and the previous subsection, we have established enough
links between sets of desirable gambles and lower previsions to translate
the concepts of natural extension, avoiding sure loss, and coherence
from the former context to the latter.
.. Natural extension
Consider a set of gamblesK :⊆LΩ and a lower prevision P onK . WeThe main refer-
ence for this sub-
section is Wal-
ley [, §.].
are going to look at what our current judgements – formalized as P –
tell us about the lower prevision of any gamble f inLΩ, i.e., about the
supremum price we are implicitly willing pay for it. When f ∈K , we
correct our current judgements to make them internally consistent; when
f ∉K , we extend our judgements. We use the latter term to generically
refer to both cases.
The procedure of natural extension for lower previsions is derived by
(i) going from the given lower prevision P to the corresponding set of






? (ii) using this set and (.)å to obtain the set of desirable gamblesDP
that correspond to P ,
(iii) applying the procedure of natural extension for sets of desirable
gambles (.) to this setDP to obtain its natural extension
RP :=RDP , (.)
and finally,





ing to the set of desirable gambles RP , resulting in a lower pre-
vision E :PLΩ that is then called the natural extension of P . In
the next subsection, we derive the condition necessary for (.)å,
which ensures thatRP avoids sure loss.
We now derive the formula for calculating the supremum acceptable
buying price for any gamble f on Ω as it is implied by the given lower
prevision P and our rationality criteria (.)–(.). The equations men-
tioned in the enumeration above are used in reverse order, the first two
are (.)å and (.), respectively:To improve read-





E f := sup{α :R ∣∣∃g :RP ; f −α≥ g}
= sup{α :R ∣∣∃D :⊆⊂DP ∪ (LΩ)≥0∧6=0∧.D 6= ;;
∃λ : (R>0)D ; f −α≥∑g :Dλg · g}
. Rationality & its consequences 
the use of the supremum allows us to drop the ‘6= 0’-restriction onLΩ,
which in turn makes the restrictionD 6= ;moot, so
= sup{α :R ∣∣∃D :⊆⊂DP ∪ (LΩ)≥0;∃λ : (R>0)D ; f −α≥∑g :Dλg · g}
now we can ignore gambles in (LΩ)≥0 because the zero gamble is in-
cluded with the caseD :=;:
= sup{α :R ∣∣∃D :⊆⊂DP ; ∃λ : (R>0)D ; f −α≥∑g :Dλg · g}
because of (.) and the use of the supremum, we can replace DP
by GP ; subsequently, we can apply (.):
= sup{α :R ∣∣∃D :⊆⊂GP ; ∃λ : (R>0)D ; f −α≥∑g :Dλg · g}
= sup{α :R ∣∣∃D :⊆⊂K ; ∃λ : (R>0)D ; f −α≥∑g :Dλg ·GP g}.
We use the last formula – rewritten and reformatted a bit – to in-
troduce the least committal extension function, which maps a lower
prevision P on K on whatever domain K :⊆LΩ to its natural exten-










∣∣∣∃N :⊆⊂K ;∣∣∣∃λ : (R>0)N ;
f −α≥∑g :N λg ·GP g}.
(.)
Its name’s origin is clarified later on in §.., where we put it next
to other possible extensions. Consider some gamble f inK , by taking
N := ı f and λ f := 1, we see that only upward, nonnegative, corrections
are possible.
We now have a way to extend any set of prices (specified by P onK )
to prices for all gambles. These latter prices are only reasonable when-
ever P is a reasonable uncertainty model; what this means is what we
are going to look at next.
.. Avoiding sure loss




loss are unreasonable uncertainty models. This corresponded to their
natural extension containing nonzero gambles in the nonpositive or-
thant (LΩ)≤0. The interior of this orthant contains gambles leading to a
sure loss, its border contains gambles leading to a partial loss that is not
sure.
For a lower prevision P onK , the corresponding sets of (marginally)
desirable gambles GP ,DP , andRP defined by (.), (.), and (.)
are the ones to look at. Formally, they incur a partial loss or a sure loss, if
 Modeling uncertainty
respectively (cf. (.))
∃g :RP ; inf{g }< 0∧ sup{g }≤ 0, or ∃g :RP ; sup{g }< 0. (.)
By taking their converse and doing some rewriting and reformatting (in
the spirit of the derivation of (.)å, which we shall from now on call
back-expanding), we can obtain expressions for avoiding sure or partial
loss more explicitly in terms of P andK . One step in the derivation of
the criterion for avoiding partial loss is important; to wit, the equivalence
of
∀D :⊆⊂GP +R>0;∃λ : (R>0)D ;inf
{∑
g :Dλg · g
}≥ 0∨sup{∑g :Dλg · g}> 0
and
∀D :⊆⊂GP ; ∃λ : (R>0)D ; sup
{∑
g :Dλg · g
}≥ 0.
The last of these expressions is also encountered in the derivation of the
criterion for avoiding sure loss. This means that for (sets of desirable
gambles corresponding to) lower previsions, the concepts of avoiding
partial loss coincides with the concept of avoiding sure loss. This is not
surprising, as the difference between both concepts lies in borderline be-
havior, which previsions ignore (cf. (.) and below). So for previsions
this unique concept of avoiding sure loss is formalized by introducing a
predicate asl :PK →B:
aslP ⇔∀N :⊆⊂K ;
∀λ : (R>0)N ;
sup
{∑
g :N λg ·GP g
}≥ 0. (.)
The set of lower previsions that avoid sure loss is then written (PK )asl.
As the natural extension of a set of desirable gambles that incurs a
sure loss is the setLΩ, the condition above is necessary for letting the
natural extension of P differ from +∞, an unreasonable buying price in
any case for any gamble.
Consider a lower prevision P onK that avoids sure loss; important
consequences of this property are: (let f :K )Walley [,
§..] mentions
a large number of
consequences of
avoiding sure loss.
Avoiding sure loss: P f ≤ sup{ f }, (.)
Upper dominates lower: − f ∈K ⇒ P f ≤−P (− f )= P f . (.)
These are derived from (.) with specific choices forN and λ.
To finish this discussion, let us return to this section’s introduction:
My lower probability for a white Christmas must – if I want to avoid
sure loss – be smaller than my upper probability, which in turn must
not exceed 1. So I now choose them to be −1 and 1, respectively. These
are still patently inconsistent choices and must be corrected. In this
. Rationality & its consequences 
subsection we have derived the criterion for lower previsions that, if
satisfied, ensures that an uncertainty model can be corrected (made
consistent) or extended to a model that specifies prices that are nowhere
infinite. In the next section, we take a better look at what this consistency
is and how it can be guaranteed.
.. Coherence




have to be corrected, satisfies a form of internal consistency. Formally, a
lower prevision P onPK is invariant under natural extension whenever
it holds for all f inK that P f = lceP f . This criterion can be reformu-
lated; we respectively start by writing its double negation and recalling
that only upwards corrections are possible:
¬(P f 6= lceP f )⇔¬(P f < lceP f )
we next apply the definition of lceP (see somewhat above (.)) and
reformulate the result:
⇔¬(P f < sup{α :R | ∃g :RP ; f −α≥ g })
⇔¬(∃α :R ; P f <α∧ (∃g :RP ; f −α≥ g ))
we continue by grouping the quantifiers, pulling the negation through
them, and subsequently spotting the (material) implication:
⇔∀g :RP ;∀α :R ; P f ≥α∨¬( f −α≥ g )
⇔∀g :RP ;∀α :R ; f −α≥ g ⇒ P f ≥α
now we replace the pointwise inequality by a plain one using an infimum;
after some more rewriting we finish by spotting the marginal gamble:
⇔∀g :RP ;∀α :R ;α≤ inf{ f − g }⇒α≤ P f
⇔∀g :RP ; inf{ f − g }≤ P f
⇔∀g :RP ; sup{g −GP f }≥ 0.
Whenever a lower prevision both avoids sure loss and satisfies the cri-
terion above, it is called coherent; the rationality criterion corresponding
to this case is formalized using the predicate coh:PK →Bwith
cohP ⇔ aslP ∧∀ f :K ;
∀N :⊆⊂K 6= f ;
∀λ : (R>0)N ;
sup
{∑




which is obtained after some back-expansion. Note that we can work
withK 6= f instead ofK because P avoids sure loss. The set of coherent
lower previsions is written as (PK )coh.
We have already assumed that it is reasonable to require any lower
prevision to avoid sure loss. On top of that, we assume that it is also
reasonable to require all lower previsions to be coherent, i.e., internally
consistent in the sense that, for no gamble whatsoever, the supremum
buying price can be corrected upwards. In fact, for the rest of this thesis,
coherence is the strongest universal requirement. For specific problems,
when evidence is available or reasonable assumptions can be made,
criteria based on this can be used to further restrict the set of lower
previsions that are considered an acceptable uncertainty model for the
problem at hand.
Now consider a coherent lower prevision P onK ; three important
consequences of this property are: (let f , g :K 2 and λ :R≥0)
Accepting sure gains: P f ≥ inf{ f }, (.)
Nonnegative homogeneity: λ · f ∈K ⇒ P (λ · f )=λ ·P f , (.)
Superadditivity: f + g ∈K ⇒ P ( f + g )≥ P f +P g . (.)
They can be derived from (.)å with appropriate choices for f ,N ,
and λ. Their importance is mainly due to the fact that these properties
are equivalent to coherence (.)å onK that are linear spaces, such
as LΩ. (Many definitions simplify when K has a special structure.)
Note that positive homogeneity and superadditivity combine into (let
additionally µ :R≥0)
Superlinearity:
λ · f +µ · g ∈K ⇒ P (λ · f +µ · g )≥λ ·P f +µ ·P g . (.)
Upper previsions that are conjugate to a coherent lower prevision have
similar properties; most notably, they are sublinear: (.), but with P
replaced by P and the inequality reversed.
Other consequences are: (now let µ :R)Walley [,
§..] mentions
a large number of
consequences of
coherence.
Monotonicity: f ≤ g ⇒ P f ≤ P g , (.)
Normedness: (Ω ;µ) ∈K ⇒ P (Ω ;µ)=µ, (.)
Constant additivity: f +µ ∈K ⇒ P ( f +µ)= P f +µ, (.)
Mixed subadditivity: ( f + g ,−g ) ∈K 2 ⇒ P ( f + g )≤ P f +P g . (.)
Note that normedness, positive homogeneity, and constant additivity
allow for easy natural extension ofK to constant gambles and gambles
of the form λ · f +µ.
Using natural extension, the lower probability modeling my uncer-
tainty about the occurrence of white Christmases specified at the end of
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the previous subsection is corrected from−1 to 0; the upper probability 1
does not change. This results in the pair 0,1 of coherent lower and up-
per probabilities: they do not imply any commitment whatsoever about
taking or not taking a bet on this issue. By coincidence (honestly), this
pair is an example of an interesting type of coherent lower previsions:
the vacuous ones.
Vacuous lower previsions imply a total lack of commitment and thus
model complete ignorance. Given a set of gamblesK , the vacuous lower
prevision is defined by
PΩ := f :K ; inf{ f }. (.)
More generally, we can also model ignorance relative to some nonempty
subset A of the possibility space Ω:
P A := f :K ; inf{ f A}. (.)
Use such a model to express that the only thing you know (believe) is
that the event A will occur. A peculiar subset of these – the vacuous lower
previsions relative to singletons, called degenerate previsions – actually
model a lack of ignorance; let ω :Ω, then
Pω := f :K ; f ω; (.)
it models an absolute conviction that ω will occur.
Now that we have translated all the concepts introduced for sets of
desirable gambles to the context of lower previsions, we illustrate these
concepts with a concrete example in the next subsection.
.. An example: extending a moment
Consider a problem where the possibility space is the unit interval, Miranda et al. [,
, b,a] re-








in other words, let Ω := [0,1]. Assume that only the k-th raw moment
mk : ]0,1[ is known, where k is a nonzero natural number. We wish to
know what this tells us about the other raw moments. (So we only extend
to part of all possible gambles.)
The information we have about the problem can be modeled by
(i) a set of gamblesK := {vk ,−vk },
where vα :=ω :Ω ;ωα for any nonnegative real number α,
(ii) a so-called self-conjugate lower prevision P onK
with P vk =mk and P vk =−P (−vk )=mk .
The information we have about the other raw moments can then be
made explicit by extending P to all gambles ±v` (where ` :N) using the
procedure of natural extension. (Readers less interested in the technical
details of the derivation can jump to the discussion of the results just
below (.).)
First, we show that P avoids sure loss; for this problem, (.) can
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be rewritten as
aslP ⇔∀λ,µ : (R≥0)2 ; sup
{
λ · (vk −mk )+µ · (−vk +mk )
}≥ 0
⇔∀ν :R ; sup{ν · (vk −mk )}≥ 0, (.)
which holds for ν ≥ 0 as vk 1 = 1 and for ν ≤ 0 as vk 0 = 0. So P can be
extended to a coherent lower prevision E on {±vn |n :N}.
Do we actually need to correct P , i.e., is it a coherent lower prevision




∀λ :R>0 ; sup
{
λ · (−vk +mk )− (vk −mk )
}≥ 0
∀µ :R>0 ; sup
{




∀λ :R>0 ; sup
{−(λ+1) · (vk −mk )}≥ 0
∀µ :R>0 ; sup
{
(µ+1) · (vk −mk )
}≥ 0, (.)
which holds for the λ-case as vk 0= 0 and for the µ-case as vk 1= 1. So P
is coherent, which means that E vk := P vk = mk and E vk := P vk = mk .
Actually, the condition (.) for coherence is equivalent to (.), the
one for avoiding sure loss; this is typical for self-conjugate previsions
(cf. §.. on so-called linear previsions).
There are two other gambles for which calculating the natural ex-
tension is trivial: When considering the case `= 0, we see that v0 is the
constant function IΩ. Therefore, as E is coherent and therefore normed,
this forces E v0 := 1 and E v0 := 1.
To obtain the natural extension for the other gambles of interest, we
are going to use a formula that is equivalent to the formula (.) we
derived in §.. [Walley , §..]: (we use the same notation as
in (.))




f −∑g :N λg ·GP g}∣∣∣N :⊆⊂K ;λ : (R>0)N }.
Taking the specific set of gamblesK we currently consider and the
specific form of the gambles to which we wish to extend into account,
the lower and upper prevision of gambles v` are then defined by
E v` := lceP v` = supµ:R
(
µ ·mk +min{v`−µ · vk }
)
, (.)
E v` :=− lceP (−v`)= infµ:R
(
max{v`+µ · vk }−µ ·mk
)
. (.)
For lceP v`, the right-hand side is 0 when only considering nonposi-
tive µ, for − lceP (−v`), the right-hand side is 1 when only considering
nonnegative µ. So we can rewrite (.) and (.) as
E v` :=max
{





1, infλ:R>0 (λ ·mk +max{v`−λ · vk })
}
. (.)
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A sign analysis of the function wλ := v`−λ · vk and its derivatives
Dwλ and D
2wλ allows us to characterize the functions λ :R>0 ; min{wλ} Illustrating deriva-
tion: Dsin = cos,
D2(x :R ; x2)= 2.
and λ :R>0 ; max{wλ}. This in turn allows us to simplify (.) and (.).
We now treat the cases for which ` is respectively strictly smaller or larger
than k.
For `< k, the somewhat involved analysis is summarized by a sketch
of the function wλ and a table for its minimum and maximum. Impor-
tant quantities in this analysis are the nontrivial zeroes of wλ and its
derivatives:
x0 ω2 ω1 ω0
wλω
0
λ0 λ2 λ1 λ0
min{wλ} wλ0 wλ0 wλ0 wλ1















k−` , (D2wλ)ω2 = 0.
Also important are the threshold values of λ for
which such a zero is equal to 1:
ω0 = 1⇒λ=λ0 := 1,
ω1 = 1⇒λ=λ1 := `k ,
ω2 = 1⇒λ=λ2 := `·(`−1)k·(k−1) .











1, infλ:]0,λ1](λ ·mk +1−λ), infλ:R>λ1 (λ ·mk +wλω1)
}
=min{1,1− `k (1−mk ), (mk ) /`k}
= (mk ) /`k .
(.)
In (.), two steps cannot be verified on sight:
(i) The equality of infλ:R>λ1 (λ ·mk+wλω1) and (mk )
/`k . This infimum,
which is attained inλ :=λ1 · (mk )(l−k)/k , is found with a sign analysis





k−` −λ · ( 1λ · `k ) `k−` .
(ii) That the function h := ` :N≤k ; 1− `k · (1−mk ) dominates the func-
tion g := ` :N≤k ; (mk ) /`k . This can be proven with a sign analysis of







For `> k, similar results hold as the one in the previous case because
of symmetry considerations. These results can be obtained from the
above by replacing the sketch by its negative, switching minimum and
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maximum in the table, and – in the expressions for the zeroes – switch-
ing k and ` and replacing λ by 1/λ. Amongst other things, this results in
a minimum at $1 := (λ · k` )1/`−k . So this gets us the following conclusions
from (.) and (.) for the case `> k:
E v` :=max
{
0,supλ:]0,λ1](λ ·mk +1−λ),supλ:R>λ1 (λ ·mk +wλ$1)
}
=max{0,1− `k (1−mk ), (mk ) /`k}
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(we chose k to be 5 and m5 to be 1/2). The
values E v` are indicated using a downwards-
pointing triangle , and the values E v` by
an upwards-pointing triangle . Notice that
E v0 = E v0 = 1.
Nothing in our analysis depended on `
(or k) being integer-valued. The same results
would be obtained for ` :R≥0, which is why the graph also has curves for
the corresponding values E v` and E v`.
The difference between the lower and upper prevision of a gam-
ble is often called the imprecision. Lower values for lower previsionsImprecision as a
measure of (lack of)
information is not







and higher values for upper previsions indicate less commitment. This
commitment reflects the information available about the gamble under
scrutiny (or at least it should). The imprecision of a gamble can therefore
be seen as a measure for (lack of) the information available about that
gamble. In the plot, we draw attention to the fact that the imprecision
increases as ` moves away from k := 5, by shading the area between the
plots of the functions ` :R≥0 ; E v` and ` :R≥0 ; E v`.
In the next subsection, we show that there are other possible exten-
sions than the natural extension used here. As was the case here, the
concept of commitment will still be used to give an interpretation to
these extensions.
.. Least and maximally committal extensions
Let us return for a while to the land of sets of desirable gambles we first
visited in §... We saw that whenever some set of desirable gam-
bles D :⊆LΩ avoided partial loss, its natural extension – the coher-
ent set of desirable gambles RD (cf. (.)) – took the form of a con-
vex cone containing, apart from the origin, the entire nonnegative or-
thant (LΩ)≥0, but no gamble from the nonpositive orthant (LΩ)≤0. Any
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other convex coneR :⊂LΩ with these properties and containingD is a
coherent extension ofD. R
D
The many cones that are coherent extensions ofD can be partially
ordered; we can identify both a unique smallest cone (contained in all
coherent extensions) and a set of maximal cones (not contained in any
smallestR maximalR maximalR
other extension). These correspond
to the so-called least committal ex-
tension and maximally committal ex-
tensions, respectively. An illustration
is given on the side.
The unique smallest cone corre-
sponds to the already encountered
natural extension (.). We also already encountered the natural ex-
tension of a lower prevision P onK in §.., where we introduced the
least committal extension function lceP , whose name is derived from
an alternative name for natural extension: least committal extension.
This is an apt name, as the natural extension of P assigns the lowest
supremum acceptable buying price one is implicitly committed to when
specifying P .
It is interesting to note that the least committal extension procedure
is transitive [this is implicit in Walley , §..]: Take any two gambles
f and g on Ω and define the lower prevision E onK ∪ ı f by EK 6= f = P
and E f = lceP f , then lceP g = lceE g . This also works, of course, after
extension to multiple gambles.
The maximal cones correspond to the maximally committal exten-
sion procedure, which is named as it is, because it assigns the highest
supremum acceptable buying price that does not result in a sure loss.
For any lower prevision P onK and any gamble f inK , this price is
calculated using the most committal extension function, defined as the
least upper bound of the prices leading to a partial and thus a sure loss
(cf. §..); we start from (.) and add a tentative marginal gamble
for f to the gamble ofRP under scrutiny:
mceP f := inf
{
β :R
∣∣∃g :RP ; inf{g + ( f −β)}< 0∧ sup{g + ( f −β)}≤ 0}
we rewrite the inequalities involving the supremum and infimum by




∣∣∣∃N :⊆⊂K ;∣∣∣∃λ : (R>0)N ; (.)
β− f ≥∑g :N λg ·GP g}.
It is important to note that the maximally committal extension pro-
cedure is not transitive. It assigns the highest reasonable supremum
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buying price consistent with the judgements P and a specific sequence
of gambles to be extended; different sequences can result in different
extended lower previsions. The correct way to apply this procedure is
in a stepwise fashion: Take any two gambles f and g on Ω and in a first
step define E :K ∪ ı f by EK 6= f = P and E f =mceP f , then in the next
step the extension to g must be defined as mceE g .
It follows from (.) and (.)å that mceP f =− lceP (− f ) for any
gamble f on Ω. This implies that mceP is also the function that returns
the natural extension for upper previsions [Walley , §..]; to wit,
let E :PLΩ be the natural extension of P , then, by conjugacy (.),
E f =−E(− f )=− lceP (− f )=mceP f .
As will be justified in §.., maximally committal extension can
also be called extremal extension and any possible extended lower previ-
sion an extremal extension.
Using extremal extension and starting from our choices in the last
paragraph of §.. – the pair −1,1 of lower and upper probabilities
for white Christmases –, we can obtain 1,1 or 0,0 as pairs of lower and
upper probabilities for my uncertainty about the occurrence of white
Christmases. The former pair implies that I should always bet on a white
Christmas happening, the latter that I should always bet against this.
So, we now know there are other extension procedures than natural
or least committal extension. We also know some more details about
one of these procedures, the maximally committal or extremal extension.
The question is: why did we bother to introduce the extremal extension?
The next subsection gives an answer.
.. Linear previsions
In §.., we discovered the coherent lower previsions as the ones thatThe main refer-
ence for this sub-
section is Wal-
ley [, §.].
avoided sure loss and were invariant under natural or least committal
extension. Being naturally curious, we like to find out what the prop-
erties of the lower previsions are that are additionally invariant under
maximally committal extension.
In the previous subsection, we saw that the function used for calcu-
lating the maximally committal extension is actually also the natural
extension function for upper previsions. So a coherent lower prevision
that is invariant under maximally committal extension is at the same
time a coherent upper prevision. It then follows from (.) that this
prevision is self-conjugate (for gambles whose negative is also in the
prevision’s domain). Moreover, this prevision is both superlinear and
sublinear (cf. (.) and below), so it is linear, a property that will also
give it its name.
We cast a very general definition for linear lower previsions from the
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literature [Walley , §..] in the predicate lin:PK →B:




g :N λg ·GP g
}≥ 0. (.)




in the definition of
linear previsions.
is more restrictive than coherence (.) and avoiding sure loss (.).
The set of linear lower previsions is then written as (PK )lin.
Consider a linear lower prevision P onK ; as alluded to in the begin-
ning of this subsection, the most important consequences of linearity
– that are not a consequence of coherence – are (let f , g :K 2)
Self-conjugacy: − f ∈K ⇒ P f =−P (− f ), (.)
Additivity: f + g ∈K ⇒ P ( f + g )= P f +P g . (.)
Note that due to the extra properties of self-conjugacy and additivity,
extension to the linear span ofK is easy. For example, if the possibility
space Ω is finite and Ω⊂ (spanK )?, extension toLΩ is immediate: a
linear lower prevision is then fully specified once it is specified on the
elementary events (cf. (.) for the meaning of ‘?’).
Because these lower previsions coincide with their conjugate upper
prevision, we can from now on drop ‘lower’ and just talk about linear
previsions. They can be interpreted as giving a fair price for buying
and selling [de Finetti –]. Also, as in the previous paragraph,
previsions known to be linear are denoted without an underbar.
In §.., we obtained the pairs 0,0 and 1,1 of lower and upper prob-
abilities for my uncertainty about the occurrence of white Christmases
as the two possible results of the extremal correction (and extension)
procedure. By coincidence, both pairs are degenerate previsions, which
themselves are also always linear – epitomized by the prescient lack of
an underbar in their definition (.).
Having landed at the end of this subsection, one could wonder why
so much attention is being paid to linear previsions, as linearity is not
a rationality criterion. Linear previsions, with their attractive mathe-
matical properties, are – possibly in a different guise –, in a large part
of the literature, the only uncertainty models considered. This thesis
positions itself in another part of the literature, which tries to avoid im-
plicit assumptions (that support the central role of linear previsions) and
where a different balance is struck between mathematical complexity
and modeling power. However, linear previsions still have a role to play,
thanks to their mathematical properties and usefulness as part of an
alternative representation of the information contained in a coherent
lower prevision. This is the subject of the next subsection.
 Modeling uncertainty
.. Credal sets








of gambles K :⊆LΩ. We always choose the supremum-norm topol-
ogy on K and the topology of pointwise convergence on PK . (For
finite Ω, both are equivalent to the Euclidean or metric topologies.)
These choices, and (the ideas behind) the convexity and convergence
theorems of Walley [, §..–], when applied to the definitions of
avoiding sure loss (.), coherence (.), and linearity (.)å show
that (PK )asl, (PK )coh, and (PK )lin are closed convex sets.
Now, starting from a lower prevision P onK that avoids sure loss, the
ideas mentioned above show that the set of all linear previsions that dom-
inate P is closed and convex, which can even be shown to be compact




leads to the introduction of the function M : (PK )asl →℘(PLΩ)lin
that generates credal sets:
MP = {P : (PLΩ)lin |PK ≥ P}. (.)
Let f be any gamble inK , then Walley [, §.. and §..]
provides us with a sort of converse of the equation above under the form
of a lower envelope theorem:
lceP f =minP :MP P f
=minP :ext(MP )P f ,
(.)
where ext is the function that extracts, from a compact convex set, theIllustrating the
extractor of extreme
points: ext[0,1]=B.
set of extreme points, of which convex mixtures (and limits thereof)
can be used to define every element of the compact convex set. For
coherent previsions P on K we get a real converse to (.), as then
lceP f = P f for all f [Walley , §.. and §..]. This one-to-one
relationship between (the extreme points of) credal sets and coherent
lower previsions means that they can be used as equivalent uncertainty
models.
The extreme points of the credal set are, at least for finite possibility
spaces, the previsions resulting from extremal extension. This is so by
construction: To calculate an extremal extension, apply the maximally
committal extension procedure (cf. §..) to all the indicators of ele-
mentary events in some well-defined sequence and then use linearity
to further calculate the extension to all gambles. Now, let E : (PLΩ)lin
be an extremal extension of P and let ω and $ be the first two of its
defining sequence of elementary events in Ω. Then Eω=maxP :MP Pω;
if E is not the unique such extension with this property, then we can use
E$=maxP :MP∧. Pω=EωP$, and so forth.
Working with coherent lower previsions through their credal set is
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not only mathematically useful: For finite possibility spacesΩ, graphical
illustrations can be based on this correspondence. We have already seen
that linear previsions defined on a domain that includes all elementary
events are then fully defined by the values they take in these elementary
events. So assume Ω is finite; any linear prevision P on LΩ can then
be represented by PΩ, a point of R|Ω|. However, not all points of R|Ω|
represent linear previsions; the set of all linear previsions satisfies the
following additional restrictions:
(i) avoiding sure loss (.) implies PΩ ≤ 1,
(ii) accepting sure gains (.) implies PΩ ≥ 0,
(iii) additivity (.) and normedness (.) imply
∑
PΩ = P (IΩ)= 1.
So for any finite possibility space Ω, the set of all linear previsions is
represented by the so-called (|Ω|−1)-dimensional unit simplex
∆Ω := {q :Ω→ [0,1] |∑q = 1}. (.)




terior), and for |Ω| = 4 a tetrahedron (a three-dimensional figure in a
four-dimensional space whose axes we cannot visualize). Note that the
unit simplex is also useful to define the vector of coefficients for a convex
mixture.
Like the set of linear previsions that it represents, the unit simplex is a
bounded closed convex set. Its extreme points represent the degenerate
previsions. As these are the extreme points of the set of all linear previ-
sions for finite possibility spaces [Walley , §..], we can identify
the unit simplex (and its elements) with the set of linear previsions (and
its elements) for all intents and purposes.
We have already seen in §.. that the higher a lower prevision of a
gamble, the bigger the implied commitment. Whenever the uncertainty
is measured reasonably, the commitments concerning a gamble should
reflect the amount of information available about that gamble. So, a
coherent lower prevision with higher values is a model that reflects more
information. There are less linear previsions that dominate a coherent
lower prevision with higher values, so smaller credal sets reflect more
information.
We now use the unit simplex and credal sets to illustrate that a coher-
ent lower prevision generally contains more information than its restric-









be such that ℘Ω⊂K ?, and let a coherent lower prevision P onK be
defined by its credal setMP , drawn (in gray) in the top unit simplex. In
the unit simplices below, we find the credal sets MP℘Ω and MPΩ of
its restriction to events and elementary events, respectively. As each of
the latter two credal sets encompasses the previous one, P reflects more
information than P℘Ω, which in turn reflects more information than PΩ.
To finish this subsection, we use the unit simplex to illustrate the
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extension procedures described in §.. and §... Again, as |Ω| = 3
is the case best suited for graphical illustrations, let Ω := {a,b,c}. Fur-











Pc ≥ lceP (I c )= 26100
sion P : (PK )asl, defined concurrently by
P {a,b}= 310 ,
Pc = 110 ,
P {a,c}= 710 ,
P (I {b,c}− 15 · I b)= 12 .
Each of these assignments constrains all
of the possible linear extensions P :MP
of P . These four constraints are drawn on
the first simplex shown; the hairs of the
lines representing the constraints point into
the direction of the P that are allowed by
that constraint. On a second simplex, we
have drawn the constraints that result from
applying natural extension; only one con-
straint needed correcting, Pc = 1/10. The
credal setMP that stands in a one-to-one
relation with the resulting coherent lower
prevision is again drawn in gray. Its extreme
points ext(MP ), the linear previsions result-
ing from extremal extension, are indicated
using a little circle .
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consisting of a single lower prevision defined on some gambles on a
given possibility space. In this section, we are going to add lower previ-
sions defined on some gambles on (a possibly transformed) part of this
possibility space to the mix and look at the relationships between both
types of models imposed by rationality.
.. Marginal and induced previsions
The first kind of restricted uncertainty models we look at are the so-
called marginal previsions (the term ‘marginal’ here is in no way related
to marginal or marginally desirable gambles). It is applicable when the
possibility spaceΩ can be written as a cartesian productX×Y of setsX
andY , which are possibility spaces in their own right.
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ble f onX if f˜ = f (or, by explicitly writing out the pointwise extension,
if ∀y :Y ; f˜ (•, y)= f ). Given some set of gambles K :⊆LΩ, the set of
gambles inLX that have a cylindrical extension inK is
KX := { f :LX | ∃ f˜ :K ; f˜ = f }. (.)
Now consider a lower prevision P onK , then itsX -marginal is the
lower prevision R onKX , which is defined for every gamble f inKX by
R f = P f˜ . The behavioral interpretation is that a desirable gamble which
remains constant under the variation of some possibly influencing factor
remains desirable when this factor is not considered.
When P avoids sure loss or is coherent, then this property is inherited
by R. This is so because
(i) if the corresponding criteria (.) or (.) hold for P (defined
onK ), then they also hold for its restriction to the set of cylindrical
extensions { f˜ :K | ∃ f :KX ; f˜ = f }, and thus
(ii) the criteria also hold for R, as cylindrical extension is a linear,
constant additive operation and also supremum-preserving, i.e.,
sup{g } = sup{g˜ } by construction for any gamble g on X and its
cylindrical extension g˜ onX ×Y .
The idea behind marginalization can be generalized: notice that the
central element above was a way to associate a gamble inLZ – whereZ
is some set (above, this is X ) – with a gamble in LΩ (above, this is
cylindrical extension). So consider a lower prevision P onK and a func-
tionΓ :LZ →LΩ, then the induced lower prevision Q onKZ is defined
for every gamble f inKZ by Q f = P (Γ f ), where
KZ := { f :LZ |Γ f ∈K } (.)
is the set of gambles onZ with an associated gamble inK . When the
function Γ is linear, constant additive, and supremum-preserving (as
was the case for cylindrical extension), this is sufficient for the properties
of avoiding sure loss and coherence to be inherited.
The parallels between marginal previsions and induced previsions
are strongest whenΓ is defined by a surjective mapϕ :Ω→Z , i.e., when
the set Z is isomorphic to a partition of Ω. Then for each gamble f Illustrating func-
tion composition:
lnR>0 ◦expR = idR.
inLZ we have Γ f := f ◦ϕ. We then also give the name marginal previ-
sion to Q and the restriction of P to the set {Γ f | f :KZ } of gambles that
are constant on the events in the induced partition.
The following points are noteworthy about this last case:
(i) Being defined by a surjective map ϕ, Γ is linear, constant additive,
and supremum-preserving, so avoiding sure loss and coherence
are automatically preserved.
(ii) Whenϕ is the projection fromX ×Y toX ,Γ becomes cylindrical
extension and we find back the case that opened this subsection.
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(iii) Take A :⊆Z , then ΓI A = Iϕ−1 A , where ϕ−1 A is the inverse imageThe map
ϕ−1 :℘Z →℘Ω
is defined for every
A :⊆Z by ϕ−1 A =
{ω :Ω |ϕω ∈ A}.
of A in Ω, then Q A = P (ϕ−1 A), an expression quite often seen in
the literature [see, e.g., Burrill , §-].
Conceptually, marginal (and induced) previsions are relatively simple
when compared to conditional previsions, the next type of restricted
uncertainty models we are going to take a look at.
.. Contingent, updated & conditional lower previsions
Consider a possibility space Ω. In many situations uncertainty models
relative to some nonempty conditioning event B of Ω – where B takes
the role of Ω – are useful, be it because these may be easier to assess or
necessary in the analysis of the problem at hand.
Our workhorse uncertainty model is the prevision, so consider a
lower prevision P (•|B) defined on the set of gamblesKB :⊆L B . (Note
the explicitly different notation.) It is called either a contingent or an up-
dated lower prevision, depending on what it models. The former refers
to current commitments contingent on the event B happening, the latter
to current commitments for the situation where it has become clear
– due to some observation – that B has happened (but nothing more spe-
cific is learned). Contingent previsions say nothing about buying prices
contingent on B not happening; this is formalized by specifying a price
of 0 for the zero gamble on Ω \ B , i.e., by trivial extension (cf. §..)
of marginal gambles from B to Ω, as we will see later on in this subsec-
tion. We assume that contingent and updated commitments coincide
[Walley , §.., the updating principle]; we use the term updated
prevision generically for both from now on.
The interpretation given to an updated prevision – current commit-
ments for the situation after the observation of the occurrence of an
event – makes it natural to consider sets of updated lower previsions
whose corresponding observed events form a partitionB :⊆℘Ω of the
possibility space: Any experiment that allows us to observe the occur-
rence of some event immediately reveals the nonoccurrence of its com-
plement; finer partitions can be obtained by chaining such experiments
or performing other, more discriminatory types of experiments.
We do not give a direct treatment of infinite partitions and its many
pitfalls. When they are needed, we obtain them – in Jaynesian [,
§B.] fashion – using limit arguments.
A set {P (•|B) |B :B} of updated lower previsions and its associated
set of gambles
K := { f :LΩ |∀B :B ; fB ∈KB } (.)
allow us to introduce the conditional lower prevision P (•|B) :K ?→LΩ,
which is defined for every gamble f inK by
P ( f |B)=∑B :BP ( f |B) · I B , (.)
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where we used the notational convention P ( f |B)= P ( fB |B). Note that
the definition of a conditional lower prevision preserves the conjugacy
of the defining (updated) lower previsions, so we can also talk about
the conjugate conditional upper prevision P (•|B) defined on −K . Also
note that an evaluated conditional lower prevision such as P ( f |B) is a
gamble; we say that it is generated from f by P (•|B).
The conditional lower prevision P (•|B) generates gambles that are
constant on the elements of the partitionB. Such gambles are called
B-measurable and formalized by the predicate B-msr:LΩ→B, de-
fined for every gamble f on Ω by
B-msr f ⇔∀B :B ;∃αB :R ; fB =αB (.)
⇔∀B :B ;∀(ω,$) : B 2 ; f ω= f $.
A so-called unconditional lower prevision P onK , where we now
take K :⊆LΩ, can also be looked at as an updated lower prevision
for the trivial conditioning event Ω. The corresponding conditional
lower prevision P (•|ıΩ) :K ?→LΩ generates constant functions, i.e.,
P ( f |ıΩ)= P ( f |Ω)= P f for every f inK .
Conditional lower previsions such as P (•|B) are used as an inter-
mediate between sets of updated lower previsions and sets of desir-
able gambles. Recall that in §.. we used marginal gambles to con-
struct a set of marginally desirable gambles corresponding to a given
lower prevision. We are going to do something very similar for condi- Illustration
withΩ := A∪B ,
B := {A,B},
and C := {a,b},
the set we project
on for visualization
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tional previsions: with each of the updated lower previsions present
in a conditional prevision we can associate a set of marginally desir-
able (marginal) gambles, by patching these together as we did with the
gambles in each of theKB to obtainK , we obtain a set of marginal gam-
bles for the conditional prevision. So what we need to do is generalize
definition (.) to conditional previsions: Given a conditional lower
prevision P (•|B) :K ?→LΩ, the marginal gambles are generated by
the function GP (•|B) :K → (LΩ)B-msr, defined for every gamble f inK
by
GP (•|B) f = f −P ( f |B). (.)
The marginal gambles resulting from this generalized definition are
marginally desirable:
(i) conceptually, because whichever event B in the partitionB occurs,
the restricted gamble (GP (•|B) f )B is a marginally desirable gamble,
as it is identical to the marginal gamble GP (•|B) fB ;
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Ω = f −
∑
B :BP ( f |B) · I B
of marginally desirable gambles (note the use of trivial extension
to go from B to Ω).
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These marginally desirable gambles form the set
GP (•|B) := {GP (•|B) f | f :K }. (.)
Our basis is now strong enough to discuss, in the next two subsec-
tions,
(i) how to derive updated previsions from unconditional ones, and
(ii) the rationality criteria we need when working with both condi-
tional and unconditional previsions.
.. Natural & regular extension to updated previsions
In the previous section, when we introduced natural extension or some
rationality criterion for previsions, we did so by translating things to
the language of sets of desirable gambles, then using its simple rules
(cf. §..), and afterwards going back to the language of previsions.
Here, we are going to do the same to find out how to extend an uncer-
tainty model to updated previsions.
But first we need to introduce, for arbitrary sets of gamblesF :⊆LΩ
and for any event C of the possibility space Ω, the contingent set of
gamblesThe support func-
tion: supp f =
{ω :Ω | f ω 6= 0}.
FC := { fC | f :F∧. f · I C = f }= { fC | f :Fsupp•⊆C }, (.)
where Fsupp•⊆C is the set of gambles that reduce to the zero gamble
on Ω\C .
With the definition (.)å of marginal gambles for conditional pre-
visions we have a tool to do the first translation. Going back from some
set of desirable gamblesR :⊆LΩ to an unconditional prevision is done
with (.) or one of its variants. To obtain an updated prevision for
some conditioning event C ofΩ, we apply the same formula, but, instead
ofR, use its restriction to C [Walley , §F]: (let g be a gamble on C )
P (g |C ) := sup{α :R | I C · (g −α)Ω ∈R}
= sup{α :R | g −α ∈RC }, (.)
Here gΩ inLΩ is the trivial extension of g from C to Ω, i.e., (gΩ)C = g
and (gΩ)Ω\C = 0 andRC is the set of desirable gambles contingent on C .
When we start from some lower prevision P onK , withK :⊆LΩ,
formula (.) becomes the formula for natural extension to an updated
prevision:
lceP (g |C ) := sup{α :R | g −α ∈ (RP )C }, (.)
which generalizes (.). We have not done the effort to give the back-
expanded version, as the generalized Bayes’s rule we encounter in the
next subsection provides an approach to conditioning that is usually
more convenient.
Coherence of the updated prevision P (•|C ) is then a consequence
of coherence ofRC or (RP )C . As the expressions (.) and (.) defin-
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ing the updated prevision P (•|C ) are formally identical to the relation-
ship (.) we had for unconditional previsions, P (•|C ) avoids sure loss
and is coherent if it respectively satisfies (.) and (.). This must
not surprise us: we introduced updated lower previsions at the beginning
of §.. as normal lower previsions with some extra meaning added.
Before fully focusing our attention to coherence in the next subsec-
tion, it is interesting to realize the significance of (.) applied to sets
of desirable gambles: It tells us how to obtain an updated uncertainty
model in a way that takes borderline behavior into account. This is im-
portant for natural extension to updated previsions: they can depend
critically upon borderline behavior.
To see this, consider a coherent set of desirable gamblesR :⊂LΩ,
the corresponding unconditional coherent lower prevision P on LΩ,
and a conditioning event C :⊂Ω such that
PC := sup{α :R | I C −α ∈R}= 0.




out which, consider any gamble f inRsupp•⊆C . By definition, f ∈R and
thus P f ≥ 0. The desirability of f also implies that sup{ f }≥ 0 (otherwise
it would lead to a partial loss, cf. (.)), so f ≤ sup{ f } · I C , from which
P f ≤ sup f ·PC = 0 follows by monotonicity (.). Combining these
two constraints on P f , we find that P f = 0, and thus that GP f = f . This
means that:
Any desirable gamble that has as its support an event
of lower probability zero is marginally desirable.
Formally, Rsupp•⊆C ⊆ GR or RC ⊆ (GR)C . As f ∉ GR implies P f 6= 0 Let C := {a,b}⊂Ω,
we visualize the
part of the bor-
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(cf. (.)), GP =GR . Together with equation (.), the last equality
implies that (DP )C =;, of which (RP )C = (L C )≥0∧6=0 is the natural ex-
tension (.): the updated models (RP )C we derived from P and the
corresponding updated prevision P (•|C ) onL C are vacuous.
Now consider the updated lower prevision Q(•|C ) on L C corre-
sponding toRC and consider a desirable gamble g inRC , nontrivial in
the sense that inf{g }≤ 0, for which
Q(g |C ) := sup{α :R | g −α ∈RC }> 0.
From the above derivation, we know that
P (g |C )= inf{g }≤ 0<Q(g |C ). (.)
This illustrates the fact that crucial (borderline) information aboutRC
is lost in the transition fromR to P when PC = 0.
Of course, if we initially have a given set of desirable gamblesR, the
above is just a warning that we might be throwing away useful infor-
mation when we only useR through the corresponding unconditional
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prevision P . However, it also points out that previsions lack the modeling
power to express
(i) some beliefs contingent on the assumption that some event hap-
pens, and at the same time
(ii) that this event is considered extremely unlikely to happen rela-
tive to the union of all the other – individually possibly equally
unlikely – events.
It is only human to find this a bit limiting. What would we like to be
different in our example leading up to (.)å? We would like (RP )C to
not be vacuous just because PC = 0. This can be achieved by modifying
either how we go from GP to DP , i.e., (.), or how we go from DP
to RP , i.e., natural extension (.). The first path is intriguing but
untrodden in the literature, so we here take the second, more familiar
path of replacing natural extension by regular extension [Walley ,
§J]. However, later on in §.., we will fruitfully explore the first path.
Given a lower prevision P onK , regular extension takes the set of
desirable gamblesRP obtained by natural extension ofRP , but addi-
tionally considers any of its marginally desirable gambles GRP that has
a strictly positive upper prevision to be desirable as well. We write the
resulting set of desirable gambles [Walley , §F] with an additional
bar on top to distinguish it fromRP :
R¯P :=RP ∪ { f :GRP |mceP f > 0}, (.)
where we have used the relationship − lceP (− f )=mceP f to express the
natural extension to upper previsions.
Now consider the conditioning event C again. The regular extension




rceP (g |C )
rceP (g |C ) := sup{α :R | g −α ∈ (R¯P )C } (.)
Walley [, §J] gives another, practically very useful form:
rceP (g |C )=
{
infP :MP∧. PC>0 1PC ·P gΩ, mceP I C > 0,
inf{g }, otherwise.
(.)








that the natural extension can be calculated as a lower envelope. An
infimum is used because {P :MP |PC > 0} need not be closed. When
ext(MP ) is finite, it may replaceMP in this formula. (To see this, write
the P inMP for which PC > 0 as a convex combination of the elements
of ext(MP ).)
When we use regular extension in this thesis, we explicitly mention it.
The natural and regular extension are not the two only possible up-
dated previsions: every coherent prevision dominating the natural exten-
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sion and dominated by the regular extension can be used as an updated
prevision; an example is P (•|C ). In terms of desirable gambles, the differ-
ence with regular extension is that in (.) not all marginally desirable
gambles with a positive upper prevision are chosen to be desirable. Care
should be taken that when calculating updated previsions for multiple
(overlapping) conditioning events, they should all derive from the same
modified set of desirable gambles.
Regular and natural extension coincide for extension to uncondi-
tional previsions, since then PΩ = 1. Remark that when mceP I C = 0,
regular and natural extension to the corresponding updated prevision
also coincide for the given prevision P : they are both vacuous. How-
ever, in this case the whole ofL C is also marginally desirable. So now
any coherent lower prevision onL C can be taken as the updated pre-
vision, because only coherence limits our freedom of choosing which
marginally desirable gambles we take to be desirable.
.. Separate coherence, joint coherence & the generalized Bayes’s rule
Now that we know how to relate unconditional, updated, and condi-
tional previsions to sets of desirable gambles and vice versa, it is time
to reflect on what rationality criteria we have to impose when we want
to consistently combine the different types of previsions. Each of the
previsions in such a consistent combination should be derivable by nat-
ural extension – or regular extension, if preferred – from the union of
the sets of desirable gambles corresponding to each of these previsions.
So combining is done by taking unions of sets of desirable gambles and
consistency is guaranteed by invariance under natural extension.
The first type of combination, one we already encountered, is a con-
ditional prevision P (•|B) :K ?→LΩ, whereB :⊆℘Ω is some partition
and K :⊆LΩ some set of gambles. It can be useful to talk about the
coherence of each of its separate, constitutive updated previsions at
the same time. So therefore we call a conditional prevision with coher-
ent constitutive updated previsions separately coherent [Walley ,
§.].
Three interesting consequences of separate coherence are generaliza-
tions of properties (.), (.), (.) for coherent lower previsions
for which we can replace constants by measurable functions: (let f :K , Walley [,
§..] mentions
a large number of
consequences of
separate coherence.
g : (LΩ)B-msr∧≥0, h : (LΩ)B-msr)
Measurable nonnegative homogeneity:
g · f ∈K ⇒ P (g · f |B)= g ·P ( f |B), (.)
Meas. normedness: h ∈K ⇒ P (h|B)= h, (.)
Meas. additivity: f +h ∈K ⇒ P ( f +h|B)= P ( f |B)+h. (.)
More challenging than only considering a conditional or uncondi-
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tional prevision by itself, is to look at the joint coherence of an uncondi-
tional and one or more conditional previsions [Walley , §.]. To
get an idea what joint coherence is about, consider an unconditional pre-
vision P onK and one conditional prevision P (•|B) :K˜ ?→LΩ, where
B :⊂℘Ω is some partition of Ω andK :⊆LΩ and K˜ :⊆ (LΩ)B-msr are
two sets of gambles.
(i) With each prevision, there corresponds a set of marginal gambles,
respectively GP and GP (•|B), and thus
(ii) a set of desirable gambles, respectivelyDP andDP (•|B).
(iii) Combining the two previsions consists in combining their corre-
sponding sets of desirable gambles, i.e., this consists in forming
the unionDP ∪DP (•|B). (In this example, we could have taken the
union after the first step, but this way of attacking things would
also allow adding some set of desirable gambles to the mix.)
(iv) To check the consistency of this combination, we first take the
natural extension for desirable gambles (.):
RP ,P (•|B) :=RDP∪DP (•|B) . (.)
(v) Then we use this set to define natural extension to unconditional
and updated previsions (cf. (.) and (.)): (let f :LΩ, C :⊂Ω,
and g :L C )
lceP ,P (•|B) f := sup{α :R | f −α ∈RP ,P (•|B)}, (.)
lceP ,P (•|B)(g |C ) := sup{α :R | g −α ∈ (RP ,P (•|B))C }. (.)
(vi) And finally – assuming thatRP ,P (•|B) and (RP ,P (•|B))B avoid sure
loss (for all B :B) – we can express joint coherence as invariance
under natural extension (cf. §..): It must hold for all f :K ,
h :K˜ , and B :B that
P f = lceP ,P (•|B) f , (.)
P (h|B)= lceP ,P (•|B)(hB |B). (.)
Step (iii) shows that generalizing (.)–(.) to any finite number of non-
conflicting uncertainty models is conceptually straightforward: taking
unions of sets of desirable gambles is the key idea.
Now assume P and P (•|B) to be separately and jointly coherent. The
consequence of joint coherence that interests us most is similar to theWalley [,
§..] mentions
a large number of
consequences of
joint coherence.
following immediate consequences of (.) and (.): (now let g :K˜B )
Cancellation: GP f ∈K ⇒ P (GP f )= 0, (.)
Updated cancellation: GP (•|B)g ∈ K˜B ⇒ P (GP (•|B)g |B)= 0. (.)
It expresses that an updated marginal gamble is in some sense also a
plain marginal gamble:
Mixed cancellation: (GP (•|B)g )Ω ∈K ⇒ P (GP (•|B)g )Ω = 0. (.)
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Formula (.) expresses a particularly interesting relationship be-
tween unconditional and updated previsions: Using the definition of
a marginal gamble (.), (.), and (.), we can rewrite the impli-
cand as lceP ,P (•|B)
(
g−lceP ,P (•|B)(g |B)
)
Ω = 0, which holds for any g inL B .
Furthermore, it remains valid for any set of uncertainty models we are
extending; so consider that we only started out with the unconditional
prevision P , then the expression becomes lceP
(
g − lceP (g |B)
)
Ω = 0. This
is the basis for the generalized Bayes’s rule or gbr [Walley , §..],
an alternative to (.) for calculating the natural extension to an up-
dated prevision:
lceP I
B > 0 ⇒ lceP (g |B)=µ,
where µ :R is the unique solution of lceP (g −µ)Ω = 0.
(.)
Checking whether the conditioning event has a positive lower probability
or not is necessary. In the latter case, the solution is not unique; however,
we have already seen in §.. that the natural extension then becomes
vacuous.
Formula (.) reduces to Bayes’s rule when it is applied to linear
previsions, whence its name. This fact can be used in combination
with (.) and the monotone character of P :MP ;
1
PB ·P gΩ to obtain





PB ·P gΩ, lceP I B > 0,
inf{g }, otherwise.
(.)
It is interesting to compare this to the formula (.) for regular exten-
sion.
Up to this point in this section, we have had an overview of the
important basic ideas concerning conditional and updated previsions.
The remaining subsections briefly state and contextualize related results
that we use further on in this thesis.
.. Marginal extension
In the last subsection, we discussed how to combine an unconditional
prevision P on K with a conditional prevision P (•|B) in K˜ ?→LΩ,
where B is a partition of Ω and where K :⊆LΩ and K˜ :⊆ (LΩ)B-msr
are two sets of gambles.
WheneverK only containsB-measurable gambles, P only contains
information about the relative likelihoods of the different events of the
partitionB and none about the relative likelihoods within these events.
Therefore, P can be seen as a marginal prevision (cf. second-to-last
paragraph of §..). On the other hand, P (•|B) by definition can only
encode relative likelihoods within the events of the partitionB.
 Modeling uncertainty
This hierarchical compartmentalization of information greatly sim-
plifies the calculation of the natural extension. Assume P and P (•|B)
avoid sure loss. After extending P to a coherent prevision on (LΩ)B-msr
and P (•|B) to a separately coherent conditional prevision onLΩ, we get
the combined model’s natural extension for free with Walley’s marginal
extension theorem [, §..]: (let f be a gamble on Ω)
lceP ,P (•|B) f := lceP
(
slceP (•|B)( f |B)
)
, (.)
where we have used separate natural extension
slceP (•|B)( f |B) :=∑B :B lceP (•|B)( fB |B) · I B . (.)
of the updated previsions specified by P (•|B), whose definition echoes
the definition (.) of a conditional lower prevision.
Note that the marginal extension theorem does not hold whenK
contains other than onlyB-measurable gambles. In such a situation,
the right hand side of (.) will be dominated by the natural extension,
as it erases any information available in the previsions for these non-
B-measurable gambles.
The specific case where the possibility space is a cartesian product of
finite sets and the lower previsions are given as lower envelopes of sets
of linear previsions deserves some more attention, as it will be useful
in §..: LetΩ :=X ×Y , whereX andY are finite sets, letK :=LX
and K˜ :=LY , and let B := {ıx |x :X }. Moreover, let P g := infγ:ΓPγg
and P (h|ıx) := infζx :Zx Pζx h, where g and h can be any gamble on X
andY , respectively, and where Γ and Z :=×x:X Zx are index sets. ThenThe elastic ver-





for every gamble f on Ω the marginal extension can be written as
lceP ,P (•|B) f = P
(
P ( f |B))
= infγ:ΓPγ(infζ•:Z•Pζ• f )







where the next to last step – bringing the inner infimum outside – has
been proven by Miranda & De Cooman [, §] and the last step is
meant to make sure the notation is clear.
.. Independent products
Our aim in this subsection is to combine a finite tuple (P j | j : J ) of given
coherent lower previsions from×j :JPK j ; here, J is some finite index
set and for all j in J ,K j :⊆LΩ j , with Ω j some possibility space. These
previsions have to be combined into a coherent joint lower prevision P
onLΩ, where Ω :=×j :JΩ j , of which the Ω j -marginals restricted toK j
coincide with P j .
. Restricting, transforming & combining uncertainty models 
Without additional information or assumptions about the relation-
ships between the beliefs expressed by the marginals, this combination
can be done by first defining P on the set of cylindrically extended gam-
bles (by letting P f˜ = P j f , for all j in J and all gambles f onΩ j ) and then
taking the natural extension (.) to the whole ofLΩ.
However, we here restrict ourselves to the assumption that the be-
liefs about the different components of Ω are independent. To be more
precise: for any proper subset I of J , the beliefs about ΩI :=×i :IΩi are
independent of the beliefs about ΩK :=×k:KΩk , where K is any subset
of J that is disjoint from I . Without further assumptions, this indepen-
dence is formalized by saying that P
(
f˜
∣∣ {ıω×ΩI |ω :ΩK })must be equal
to P i f for all i in I and all gambles f on Ωi [Walley , §..].
Once we have these partially specified conditional previsions, the
least committal independent joint lower prevision P that is coherent
with them can – if it exists – be obtained using the so-called indepen-
dent natural extension procedure [Walley , §..]. Conceptually,
this procedure corresponds to applying steps (i)–(v) in §.. to the
set of partially specified conditional previsions. An independent joint
prevision is also called a product prevision.
Usually, the independent natural extension of a tuple of marginals
is not the only coherent product prevision. In fact, it can be quite hard
to calculate, so other products – although not least committal – may
become interesting from a computational point of view. Some of these
other products become a natural choice after making extra assumptions,
for example by using a more restrictive interpretation of the theory of
imprecise probabilities.
The interpretation we use to lead us to a computationally simpler
product is the so-called sensitivity analysis interpretation (see [Walley
, §..,§..,§.] and also §..). Under this interpreta-
tion, the independence assumption is formalized by the requirement
that the product is an independent lower envelope.
To define such an independent lower envelope, we need to introduce
independent products of linear previsions. First consider two linear pre-
visions, Q onLX and R onY ; their independent product, denoted Q×R ,
is defined for every gamble h onX ×Y by
(Q×R)h =Q(Rh). (.)
The corresponding elastic operator is denoted by×. As in general the Elastic operators are
defined recursively;
e.g., if (P j | j : 1..7)
is a tuple of lin-
ear previsions,
then×j :1..7P j =
P1××j :2..7P j .
product order matters,× is defined for tuples and not sets of linear
previsions. However, in this thesis we only encounter products of σ-ad-
ditive linear previsions, for which the order does not matter, as the Fubini
theorem can be applied [Burrill , §-]. This does imply however
that in these cases we must restrict attention to measurable gambles.
An independent product P is an independent lower envelope when
 Modeling uncertainty
there is a set of linear previsionsQ :⊆ (PLΩ)lin such that P f = infP :Q P f
for any measurable gamble f on Ω and such that each P in Q has in-
dependent Ω j -marginals Q j , i.e., P =×j :J Q j [Walley , §..]. By
gathering these marginals in sets of linear previsionsQ j :⊆ (PLΩ j )lin,
we can express that P is an independent lower envelope of the marginals
(P j | j : J ) by requiring that P j g j = infQ j :Q j Q j g j for all j in J and mea-
surable gambles g j on Ω j .
Now, when each marginal P j is specified as a lower envelope of a set
of linear previsionsQ j , the natural thing to do is define
Q := {×j :J Q j ∣∣Q :×j :JQ j }
and consequently, for all suitably measurable gambles f ,
P f := infP :QP f = inf
{
(×j :J Q j ) f ∣∣Q :×j :JQ j } (.)
=min{(×j :J Q j ) f ∣∣Q :×j :JMP j }, (.)





Q ⊆ {×j :J Q j ∣∣Q :×j :J clcoQ j }= {×j :J Q j ∣∣Q :×j :JMP j }⊂ clcoQ
and the fact that taking the infimum over the convex closure does not
change its value. An independent product defined by an independent
lower envelope such as (.) is called a type- product [Walley ,
§..]; the equivalent form (.) is the one we will encounter later
on in some applications (cf. §.. and §..).
Having arrived at the end of this subsection, we have arrived at this






Après dîner, Mlle de La Mole, loin de fuir Julien, lui parla
et l’engagea en quelque sorte à la suivre au jardin; il obéit.
Cette épreuve lui manquait. Mathilde cédait, sans trop
s’en douter, à l’amour qu’elle reprenait pour lui. Elle
trouvait un plaisir extrême à se promener à ses côtés;
c’était avec curiosité qu’elle regardait ces mains qui, le
matin, avaient saisi l’épée pour la tuer.
Stendhal [, Ch. xviii, ¶]
In the previous chapter, we have talked at length about lower previ-
sions. We have encountered the predicates asl, coh, and lin that charac-
terize all those lower previsions that avoid sure loss, are coherent, or are
linear. We have seen that, for lower previsions defined on finite possibil-
ity spaces, the set of all linear previsions could be represented by a unit
simplex.
As a convex polytope, a unit simplex is fully characterized by its ex-
treme points. These extreme points represent the degenerate previsions.
Thus, the set of all linear previsions on some finite possibility space Ω is
a polytope also, fully characterized by the degenerate previsions on Ω.
They are the extreme linear previsions.
In this chapter, we obtain similar results when considering avoiding
sure loss, coherence, and some other interesting properties. To wit, the
sets of all lower probabilities satisfying one or more of these proper-
ties are convex polyhedra or polytopes; their extreme points are called






to compute these extreme lower probabilities starting from the expres-
sions of predicates such as asl and coh (§.), fill in the technical details
(§.), and give some practical results (§.). More extensive practical
results can be found in the Herbarium.
Note that in this chapter we restrict ourselves to finite possibility
spaces Ω and probabilities, i.e., lower previsions defined on the set of
all indicatorsIΩ or, equivalently, on the power set ℘Ω of the possibility
space. Recall that we only need to look at lower probabilities because of
conjugacy; the extreme upper probabilities follow from the conjugacy
relation for probabilities (.).
. Constraints & vertex enumeration
In this section, we introduce some concepts and results from polytope
theory. We also show how polytope theory can be useful when studying
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the different properties of interest that a lower probability can satisfy.
In the end, this will allow us to formulate how to compute the extreme
lower probabilities corresponding to each of these properties.
.. Constraints
Lower probabilities are defined on the power set ℘Ω and thus have 2|Ω|
components, each indexed by one of the subsets ofΩ. A lower probability
is therefore a point in the 2|Ω|-dimensional real vector space ℘Ω→R.








termined by a set of linear constraints (linear inequalities and linear
equalities). A lot of interesting properties such as avoiding sure loss
and coherence can also be expressed as a set of linear constraints. Ac-
tually, the definition of these properties usually consists of such a set of
constraints.
As an example, let us look at the definition for avoiding sure loss:
Consider a lower probability P :PIΩ, then (.) tells us that
aslP ⇔∀N :⊆⊂IΩ;
∀λ : (R>0)N ;
sup
{∑
g :N λg ·GP g
}≥ 0. (.)
We work with lower probabilities, so we can reformulate this definition
in terms of events (i.e., subsets ofΩ or, equivalently, elements of℘Ω). To
be able to do this, we need to write out the marginal gambles, which is
done using (.). Also taking the finitary nature ofΩ and therefore℘Ω
into account to further simplify the expression results in
aslP ⇔∀λ : (R≥0)℘Ω;∑
B :⊆ΩλB ·PB ≤ sup
{∑




This expression shows that the definition of avoiding sure loss consists of
a set of linear constraints (linear inequalities) in P , where each constraint
is defined by some λ. To be precise, each of these constraints is a linear
predicate onPIΩ.
Recall that lower probabilities are points in the vector space℘Ω→R;
this means that linear constraints correspond to hyperplanes (linear
equalities) or half-spaces defined by some hyperplane (linear inequal-
ities). For example, in the expression for the linear constraints in (.),
the left-hand side scalar product
∑
λ ·P = ∑B :⊆ΩλB ·PB determines
the orientation of the hyperplane and the right-hand side constant
sup
{∑
B :⊆ΩλB · I B
}
determines its location. The convex intersection of
these linear subspaces of ℘Ω→ R is the set of lower probabilities that
satisfies the property of interest (which in the above example is avoiding
sure loss).
 Extreme lower probabilities
Generalizing the above example, a linear inequality constraint for a
lower probability P on℘Ω has the following form: (let λ :R℘Ω be a vector
of coefficients and let α be some real constant)∑
λ ·P ≥α. (.)
A linear equality constraint corresponds to two inequality constraints.
To develop more geometric intuition, the next subsection contains
a graphical illustration of the concepts introduced above. Some new
concepts related to linear constraints are also introduced and illustrated.
.. A toy example
Any graphical illustration is limited to two or three dimensions at most.
As we are interested in depicting the space ℘Ω→R for some Ω, we must
limit ourselves to a possibility space with one element. Its power set
consist of only two elements, Ω and ;. This results in a very simple toy








Consider a tuple h := (hi | i : 1..6) of con-
straints; each of them corresponds to a linear
inequality of the form (.), i.e.,
λ; ·P;+λΩ ·PΩ≥α,
where the relative values of the real num-
bers λ;, λΩ, and α are implicitly defined in
the picture. They are represented using lines
with hairs that indicate the half-space they correspond to. The convex
intersection of the half-spaces – i.e., the set (PIΩ)∀h of lower probabil-
ities that satisfy the constraints – is colored gray.
Notice that there are some constraints that can be removed from h
without changing the resulting intersection; these are called redundant
constraints. In our example, constraints h6 is redundant because h5 is
more stringent and h3 is made redundant by the set {h1,h2,h4}.
We can immediately identify the extreme lower probabilities corre-
sponding to the given set of constraints: these are the extreme points (or
vertices) of the gray area, indicated using a black dot (v for example).
All of them are formed by an intersection of nonredundant constraints.
However, not every intersection of nonredundant constraints is an ex-
treme lower probability (w for example, indicated using a little circle ).
What we have learned about constraints and vertices with this toy
example can be extended to other, more realistic situations. The next
subsection cites the results that underpin this generalization.
.. Polyhedra, polytopes & vertex enumeration
First, the intersection of a finite set of linear constraints, i.e., the points in
℘Ω→R satisfying the constraints, is a convex polyhedron by definition
. Constraints & vertex enumeration 
(in algebraic geometry). A polytope is a bounded polyhedron. With each
constraint there corresponds a so-called defining hyperplane. A simple
illustration of an unbounded polyhedron is given on the side.
The Minkowski-Weyl theorem [Fukuda ] tells us that a convex
polyhedron that does not include a linear subspace can be equivalently
described by its
(i) vertices or extreme points: polyhedron points defined by the inter-
section of at least 2|Ω| defining hyperplanes ( in the illustration),
and
(ii) extreme rays: (normalized) polyhedron directions defined by the
intersection of 2|Ω|−1 defining hyperplanes and the hyperplane
at infinity ( in the illustration).
This means that any point of a convex polyhedron ( in the illustration)
can be written as a not necessarily unique sum of
(i) a convex combination of extreme points (i.e., a decomposition in
barycentric coordinates), and
(ii) a positive linear combination of extreme rays.
As polytopes are bounded, they can be described using extreme points
only. Extreme points and extreme rays are the extreme lower probabil-
ities we are looking for. In case the polyhedron does contain a linear
subspace – e.g., if it is a half-space – additional points of the border of
the linear subspace that take up the role of vertices – such as a point on
the border of the half-space – need to be specified.
The above decomposition property is a reason why finding the ex- De Cooman &
Miranda [,
§.] and Miranda
et al. [a, §]
provide examples of
theoretical use.
treme lower probabilities can be useful: Any lower probability satisfying
some set of properties can be written in terms of the extreme lower prob-
abilities corresponding to this set of properties. (Maaß [a,b] extends
this result to a more general, infinitary context.) This may prove useful
for theoretical as well as practical applications.
One possible practical application is what actually led us to inves-
tigate extreme lower probabilities: We wanted to use them for efficient
calculation or approximation of lower probabilities. The idea was that
once the extreme lower probabilities have been determined, they can be
used to calculate the other lower probabilities using the decomposition,
or, by retaining only part of the decomposition, which can be used for
approximation.
Anyway, the important point is that sets of lower probabilities can
be equivalently defined either with sets of constraints or with sets of
extreme lower probabilities. The former are typically available, due to
the constraint-based nature of many rationality criteria in probability Ziegler [] gives




theory, the latter are not, but are judged by us to be potentially useful.
Luckily, polytope theory provides techniques for vertex enumeration
[Matheiss & Rubin ]: converting sets of linear constraints to sets of
extreme points.
 Extreme lower probabilities
Freely available implementations of these vertex enumeration algo-




They can deal with
linear subspaces
and also contain re-
dundant constraint
removal algorithms.
algorithms is described in terms of three parameters: the dimension of
the space, the number of (nonredundant) constraints and the number
of vertices. It is an open problem whether there exists an algorithm that
can enumerate the vertices in polynomial time and space (in the given
parameters). The efficiency of these algorithms furthermore depends on
the type of polytope; for example, whether or not it is simple [Avis et al.
].
For our application, the dimension 2|Ω| of the space grows exponen-
tially with the size |Ω| of the possibility space. For most of the properties
studied, this is accompanied by a corresponding observed increase in
the number of constraints (see, e.g., the definition (.) for monotonic-
ity). Therefore, the time needed for vertex enumeration grows at least
exponentially in the size of the possibility space. At the time of writing,
computations (on a personal computer) are limited to possibility spaces
up to around five elements.
So, even though it is not practical for nonsmall possibility spaces, the
conclusion we wish to distill from this subsection is the following: Our
quest for the extreme lower probabilities that satisfy some property, is
– in principle – solved when the constraints corresponding to that prop-
erty are known; the rest of the work is left to existing vertex enumeration
algorithms.
. Property constraint generation
We have seen that the search for extreme lower probabilities has beenVertex-based defi-
nitions also exist;
e.g., linear-vacuous







reduced to a search for constraints. This section contains constraint-
based definitions for many of the properties that are of interest to people
working with lower probabilities, such as (.) for avoiding sure loss.
Moreover, we obtain versions that are feasible in the sense that they
generate a finite number of constraints (note that (.) gives an infi-
nite number). We also try to limit the number of redundant constraints
generated, even though this is of less practical importance due to the
existence of redundant constraint removal algorithms.
Once a feasible constraint-based definition is available for two or
more properties, it is straightforward to obtain the extreme lower proba-
bilities of the set of lower probabilities that satisfy all the properties at
once; one just combines the generated list of constraints before using a
vertex enumeration algorithm. We make use of this in our examples.
.. Normedness, nonnegativity & additivity
Classical probabilities are often thought of – next to betting rates – in
terms of a unit mass distributed over the elementary events. This associ-
. Property constraint generation 
ation makes requirements placed on such classical probabilities almost
tangible: they are normed, nonnegative, and additive.
Almost always, lower probabilities are also required to be normed
and nonnegative. Even though we usually will not consider these require-
ments separately, but rather as a consequence of coherence, they are
simple, so it is instructive to treat them here in their own right, i.e., give
constraint-based definitions. For the sake of completeness, we comple-
ment this subsection with a constraint-based definition of additivity, a
requirement that a lower probability does not need to satisfy.
For lower probabilities P on ℘Ω, normedness (cf. (.) for pre-
visions) is formalized using a predicate nrm:PIΩ→B; it can be ex-
pressed – independently of the cardinality of Ω – using two linear equal-
ity constraints:
nrmP ⇔ P;= 0∧ PΩ= 1. (.)
Nonnegativity (cf. accepting sure gains (.) for previsions) is for-
malized using a predicate nng:PIΩ→B; it can be expressed using 2|Ω|
linear inequality constraints:
nngP ⇔ P ≥ 0. (.)
Additivity is formalized using the predicate add:PIΩ→B which
could be expressed by giving, for every event A of Ω and every nontrivial
partitionB :⊆℘A of this event, a linear equality constraint P A =∑PB .
Due to transitivity, it is enough to look at the partition consisting of all
singletons. This allows us to eliminate a lot of redundant constraints and
to end up with a definition using 2|Ω|−|Ω| linear equalities:
addP ⇔∀A :⊆Ω∧. |A| 6= 1;
P A =∑P A , (.)
where, recall, P A is the restriction of P to A. Note that P;= 0 is included
in this definition, as P; has an empty domain, which implies
∑
P; = 0.
Expressions such as (.) and the much more complex ones we shall
encounter later are – once objects have been defined for sets and con-
straints – easy to translate to a computer program. The universal quanti-
fier ∀ introduces a for-loop and the filter ∧. an if-then-statement, which,
if passed, adds the resulting constraint to the list of constraints for the
property under scrutiny (here additivity).
.. Superadditivity
One of the big differences between lower probabilities and classical
probabilities is the fact that – as a consequence of the typical rationality
criteria used – the additivity requirement is relaxed to a superadditivity
requirement.
 Extreme lower probabilities
Analogously to additivity, superadditivity is formalized using a predi-
cate sad:PIΩ→Bwhich could be expressed by giving, for every event A
of Ω and every partitionB :⊆℘A of this event, a linear inequality con-
straint P A ≥∑PB . Due to transitivity, it is enough to look at the binary
partitions. This allows us to eliminate a lot of redundant constraints:
sadP ⇔∀A :⊆Ω;
∀B ,C :⊆ (℘A)2∧. B ∩C =;∧B ∪C = A;
P A ≥ PB +PC .
(.)
However, superadditivity is not strong enough as (the mathemati-
cal formulation of) a rationality criterion: it does not imply avoiding
sure loss. This can be quickly illustrated with the lower probability P
in (PI {a,b,c})nrm∧sad which is zero in singletons and one in doubletons;
explicitly: take λ in (.) to be one for doubletons and zero elsewhere,
then
3= P {a,b}+P {a,c}+P {b,c} 6≤ sup{I {a,b}+ I {a,c}+ I {b,c}}= 2.
So how do we make sure that a superadditive lower probability avoids
sure loss? The next subsection gives a type of approach we have not yet
come across; the one after that treats avoiding sure loss itself.
.. k-Monotonicity
Thinking in terms of mass distribution, superadditivity corresponds
to the idea that we do not have enough information to unequivocally
distribute the whole of the unit mass over the elementary events and
assigning the remains of the unit mass to the nonelementary events. The
rationale behind this could be that the nature of the available informa-
tion allows us to say to some extent how probable some nonelementary
event is, without being able to be more specific.
Formalizing this idea leads to so-called belief functions, a special type




a theory of evi-
dence on them.
uous probabilities relative to subsets (introduced in (.)). Each vacu-
ous probability in the convex combination corresponds to a nonempty
event; the coefficients correspond to the mass assigned to that event,
elementary or not. Formally, let us characterize the belief functions with
a predicate bel :PIΩ→B, which holds when a probability mass assign-
ment can be found that generates the probability in question:For the infinite case,
the extreme belief
functions are those
that are 1 on a filter
of events and 0 else-
where [Brüning &
Dennenberg ].
belP ⇔∃µ :∆(℘Ω)6=; ;
P =∑B :(℘Ω) 6=;µB ·P B , (.)
(Recall that we use subscripting to indicate coefficient vector compo-
nents such as µB .) Note that this is a vertex-based definition, the vertices
. Property constraint generation 
– i.e., the extreme belief functions – being the vacuous probabilities rela-
tive to subsets.
Belief functions are not the only lower probabilities that can be writ-
ten in terms of vacuous probabilities when we allow generalized mass
assignments that do not sum up to one, have negative components,
and a possible nonzero assignment for the empty set. Such a lower
probability P on ℘Ω can be written in terms of its generalized mass
assignment µ :R℘Ω and vice versa by Möbius inversion and Möbius
transformation respectively [Shafer , Lemma .]:
∀A :⊆Ω ; P A =∑B :⊆AµB
⇔∀A :⊆Ω ;µA =∑B :⊆A(−1)|A\B | ·PB . (.)
There is a class of lower probabilities, the so-called k-monotone Interesting subtypes
are (i) monotone
lower probabilities




ated by lower and
upper probability
functions defined
on Ω (de Campos






lower probabilities (where k :N>0), that can be described by specific
types of generalized mass assignments [Chateauneuf & Jaffray ]. In
general, these cannot be written as a convex combination of vacuous
probabilities. We can find the extreme k-monotone lower probabilities,
however, using a constraint-based definition of k-monotonicity. For
every k :N>0, we introduce a predicate k-mon:PIΩ→B that expresses
k-monotonicity: [modified from De Cooman et al. b]
k-monP ⇔∀A :⊆Ω;
∀A :⊆℘Ω∧. 0< |A | ≤ k;∑





⋂; :=Ω. The definition immediately allows us to see that every
k-monotone lower probability is `-monotone for all ` : 1..k. We call the A
in this definition a generating event.
Note that k-monotonicity implies neither normedness nor nonnega-
tivity, properties that are almost always required, however. The k-mono-
tonicity of all constant lower probabilities P :PIΩ∧. P =α, where α is






=∑`:0..|A | (∑B:⊆A∧. |B|=`1) · (−1)`
=∑`:0..|A |(|A |` ) · (−1)` ·1|A |−`
= 0,
due to the binomial theorem. Adding just normedness is enough to
The binomial
theorem: for all
n :N and x, y :R2, it










also let nonnegativity be satisfied; furthermore, k-monotonicity is then
sufficient for coherence if k ≥ 2 [De Cooman et al. b].
 Extreme lower probabilities
Even though (.)å gives a feasible set of linear constraints, it is
possible to greatly reduce the number of redundant constraints, leading
to a more efficient program. We finish this subsection by carrying out
this reduction.
First notice that every constraint in (.)å depends only on subsets






B:⊆A (−1)|B| ·P (A∩
⋂
B)=∑B:⊆A (−1)|B| ·P(A∩⋂B :B(A∩B))
=∑B:⊆{A∩B |B :A }(−1)|B| ·P (A∩⋂B)
This derivation shows that for each generating set A of Ω, we need only
look at setsA :⊆℘A.
Also notice that whenever A ∈A , the left-hand sum in (.)å be-
comes identically zero:∑
B:⊆A (−1)|B| ·P (A∩
⋂
B)
=∑B:⊆A∧. A∉B(−1)|B| ·P (A∩⋂B)+∑B:⊆A∧. A∈B(−1)|B| ·P (A∩⋂B)
=∑B:⊆A∧. A∉B(−1)|B| · (P (A∩⋂B)−P (A∩ A∩⋂B))
= 0.
Therefore, the constraint is trivially satisfied in this case, which means
that we only need to look at setsA :⊆ (℘A)6=A . This in turn implies that
we do not need to consider the case A :=;.
Let us write out the intermediate expression for the definition of
k-monotonicity we have now obtained:
k-monP ⇔∀A : (℘Ω) 6=;;
∀A :⊆ (℘A)6=A∧. 0< |A | ≤ k;
P A+∑B:⊆A∧.B 6=;(−1)|B| ·P (⋂B)≥ 0.
(.)
The term P A we have written separately corresponds toB :=;.
Suppose we separately consider 1-monotonicity, or monotonicity
for short. It is expressed by a predicate mon:PIΩ→Bwith a definition
derived from the intermediate expression above:
monP ⇔∀A : (℘Ω) 6=;;
∀B :⊂ A;
P A ≥ PB.
(.)
Then, for A :⊆℘A such that ⋃A 6= A, the corresponding constraint
in (.) is implied by monotonicity – i.e., P A ≥ P (⋃A ) – and the con-
straint for
⋃
A as the generating event, because A ⊆ ℘(⋃A ). So, this
corresponding constraint may be dropped; or, in other words, we only
need to consider setsA :⊆℘A such that⋃A = A, which are nonempty
by definition. The same transitivity argument allows us to reduce the
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number of constraints that have to be checked for monotonicity itself to
the ones for which |B | = |A|−1:
monP ⇔∀A : (℘Ω) 6=;;
∀B :⊂ A∧. |B | = |A|−1;
P A ≥ PB.
(.)
Here, you can already see the typical exponential increase in the number
of constraints with |Ω|which we alluded to in the next-to-last paragraph
before §..
The last set of redundant constraints we consider in the definition of
k-monotonicity is related to the case when there is some C :A such that
C =⋂A . We can then write∑
B:⊆A∧.B 6=;(−1)|B| ·P (
⋂
B)
=∑B:⊆A6=C∧.B 6=;(−1)|B| ·P (⋂B)+∑B:⊆A∧. C∈B(−1)|B| ·PC
=∑B:⊆A6=C∧.B 6=;(−1)|B| ·P (⋂B)−PC ·∑B:⊆A6=C (−1)|B|
=∑B:⊆A6=C∧.B 6=;(−1)|B| ·P (⋂B),
where the binomial theorem was used again in the last step. So, we only
need to consider sets A :⊆℘A such that ⋂A ∉A . The special case of
A :⊆℘A that contain the empty set; need therefore also not be consid-
ered.
We have finally arrived at a definition of k-monotonicity that leads
to a more efficient program by eliminating a large number of redundant Constraints for
Ω= {a,b,c}, k = 2:
PΩ ≥˚ P {a,b} ≥˚ P a ≥ P;,
PΩ ≥˚ P {a,b}+Pc−P;,
PΩ≥ P {a,b}+P {a,c}−P a,
P {a,b}≥ P a+Pb−P;.
(up to permutation;




∧∀A : (℘Ω) 6=;;




P A+∑B:⊆A∧.B 6=;(−1)|B| ·P (⋂B)≥ 0.
(.)
To get a feeling for the computational complexity of this definition, let
us consider the number of candidate sets of events A when A :=Ω







when considering the constraints on |A |. Let us illus-
trate this with some magnitudes for both quantities:
|Ω| = 4: 104 and 103 (easy for current computers),
|Ω| = 5: 109 and 104,
|Ω| = 6: 1019 and 107 (hard, even with an efficient implementation).
An important difference with the original definition (.) is that these
numbers now go down sharply with |A|, whereas in the original defini-
tion they are valid for all A :⊆Ω.
 Extreme lower probabilities
.. Avoiding sure loss
In this section’s introduction, we have already drawn attention to the
fact that the set of constraints for avoiding sure loss defined by (.)
is infinite and thus infeasible. In the current subsection, we first give
a quickly obtained direct, vertex-based definition. After that, we still
make the effort of finding a feasible constraint-based definition (i.e., one
that generates a finite number of constraints); this allows us to combine
avoiding sure loss with other properties and prepares us for work that
cannot be avoided when looking at coherence in the next subsection.
Walley [, §..] has shown that a lower prevision avoids sure
loss if and only if it is dominated by some linear probability. This impliesThe set (PIΩ)asl
for |Ω| = 1 (shaded)






that the set of extreme sure-loss-avoiding lower probabilities consists of
the degenerate probabilities (the extreme linear probabilities, cf. (.))
as extreme points and all negative main directions in℘Ω→R as extreme
rays. An alternative to definition (.) for avoiding sure loss therefore
becomes (let P :PIΩ)
aslP ⇔∃λ :∆Ω;
∃µ : (R≤0)℘Ω;
P =∑ω:Ωλω ·Pω+∑B :⊆ΩµB · I ıB .
(.)
To find a feasible constraint-based definition, we start from the ex-
pression (.) we used when introducing the concept of constraints
in §..; we immediately replace indicators by events, write out the
marginal gambles, and take into account the finite nature of Ω:
aslP ⇔∀B :⊆℘Ω;
∀λ : (R>0)B ;∑
B :BλB ·PB ≤ sup
{∑









nonnegativity – i.e., that P is an element of the first orthant of ℘Ω→R –,
Walley [, §A] mentions how the corresponding set of constraints
can be reduced to a finite one. We do not assume nonnegativity.
First of all, the cases B := ı; and B := ıΩ lead to the simple con-
straints P;≤ 0 and PΩ≤ 1, which we consider separately from the rest.
The reason is that for any P that satisfies these constraints, all other
constraints involving; or Ω are made redundant by the corresponding
(equivalent or more stringent) constraint not involving ; or Ω. Look-
ing at the inequality in (.), this follows for ; from the fact that the
left-hand side cannot increase (P; ≤ 0) and the right-hand side stays
constant (I; = 0). For Ω this follows from the fact that the left-hand side
decreases less (PΩ≤ 1) than the right-hand side (IΩ = 1).
Each of the other constraints can be replaced by an equivalent or
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more stringent constraint written in some standard form that we now
set out to identify.
The first thing we do is rescale the coefficients in such a way that the
right-hand side supremum of the constraint in (.) is 1. So we replace λ
by λ/sup
{∑
B :B λB · I B
}
, which has components in ]0,1]. This creates an
equivalent constraint. Assume from now on that this rescaling has been
done for all λ.
This rescaling is only the first step on our road to the standard form.
One of the other things we are going to do is fiddle with the linear combi-
nations appearing in the left-hand and right-hand sides of the constraint
in (.): We will increase the coefficients λ and enlarge the set the sum
ranges over, but we do this in such a way as to keep the right-hand side
unchanged. This will result in constraints that are still part of the set
described by (.), but we need to ensure that it results in constraints
that are either equivalent to or more stringent than the ones we started
out with. In that case, we can drop the original constraints, as they are
implied by the new ones we replace them with.
For lower probabilities P that are nonnegative everywhere, the left-
hand side increases when fiddling (as we have described just above)
with the linear combination, whereas the right-hand side remains con-
stant (equal to 1), so the constraint becomes more stringent. However,
when P has negative components, the left-hand side might decrease,
causing a possibly less stringent constraint. To counter this, we use bi-
nary masksβ :B℘Ω to create a specific constraint for all possible orthants
P can be located in. This, together with the rescaling and the separate
treatment of ı; and ıΩ, but without the fiddling, results in the following
intermediate equivalent expression for the definition of avoiding sure
loss:
aslP ⇔P;≤ 0∧ PΩ≤ 1
∧∀β :B℘Ω;
∀B :⊆℘Ω\ {;,Ω};
∀λ : ]0,1]B∧. sup{∑B :BλB · I B}= 1;∑
B :BλB ·βB ·PB ≤ 1.
(.)
Let us explain how these binary masks work: Whenever PB < 0 for Binary masks β





some B :B, there is a constraint for which βB = 0, which will be more
stringent than the original constraint. We need to be cautious, however,
because only when β = 1 (suitable for P in the first orthant, with only
nonnegative components), we have a constraint that is of the form given
by the inequality in (.). The others might be too stringent.
Luckily, however, these other constraints are never too stringent: We
can show that the constraints for which β 6= 1 are also implied by the
original definition. This follows by replacing λ in the original definition
 Extreme lower probabilities
by β ·λ (the set of constraints implied by definition (.) does not
change when allowing coefficients with components equal to 0) and
realizing that sup
{∑
B :Bˆ λB ·βB · I B
}≤ sup{∑B :Bˆ λB · I B}.
Now we start fiddling fearlessly with the linear combination: we only




already taken care of the effect of the fiddling on (the other parts of) the
constraint. We can ‘fill things up’, i.e., modify the sum in such a way that
it results in the constant function
∑
B :Bˆ λˆB · I B = IΩ = 1. In this modified
sum, Bˆ :⊆℘Ω is such thatB ⊆ Bˆ and the coefficients λˆ in (R>0)Bˆ are
such that the rescaled λ≤ λˆB . This modification is done as follows:




(1−∑C :BˆλC · I C )B};
for subsequent sets the increase is calculated similarly, but the
appearing sum uses the increased coefficients where available.
(ii) If the procedure above does not yield a sum
∑
B :Bˆ λˆB · I B that is
identically one we go over all B in ℘Ω\B and – for the first set B –
add B to Bˆ and set
λˆB =min
{
(1−∑C :Bˆ\B λˆC · I C )B};
for subsequent sets the coefficient is again calculated similarly.
Because ℘Ω is finite, this procedure is guaranteed to stop after
a finite number of steps; at that point, the sum is identically one
and Bˆ only contains sets with coefficients that are nonzero.
The filling-up procedure is illustrated for the case Ω = {a,b,c} in the
following example:
B := {{a,b}, ıb, ıc}; λ{a,b} := 12 , λıb := 12 , λıc := 23 ; ∑B :BλB · I B = 01
a b c
.






Bˆ =Ω as a side-effect and also implies that the
set of functions ı IΩ∪ {I B |B :Bˆ} is linearly dependent.
A predicate dep:℘LΩ→B that expresses linear dependence of some
finite set of gamblesK :⊆⊂LΩ is therefore useful to have at our disposal.
It is defined by
depK ⇔∃µ :RK ∧. µ 6=K ; 0;∑
f :K µ f · f = 0.
(.)
When talking about linear independence, we can use the (implicitly
pointwise extended) negation ¬dep of this predicate.
. Property constraint generation 
Let us write out the intermediate expression for the definition of
avoiding sure loss we now obtain (dropping hats):
aslP ⇔P;≤ 0∧ PΩ≤ 1
∧∀β :B℘Ω;
∀B :⊆℘Ω\ {;,Ω}∧.⋃B =Ω∧ dep(ı IΩ∪ {I B |B :B});
∀λ : ]0,1]B∧.∑B :BλB · I B = 1;∑
B :BλB ·βB ·PB ≤ 1.
(.)
This definition is still infeasible; for general B, the set of possible co-
efficients λ is still infinite. In the filling-up example (.), the coeffi-
cients λˆ{a,b}, λˆıa , and λˆıb were chosen equal to 1/2, but they only needed
to satisfy λˆıa = λˆıb = 1− λˆ{a,b}.
Technical lemma (A.)–(A.) – applied with q :=β ·P and ρ := 1 – al-
lows us to derive that we only need to consider those sets of events
B :⊆℘Ω such that the set of gambles {I B −βB ·PB |B :B} is linearly
independent and those coefficients λ :R>0B for which
∑
B :B λB · I B is
constant. Because λ > 0, we can implicitly rescale this constant to 1,
which gives us back the requirement
∑
B :B λB · I B = 1. This in turn al-
lows us to use technical lemma (A.) to show that linear indepen-
dence of {I B −βB ·PB |B :B} is equivalent to the linear independence
of {I B |B :B}.
Linear dependence of ı IΩ∪{I B |B :B} ensures that the linear system LetΩ := {a,b,c}.











where λ : (R>0)B ,
results in λ= 1/2.
of equations
∑
B :B λB · I B = 1 has a solution λ. Linear independence of
{I B |B :B} makes sure that the number of unknowns |B| is never larger
than the number of equations |Ω|, so this solution is unique. As the coef-
ficients in the system are B-valued, the unique solution is rational. This
is what allows us to formulate a feasible constraint-based definition, as
there are only a finite number of possibleB, and we must only consider
one rational-valued λ perB.
So we have finally found a feasible definition for avoiding sure loss: Constraints for
Ω= {a,b,c}:
P;≤ 0, PΩ≤ 1,
P a+Pb+Pc ≤ 1,
P {a,b}+Pc ≤ 1.




≤˚ indicates a redun-
dant constraint)
aslP ⇔P;≤ 0∧ PΩ≤ 1
∧∀B :⊆℘Ω\ {;,Ω}∧.⋃B =Ω∧ {dep(ı IΩ∪ {I B |B :B})¬dep{I B |B :B};
∀λ : (Q∩ ]0,1])B∧.∑B :BλB · I B = 1;
∀β :BB ;∑
B :BλB ·βB ·PB ≤ 1.
(.)
Note that the quantification over λ just selects the unique solution. The
binary masks are applied at the end out of efficiency considerations;
checking linear (in)dependence and solving for λ are the most computa-
tionally intensive steps of the constraint generation process. The large
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number of redundant constraints the binary masks create in practice are
easily removed by redundant constraint removal algorithms.
.. Coherence
We have stated in §.. that coherence is the strongest universal re-
quirement we want to impose on lower previsions, and thus on lower
probabilities. Therefore, a feasible constraint-based definition for the
coherence of lower probabilities is the most important of all the defi-
nitions in this section. Again, Walley [, §A] mentions a finitary
constraint-based definition without elaborating.
Our starting point is the original definition (.), which we imme-
diately reformulate for lower probabilities P :PIΩ on a finite possibility
space Ω; i.e., we work with events instead of gambles. For this, we have
to write out the marginal gambles using (.); we obtain
cohP ⇔aslP
∧∀A :⊆Ω;
∀B :⊆ (℘Ω) 6=A ;
∀λ : (R>0)B∪ı A ;∑
B :BλB ·PB −λA ·P A ≤ sup
{∑




where we have also added a coefficient corresponding to A; it does not
change the definition, which can be seen by dividing both sides of the
inequality by λA .
The form of each of the (infinite number of) constraints for coher-
ence is very similar to the one for avoiding sure loss (.), but there
are differences. On the one hand, those differences imply that coherent
probabilities are nonnegative, so the trick with the binary masks is not
necessary; on the other hand, they give rise to a number of different
cases we need to look at separately. Once each of these cases is formu-
lated, the ideas we used for reformulating the definition of avoiding sure
loss can be straightforwardly applied.
First of all, let us look at the two simple cases:
(i) Applying avoiding sure loss (.) to the gambles inIΩ, we find
PB ≤ sup{I B }, so PB ≤ 1 for all nonempty B of Ω and P;≤ 0.
(ii) TakingB =;, we find the constraint P A ≥ inf{I A}, so P A ≥ 0 for
all A :⊂Ω and PΩ≥ 1.
This means that a coherent lower probability P must be [0,1]-bounded
and normed, which implies nonnegativity. Normedness also implies
we do not have to consider ; and Ω any more as candidates for A or
elements ofB; they result in constraints that are equivalent to the corre-
sponding constraints not involving; or Ω.
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We now show how to write all constraints in one of three standard
forms, each of which will be investigated separately afterwards.
The right-hand side supremum is either positive, zero, or negative. So,
by normalizingλ and filling things up, we can respectively make the right-
hand side sum, and thus supremum, identically 1, 0, or −1. This time,
the possibilities for filling up not only include the ones we encountered
when looking at avoiding sure loss in the previous subsection, to wit,
(take Bˆ :⊆℘Ω∧.B ⊆ Bˆ and λˆ : (R>0)Bˆ∪ı A∧. λB ≤ λˆB ∧λA ≥ λˆA)
(i) appropriately increasing the coefficients to λˆB for some well-cho-
sen events B :B,
(ii) adding some well-chosen events C :℘Ω\B – creating the set of
events Bˆ – and appropriately setting the value of the correspond-
ing coefficients λˆC ,
but they also include
(iii) appropriately decreasing the coefficient λA to λˆA .
Whenever this decrease would lead to a nonpositive λˆA , we effectively
get a constraint for avoiding sure loss, something we are already taking
into account.
The effect of this procedure on the constraint as a whole is that, due
to the nonnegativity of P , the left-hand side can only increase while the
right-hand side stays constant (1, 0, or −1): A more stringent constraint
is obtained. We therefore only need to consider the constraints resulting
from this procedure (dropping hats):
cohP ⇔ aslP ∧nrmP ∧0≤ P ≤ 1
∧∀A :℘Ω\ {;,Ω};
∀B :⊆℘Ω\ {;, A,Ω};
∀γ : {1,0,−1};
∀λ : (R>0)B∪ı A∧.∑B :BλB · I B −λA · I A = γ;∑
B :BλB ·PB −λA ·P A ≤ γ.
(.)
We first consider constraints with γ= 1. This situation can only occur
when at the same time {IΩ, I A}∪ {I B |B :B} is a linearly dependent set
and
⋃
B =Ω. Lemma (A.)–(A.) applied with q := P and ρ := 1 allows
us to derive that we only need to consider those A andB such that the
set of gambles ı(I A −P A)∪ {I B −PB |B :B} is linearly independent and
those coefficientsλ :R>0B∪ı A for which
∑
B :B λB · I B −λA · I A is constant.
After rescaling, this constant can be 1, 0, or−1. Generated constraints for
the last two cases are treated further on; for the first case, we can then
use lemma (A.) to show that linear independence of the given set is
equivalent to linear independence of ı I A∪{I B |B :B}. This ensures there
is a unique (rational-valued) solution λ to the given condition.
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Next, we treat constraints with γ= 0. This situation can only occur
when
⋃
B = A. We can normalize λ such that λA = 1 and such that
the other components lie in ]0,1], satisfying
∑
B :B λB · I B = I A , which
in turn implies ı I A ∪ {I B |B :B} is linearly dependent. The form of the
constraint becomes
∑
B :B λB ·PB ≤ P A. Note that this form can be seen
as avoiding sure loss relative to A (cf. (.)); in our final definition,
we shall therefore merge avoiding sure loss into this case by allowing A
to be Ω. Similarly as when deriving the feasible definition of avoiding
sure loss, we can use lemma (A.)–(A.), now relative to A and ap-
plied with q := P℘A , to derive that we only need to consider those B
for which {I B −PB |B :B} is linearly independent. Because of the condi-
tion
∑
B :B λB · I B = I A on λ, lemma (A.) – again applied relative to A –
shows that this is already guaranteed when {I B |B :B} is linearly indepen-
dent. This again ensures there is a unique (rational-valued) solution λ to
the given condition.
Finally, we consider constraints with γ = −1. They can only occur
when A =Ω, which we have already excluded, so this case can be ignored.
Incorporating what we have learned about the three different cases
results in a feasible definition for the coherence of a lower probability:Constraints for
Ω = {a,b,c}:
P; = 0, PΩ = 1,
0≤ P a ≤˚ 1, 0 ≤˚ P {a,b} ≤˚ 1
P {a,b}+P {a,c}−P a ≤ 1.
P a +Pb +Pc ≤˚ PΩ,
P {a,b}+ Pc ≤˚ PΩ.
P {a,b}+P {a,c}+P {b,c}
≤˚ 2 ·PΩ,
P a + Pb ≤ P {a,b},
(up to permutation;
≥˚ indicates a redun-
dant constraint)
cohP ⇔nrmP
∧0≤ P ≤ 1
∧∀A :℘Ω\ {;,Ω};
∀B :⊆℘Ω\ {;, A,Ω}∧.⋃B =Ω∧ {dep({IΩ, I A}∪ {I B |B :B})¬dep(ı I A ∪ {I B |B :B});
∀λ : (Q>0)B∪ı A∧.∑B :BλB · I B −λA · I A = 1;∑
B :BλB ·PB −λA ·P A ≤ 1
∧∀A :℘Ω 6=;;
∀B :⊆℘A \ {;, A}∧.⋃B = A ∧ {dep(ı I A ∪ {I B |B :B})¬dep{I B |B :B};
∀λ : (Q∩ ]0,1])B∧.∑B :BλB · I B = I A ;∑
B :BλB ·PB ≤ P A.
(.)
It is again interesting to get some feeling for the computational com-
plexity of this definition. So let us consider the number of candidate sets
of eventsB for the last case and for A :=Ω, i.e., for avoiding sure loss:
there are a total of 22






when considering the requirement
⋃
B =Ω (when `> 1) and the linear
independence requirement (when ` ≤ |Ω|). Let us illustrate this with
some magnitudes for both quantities:
|Ω| = 4: 104 and 103 (easy for current computers),
|Ω| = 5: 109 and 105,
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|Ω| = 6: 1018 and 108 (hard, even with an efficient implementation).
Generating the sets corresponding to the second quantity, as well as
their large number – as each implies a number of subsequent processing
steps – are the main contributors to the computational complexity.
With definition (.), we have given the most important theoretical
result in this chapter. This does not mean that all is said and done on the
theoretical side: Before talking about the more practical results, we treat
two other interesting topics in the next two subsections.
.. Permutation invariance
Up until now, all properties we have looked at were criteria that more or
less defined the set of all possible lower probabilities one would consider
working with in general: rationality criteria (avoiding sure loss, coher-
ence) or criteria justifiable on the basis of their mathematical simplicity
(additivity, k-monotonicity). There are other properties that can be used
to restrict attention to a subset of lower probabilities that are appropriate
in specific cases.











assume that the uncertainty model we use should be invariant under a
set of permutations of the possibility space. This assumption typically
arises in a situation where we have evidence that is symmetrical; e.g.,
about a six-faced die we get trustworthy information that every face
comes up at least one tenth of the time. This does not preclude the
die from being loaded, e.g., of one face coming up half of the time. So
this weak permutation invariance differs from the strong permutation
invariance which occurs when we have evidence of symmetry; e.g., when
the die is tested and proclaimed fair.




∣∣∣ ∀ω :Ω ;piω ∈Ω∣∣∣∧∀A :⊆Ω ;piA = {piω |ω : A}}. (.)
of elements and subsets of a finite possibility space Ω, a lower proba-
bility P on ℘Ω is called (weakly) permutation invariant when the lower
probability P A of an event A ofΩ is the same as the lower probability for
any permuted event. Permutation invariance is then formalized using
the predicate pin:PIΩ→B defined by
pinP ⇔∀pi :ΠΩ;
∀A :⊆Ω;
P (piA)= P A.
(.)
As any permutation preserves the cardinality of the event, and as
we consider the set of all permutations, a weakly permutation invariant
lower probability must be constant on events with constant cardinality.
 Extreme lower probabilities
Also (let B ,C :⊆Ω2), because the constraints PB = P A and PC = P A plus
transitivity of equality make the constraint PB = PC redundant, we can
reduce the number of nonredundant constraints by keeping one side
of the equality fixed. This is done by ordering the events – any strict
total order ≺ :(℘Ω)2 →Bwill do – and letting A be the minimum of theExample order-
ings of℘{a,b,c}.
Lexicographical:
;≺ ıa ≺ {a,b}≺ {a,b,c}≺
{a,c} ≺ ıb ≺ {b,c} ≺ ıc.
Cardinality-then-
lexicographical:
;≺ ıa ≺ ıb ≺ ıc ≺ {a,b}≺
{a,c} ≺ {b,c} ≺ {a,b,c}.
relative order for each cardinality. We get [also see Weichselberger ,
§..]
pinP ⇔∀k : 1..|Ω|−1;
∀B :⊂Ω∧. |B | = k ∧B Âmin{A :⊂Ω |k = |A|};
PB = P (min{A :⊂Ω |k = |A|}).
(.)
Programming-wise, using an ordering of the events is very natural, as
most objects (such as the power set ℘Ω) are encoded using list-like
structures.
.. Maxitivity
The last property we are going to look at is the one that is characteristic
for necessity measures, which are the conjugate lower probabilities of
the (maxitive) possibility measures [Dubois & Prade , §.]. These
necessity measures are a special type of belief functions (cf. (.)), but
we are going to make abstraction of that fact here.
An upper probability P on℘Ω is maxitive when its value in the union
of a couple of events B and C of Ω is the maximum of the values in each
of these events (P (B ∪C )=max{PB ,PC }), and therefore – for finite Ω –
the maximum of the values in the union’s elementary events. So an upper
probability P is maxitive if
∀A :⊆Ω∧. |A| > 1;
P A =max{P A}.
(.)
Note the similarity to the additivity property (.). To avoid technical
issues, we adopt the ad hoc convention that P;≤ PΩ, i.e., the value in
the empty set is not uniquely defined, but only constrained from above.
We use the conjugacy property (.) to translate this maxitivity
property to lower probabilities and obtain a predicate nec:PIΩ→B
defined by
necP ⇔∀A :⊂Ω∧. |A| < |Ω|−1;
P A =minω:Ω\APΩ 6=ω,
(.)
now with the ad hoc convention PΩ≥maxω:ΩPΩ 6=ω.
There is a problem with this property: it generates nonlinear con-
straints. Even worse, the predicate is nonconvex: take P ′ :PIΩ, then
necP ∧necP ′ does not guarantee nec( 12 P + 12 P ′)! This means the set of
all lower probabilities satisfying nec is not convex.
. Results 
So why do we investigate this property? A little reasoning allows us to
still use our standard procedure of first generating linear constraints and
then doing vertex enumeration to obtain the structure of the set of all
lower probabilities satisfying nec. This is why we investgate this property.
Recall that in §.., for finding a feasible set of constraints for
avoiding sure loss, we at some point used binary masks to introduce
constraints for each orthant P could be located in. Here we do something
similar: to be able to rewrite (.) using linear constraints, we have to
be able to explicitly write out the appearing minima. These are fully
determined when the set of values {PΩ 6=ω |ω :Ω} can be totally ordered,
which is always the case. We therefore consider all the possible orderings
and transfer these to a strict total order of the events of cardinality |Ω|−1
to obtain
necP ⇔∃ strict total order ≺ :{Ω 6=ω |ω :Ω}2 →B;
PΩ≥ P (max{Ω 6=ω |ω :Ω})
∧∀A :⊂Ω∧. |A| < |Ω|−1;
P A = P (min{Ω 6=ω |ω :Ω\ A}),
(.)
where we have incorporated our ad hoc convention concerning the lower
probability of the possibility space into the definition.
The trick we used to obtain (.) also tells us something about
the structure of the set of lower probabilities satisfying nec: For every
order, we obtain a specific convex set we call a lobe, so the whole set is
a union of lobes. As the events of cardinality |Ω|−1 are determined by
the missing elementary event, an ordering of these sets can therefore be
characterized by an (inverse) ordering of the missing elementary events.
This allows us to see that the set of all orders can be obtained by applying
all permutations of Ω to any one order. This means that all lobes are
identical up to a permutation of the possibility space Ω and we only
need to compute one.
We have arrived at the end of our discussion of a number of interest-
ing properties for lower probabilities and their constraint-based defini-
tion. Now it is time to leave the land of constraints and move to the land
of extremes.
. Results
In this chapter, we have started out by drawing attention to a nice prop-
erty of linear probabilities: any one of them can be written as a convex
combination of the degenerate probabilities, the extreme linear probabil-
ities. We claimed that the same could be done for lower probabilities that
are coherent or avoid sure loss; to wit, we claimed extreme lower proba-
 Extreme lower probabilities
bilities could be found for these cases. In §., the proposed approach
was shown: write down a constraint-based definition for the property
of interest and then apply a vertex enumeration algorithm to find the
extreme points corresponding to the generated set of constraints. In
the previous section, we deduced feasible, sometimes relatively efficient
constraint-based definitions for a number of interesting properties.
Here, in this section, we are going to look mainly at the output of
the vertex enumeration step. Of course, you will not be served withIn this text’s elec-
tronic version, the
raw input and out-
put files as well as
the source of the
‘constraints’ pro-
gram, are attached.
the raw output of the programs we used [Avis ; Fukuda & Prudon
]; i.e., text file upon text file of ordered numbers. Nor will you be
subjected to the raw input for these programs – text file upon text file
of ordered numbers, again –, generated by the “constraints” program
I wrote (encouraged by Matthias Troffaes’s 2-monotonicity prototype).
No, an illustrated overview of some simple results is far better to carry
the important ideas across; more (extensive) results can be found in the
Herbarium.
.. Assorted general remarks
Because we are still studying an aspect of normative probability theory,
we only present the extreme lower probabilities for sets of properties
that include or imply the property of avoiding sure loss.
Most of the properties we have discussed in the previous section do
not imply nonnegativity (.) and normedness (.) by themselves;
for example: lower probabilities that avoid sure loss can have negative
components and k-monotonicity is a scale-independent and translation-
independent property. However, in this section, we add these properties
if necessary, which ensures that all extreme lower probabilities P on ℘Ω
are located in the first orthant (P ≥ 0) and have trivial values in the im-
proper events (P;= 0 and PΩ= 1). Avoiding sure loss then guarantees
(cf. (.)) that all components of all extreme lower probabilities are
bounded, so we only encounter polytopes.
In case the set of properties implies coherence, it is possible to give a
graphical representation of the corresponding extreme lower probabili-
ties by using their credal set. Now that we are talking about credal sets, it
is also a good moment to draw attention to the almost entirely parallel
construction of extreme lower probabilities and the extreme points of a
credal set: the space of interest in the latter case is the unit simplex ∆Ω
instead of ℘Ω→ R and every component of the lower probability for
which we want to find the credal set specifies a constraint. (Compare
the figure at the end of §.. with the one at the beginning of §..,
both reproduced in the margin.)
Even though we do not know how to obtain the set of extreme coher-
ent lower probabilities on some possibility space Ω analytically, or even
if this is possible, there are some results we can deduce analytically.
. Results 
(i) One of them is that this set includes the – evidently coherent –
vacuous previsions relative to subsets (.). To see this, assume
that the vacuous probability P A (i.e., relative to A :⊆Ω) can be
written as a convex combination of coherent lower probabilities:
∃Q :⊆⊂ (PIΩ)coh;
∃λ :∆Q ;∑
R:QλR ·R = P A ,
then, due to the [0,1]-boundedness of coherent probabilities, it
must hold for all events B of Ω and all lower probabilities R :Q
that RB = P AB . This meansQ = ıP A .
(ii) Another result is that the degenerate probabilities are the only ex-
treme coherent lower probabilities that are nonzero on some ele-
mentary event. Using normedness and superadditivity, this follows
from the fact that any extreme coherent lower probability must
be {0,1}-valued on singletons, which itself can be seen to hold
using the following argument: Consider, ex absurdo, that there
is a P : ext(PIΩ)coh and an ω :Ω such that Pω ∈ ]0,1[. For every
P :MP , P−Pω·P
ω
1−Pω is an additive probability (we have just moved
the probability mass Pω1−Pω away from ω to the other elementary
events). So
R :=minP :ext(MP ) 11−Pω · (P −Pω ·Pω),
is a coherent lower probability. Moving first the scaling factor
1−Pω and then the term Pω ·Pω to the left-hand side, we see
that we can write P =minP :ext(MP ) P = (1−Pω) ·R+Pω ·Pω, con-
tradicting the assumption that P is an extreme point. (Our proof
here is based on an argument by Sebastian Maaß [].)
(iii) Because the labeling of the elements of Ω is irrelevant, the set of
(extreme) coherent lower probabilities is invariant under permuta-
tion of the labeling. Adding requirements besides coherence may
break this symmetry, of course.
(iv) Every coherent extreme lower probability on a possibility space Ω
can be extended to an extreme coherent lower probability on a
larger possibility space Ω′. This becomes clear by realizing that
any coherent lower probability P on ℘Ω′ such that P (Ω′ \Ω)= 0
can only be written as a convex combination of extreme points for
which the same holds. Each of these extreme points is therefore
completely determined by their values on ℘Ω.
Concerning k-monotonicity, there is one analytical result we must
mention: k-monotonicity for any k ≥ |Ω| is equivalent to complete
monotonicity [Chateauneuf & Jaffray , Corollary ]. Our results do
not contradict this, we always find the vacuous probabilities relative to
events as extreme points in these cases (cf. (.)).
 Extreme lower probabilities
A last general remark concerns the combination of properties. When
we look at the convex sets of lower probabilities satisfying different linear
constraint-based properties, their intersection is the convex set of lower
probabilities satisfying all those properties. Every extreme point of any
of the original sets that also satisfies the other properties – i.e., lies in the
intersection – is thus an extreme point of this intersection. A useful appli-
cation of this insight is the following: We have mentioned (after (.))
that, for k :N≥2, nonnegative normed k-monotone lower probabilities
are coherent. The vacuous lower probabilities relative to events are k-
monotone by definition (cf. the two paragraphs before (.)) and
are, as seen above in item (i)å, extreme coherent lower probabilities.
Therefore, the vacuous lower probabilities relative to events are extreme
nonnegative normed k-monotone lower probabilities.
After these general remarks, we take a look at some more practical
results in the next subsections. There, we only look at possibility spaces of
three, four and six elementary events. The smaller cardinalities become
trivial, as the restrictions imposed at the beginning of this subsection
give the same results as coherence and even complete monotonicity:
|Ω| = 0: thenΩ=; and℘Ω= {;}; (PI;)nrm is empty, because normed-
ness (.) cannot be satisfied. (Admittedly, this case is absurd.)
|Ω| = 1: then ℘Ω = {;,Ω}; (PIΩ)nrm’s single extreme point is the de-
generate vacuous prevision PΩ. (This case is useless if not absurd.)
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are the vacuous probability PΩ and the degenerate probabili-
ties P a and P b . So in this first nonabsurd and useful case – often
used in examples – all coherent probabilities are linear-vacuous,
which makes it ill-suited to illustrate the peculiarities of coherence.
Due to the combinatorial explosion in the number of constraints for the
interesting properties and the computational complexity of the vertex
enumeration algorithms (cf. §..), results for possibility spaces larger
than four are hard to compute.
.. Three elementary events
In this subsection, we let Ω := {a,b,c} and use the cardinality-then-lex-
icographical ordering of events; as an illustration, let us see what this
gives for the power set and some special lower probabilities:
℘Ω= {;, ıa,ıb,ıc, {a,b},{a,c},{b,c}, Ω},
PΩ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 ),
P {a,b} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1 ),
P a = (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1 ).
Furthermore, it is economical, notation-wise, to write the lower probabil-
ities more compactly without parentheses and commas as, for example,
. Results 
P a = 0 100 110 1, grouped per cardinality of the event. Stacked versions
are also used; e.g., P a = 0 100110 1 .
As an introductory example, we are going to look at the extreme
linear-vacuous lower probabilities, or, more explicitly, at {PΩ,P a ,P b ,P c }.
Apart from giving this set of extreme points, we can also give the cor- The list of neighbors
can be obtained




responding adjacency graph, in which the nodes correspond to the ex-
treme points and in which the edges connect neighboring extreme points
of the polytope. The adjacency graph of the set defined by convex com-
binations of P a , P b , P c , and PΩ is given by the left-hand side figure. The













cates that the extreme lower probability is
completely monotone (cf. §..); the cir-
cular arrow 	 indicates that the extreme
lower probability is permutation invariant,
i.e., satisfies (.). For the current case, the
adjacency graph can be drawn in its entirety;
this would result in too space-consuming
spaghetti-like drawings for others. In some
cases, this can be resolved by looking at the permutational symme-
tries in the graph: we can restrict ourselves to a partial graph that gen-
erates the whole graph – i.e., all of its nodes and edges – by looking
at all permuted versions. This is shown in the right-hand side figure.
In such a partial graph, some nodes represent a permutation class, a
permutation-invariant subset of extreme lower probabilities; here, P b
represents {P a ,P b ,P c }. To indicate edges within this subset, loops are
used. To keep track of the total number of extreme lower probabilities,
a #-prefixed number is added as annotation to indicate the number of
extreme lower probabilities represented by the node.
The first nontrivial case we are going to look at is lower probabilities
that avoid sure loss, the set (PIΩ)asl∧nng∧nrm, to be precise. This set has
 extreme points; the corresponding adjacency graph is given in the left-
hand side drawing, its permutationally restricted but legible counterpart
























 Extreme lower probabilities
A first remark concerns the full graph: we have included it here just this
once as a justification for not giving it again for any of the cases still to
come. Some additional remarks about the restricted graph are also in
order: When an extreme lower probability is nonmonotone, we omit
the (undefined) monotonicity level. Some extreme lower probabilities,
although related by permutation, are nevertheless given as separate
nodes (e.g., 0 010001 1 and
0 100
010 1 ); this is because they take up a different role
in the restricted graph. This also forces us to indicate – by notationally
abusing the bijection arrow↔ – to which permutation the loops on these
nodes correspond.





















simpler adjacency graphs: We compare
the graphs for the completely monotone
belief functions (PIΩ)bel (cf. (.); it
is also equal to (PIΩ)3-mon∧nrm) and
the necessity measures (PIΩ)nec∧nrm
(cf. §..; a subset of the belief func-
tions). It is known that both sets have the
vacuous previsions relative to events as
extreme points, but for belief functions, all extreme points are neighbors
(see left-hand side figure), for necessity measures, the ‘extreme points’
are grouped per lobe (see right-hand side figure). For (PIΩ)bel, notice
the need to create a separate node P {b,c}; it would otherwise not have
been possible to express that it also neighbors P a .
To finish this subsection with the most important case, we now look
at coherence. As was also shown by Maaß [a, ], the set of eight
























0 000 111 2
This set consists of all the vacuous lower prob-
abilities relative to events and also one new
extreme point, which is 2-monotone. This im-
plies – as k-monotonicity is preserved under
convex combinations – that all lower probabil-
ities on a possibility space of three elements are
2-monotone, so this is also the graph correspond-
ing to (PIΩ)2-mon∧nrm. In the adjacency graph
we have added a graphical representation of the




2 1 (the credal sets of the
vacuous lower probabilities are the 0..2-dimensional faces of the unit
simplex). Due to their construction, all the extreme lower probabilities
have rational components, so after rescaling, they can be written more
tersely using only integers, as is illustrated in the figure.
. Results 
.. Four elementary events
In this subsection, we let Ω := {a,b,c,d}; the power set with its ordering
and some illustrative vacuous lower probabilities become
℘Ω= {;, ıa,ıb,ıc,ıd , {a,b},{a,c},{a,d}{b,c},{b,d},{c,d}, Ω 6=d ,Ω 6=c ,Ω 6=b ,Ω 6=a , Ω},
PΩ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 ),
PΩ 6=d = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1 ),
P {a,b} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1 ),
P a = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1 ).
With the increase in size of the possibility space, and the correspond-
ing doubling of the size of its power set, the adjacency graphs risk be-
coming unreadable (due to the increase in the number of nodes and
connections), even when exploiting permutational symmetries. There is,
however, a possibility for a further simplification of the graphs: We have
observed that whenever coherence is implied by the properties studied,
every extreme lower probability that is additive is connected to all other
nodes (and I conjecture that this is not limited to the cases we studied).
So we can omit these additive probabilities – the degenerate ones, in



































of this approach is
given with the par-




– on the right-hand
side – with the par-
tial graph for the
set of 3-monotone
lower probabilities (PIΩ)3-mon∧nrm.Notice the parallels with what we
have seen in the previous subsection.
In §.., we have already mentioned that the decomposition of
a lower probability as a convex combination of extreme lower proba-
bilities is not necessarily unique. The last case allows us to illustrate
this fact nicely. The permutation invariant completely monotone lower






4 1 can be written as two different convex
combinations of extreme 3-monotone lower probabilities:






4 1= 34 · (0 0000 000000 13 13 13 13 1)+ 14 ·PΩ
=∑ω:Ω 14 ·PΩ 6=ω .
More generally, we can say the following: A polytope for which the adja-
 Extreme lower probabilities
cency graph is complete – i.e., for which all nodes are connected to each
other – corresponds to a simplex, so any of its points has a unique de-
composition in terms of extreme points (the left-hand side graph above
is an example). Whenever some nodes are not connected (such as PΩ






3 1 in the last case), Radon’s theorem [Peterson
] tells us that the decomposition is not unique.
Looking at the adjacency graph for the 3-monotone lower probabil-
ities on a possibility space of cardinality 4 (above) and at the one for
2-monotone lower probabilities on a possibility space of cardinality 3
(at the end of the previous subsection), we see a very similar structure;
in comparison to the belief functions there is one extra extreme lower
probability (characterized by the value 1/|Ω|−1 on events of cardinality
|Ω| −1) connected to all but the vacuous lower probability. The same
structure is seen for a cardinality of 5, which makes me bold enough to
conjecture that this might hold for all finite cardinalities.
In the end, there are always cases for which the adjacency graphs
become too complex to draw even when leaving out the degenerate
ones. It can nevertheless be interesting to give an ordered list of the






the set (PIΩ)k-mon∧nrm of  extreme 2-monotone lower probabilities.
We still use the ‘one example per permutation class’-simplification and
have ordered the nodes such that those that are connected to the nodes
for the vacuous lower probability are on the left of the vacuous lower

















































The list of the most interesting set of extreme lower probabilities, the
extreme coherent ones, is rather large, so we have relegated it to §A..
in the Herbarium. There, you can also verify that amongst the extreme
2-monotone lower probabilities given above, only the ones in the lower-
















2 1 as a representative)
are not extreme coherent lower probabilities.
. Results 
.. Staring two-monotonely at cubical dice
For possibility spaces of five elements and larger, the computation of the
extreme lower probabilities using our approach becomes too computa-
tionally intensive in many cases. The one we present here to draw the





























Let Ω be a six-element space, we then look at
the set (PIΩ)2-mon∧nrm∧pin of 2-monotone permu-
tation invariant lower probabilities. This set con-
tains models for the uncertainty faced when betting
with common six-faced cubical dice for which no
face-specific knowledge is available. As permutation
invariant lower probabilities must be constant on
events with constant cardinality (cf. §..), we have
given only one component value per cardinality size
when writing down the extreme lower probabilities
in the nodes of the adjacency graph. (Note the regularity of the compo-
nent values. The same regularity is also observed in §A.. for smaller
possibility spaces, so this makes for a nice conjecture.)








6 1, one we know nothing about
by PΩ, and 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 should be used when we only know that none of
the die’s faces is more likely to come up than the others combined.
Note that the monotonicity levels of the non-vacuous extreme lower
probabilities had to be calculated, as it is a priori possible for some (but
not all) of them to be more than 2-monotone (e.g., 3-monotone). This
can be done quite easily by applying the Möbius transform (cf. (.))
and a result by Chateauneuf & Jaffray [, Proposition ].
To be honest, I would have liked to call this subsection “Staring co-
herently at cubical dice”, but trying to calculate the extreme permutation
invariant coherent lower probabilities on a possibility space of cardi-
nality 6 turned out to be a computational bridge too far for the current
implementation and personal computers. For lower cardinality possibil-
ity spaces, there was no problem. For those who like to see more results,
we have therefore included the adjacency graphs of all permutation in-
variant k-monotone or coherent lower probabilities for these cases in




Let men be once fully perswaded of these two princi-
ples, that there is nothing in any object, consider’d in
itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a con-
clusion beyond it; and, that even after the observation of
the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have
no reason to draw any inference concerning any object
beyond those of which we have had experience; I say, let
men be once fully convinc’d of these two principles, and
this will throw them so loose from all common systems,
that they will make no difficulty in receiving any, which
may appear the most extraordinary.
Hume [, §.., ¶]
We wish to learn from samples: make predictions about future sam-
ples or draw conclusions about the process generating the samples. This
is respectively called predictive and parametric inference. The uncer-
tainty model making these inferences based on the given samples is
called an inference model.
The theory introduced in ‘Modeling uncertainty’ allows us – us-
ing natural or regular extension – to make explicit what is implicit in
the coherent lower previsions that describe what we know about some
situation or problem. This is a form of deductive inference.
It would be nice to be able to draw definite inferences using only




be used as a logic
of induction. He
stresses, however,
that it must start
with some (by that
theory) unjusti-
fied premisses.
is possible and it tells us to conclude that we know nothing [Walley
, §..]. It would be even nicer to be able to obtain non-vacuous
inferences. For this, at least a little information about the process gener-
ating the samples (we wish to learn about) must be added in some way.
This is possible by making a leap of faith and adding a limited number
of predictions or conclusions ourselves (e.g., by elicitation). Typically,
this takes the form of a so-called prior uncertainty model that is itself
non-vacuous.
This leap of faith is an essential aspect of what learning – inductive
inference – is about. The method of trial & error, also called guess &
check, is a prime example of this. In this chapter and the next, we are
going to present inference models that are meant to allow people to make
educated but conservative guesses. We do not focus on the checking or
validation aspect of learning.
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The inference models we are going to look at more or less transform
inductive inference to deductive inference by providing some prior un-
certainty model, from which an updated or posterior uncertainty model
is obtained by conditioning on the observation. This is assumed to al-
ways be a (partial) sample and nothing more, as other types of informa-
tion cannot be identified with a conditioning event. The updated model
is then taken to be the model learned from the sample. Note however,
that even though the approach we are taking is comfortingly consistent,
there is no reason to preclude other approaches, in which learning is not
(directly) equated to conditioning. Walley [, §.] provides a nice
basis for reflection on this issue, which is especially important whenever
the observations cannot by good approximation be identified with some
conditioning event.
In this chapter, the ideas just mentioned are made concrete by look-
ing at inference models for categorical data, a term that refers to the fact
that the considered sample spaces are finite and thus discrete. On the
one hand, we look at a framework for immediate predictive inference
in §. that leads to the predictive inference model called the impre-





role in the design of
inference models.
]. On the other hand, in §., we look at the imprecise Dirichlet
model – idm for short – [Walley ], a parametric inference model. They
are followed by some applications in §.. But first we strengthen our
foundations by expounding on the concepts of exchangeability, suffi-
cient statistics, and likelihood functions; this will prove essential for the
ensuing sections.
. Exchangeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions
In this section, we do the basic set-up for the inference models we con- The consequences




De Cooman et al.
[b, c].
sider. We first look at the exchangeability assumption and its conse-
quences; it constitutes an essential ingredient in our approaches. This
discussion leads to the introduction of some other concepts, such as
sufficient statistics and likelihood functions.
.. Samples, random variables & exchangeability
Consider a subject who is making a finite sequence of N :N>0 observa-
tions of a certain phenomenon. This phenomenon can for example be
the amount and type of precipitation on Christmas eve, the number
of deadly car accidents every weekend, or the number and type of the
defects in a freshly grown silicon crystal.
In this chapter, we only consider phenomena that provide observa-
tions that can be put in a finite number of categories; the archetypical
example for this is drawing colored marbles from an urn. We call each
observation a sample and the set of possible observations (categories)
 Inference models
the sample space, generically denoted byX . This results in a possibility
spaceX N , i.e., the space of possible sequences.
As we assume that the same sample spaceX can be used for each
observation in the sequence, we can use a sequence of random variables
X := (Xk |k : 1..N ) to be able to clearly identify each of the observations
and avoid confusion about what is observed when. Each of these ran-
dom variables is just the identity function onX ; so, when observation
number ` : 1..N turns out to be the category z, then X`z = z; or X` = z
for short.
The beliefs the subject has about these random variables – i.e., about
how likely it is to observe some sequence of values – can be modeled
with a coherent set of desirable gamblesR :⊂LX N . We call the corre-
sponding unconditional coherent lower prevision P onLX N the (joint)
sequence distribution of X . They are related by GP = GR (cf. (.),
(.), and (.)).
When the subject has reasons to believe the process that generates
the samples is the same, practically speaking, for every observation, then
the order of observation is irrelevant and the subject should make no
practical distinction between a sequence of random variables with or
without permuted indices. To formalize what this means forR and P ,
we lift permutations from the index set to vectors of samples and to
gambles:Illustration
withX := {a,b},
N := 3, x := a,b, a,
and pi := 3,1,2:
pix = a, a,b.
Π1..N :=
{
pi: 1..N ↔ 1..N
∣∣∣
∪X N ∪X N
∣∣∣ ∀x :X N ;pix = x ◦pi
∪LX N ∪LX N
∣∣∣∧∀ f :LX N ;pi f = f ◦pi}. (.)
Let pi be any permutation in Π1..N . The belief that the phenomenon





we will from now on call exchangeability – implies that the subject is
indifferent between any gamble f onX N and its permutations pi f : he is
marginally willing to exchange one for the other. This means that
P (pi f − f )= P (pi f − f )= 0= P ( f −pi f )= P ( f −pi f ). (.)
Define
HX N := span{pi f − f | f :LX N ;pi :Π1..N }. (.)
It is interesting to realize that the linear subspaceHX N ofLX N only
contains marginally desirable gambles, i.e.,HX N ⊆GP =GR . To show
this, consider gambles f and g onX N , two index permutations pi and p¯i,
a positive real number α, and a negative real number β, then
P
(
α · (pi f − f ))=α ·P (pi f − f )= 0=β ·P (p¯ig − g )= P(β · (p¯ig − g )),
P
(
(pi f − f )+ (p¯ig − g ))≥ P (pi f − f )+P (p¯ig − g )= 0,
. Exchangeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions 
P
(
(pi f − f )+ (p¯ig − g ))≤ P (pi f − f )+P (p¯ig − g )= 0,
where we have used (.), nonnegative homogeneity (.), conju-
gacy (.), superadditivity (.), and mixed subadditivity (.). By
inverting the inequalities and interchanging P and P we also obtain a set
of valid expressions. This means that P is both zero and self-conjugate,
and therefore linear, on the whole ofHX N .
Knowing that a coherent lower prevision P on X N is completely
defined by its set of marginal gambles, the realization thatHX N ⊆GP
under an exchangeability assumption is used as a definition of exchange-
ability for lower previsions. The predicate xch:(PLX N )coh →B formal-
izes this:
xchP ⇔HX N ⊆GP ⇔∀ f :LX N ;
∀pi :Π1..N ;
P (pi f − f )= 0= P (pi f − f ).
(.)
On the other hand,HX N ⊆GR cannot serve as a definition of ex-
changeability for coherent sets of desirable gamblesR :⊂LX N , consid-
ering that GR cannot encode the borderline behavior ofR; it can serve
as a basis, however. As any gamble inHX N is marginally desirable, the
sum of such a gamble and a desirable gamble is also desirable, as long




gambles isHX N +
(LXN )≥0∧6=(XN ;0).
HX N +R 6=(X N ;0) ⊆R, (.)
and take this constraint onR as a definition of exchangeability for co-
herent sets of desirable gambles. We useR 6=(X N ;0) instead ofR on the
left-hand side to avoid letting the desirability of gambles inHX N de-
pend on the desirability of the zero gamble (X N ; 0), which seems just a
question of terminology. We do not have to worry about the left-hand
side not avoiding partial loss, becauseHX N contains no gambles lead-





0=∑(pi f − f )<∑y :X N∧. y 6=x (pi f − f )y,
so there is some y inX N different from x such that (pi f − f )y > 0.
The left-hand side of (.) is very much akin to the construction of a
set of desirable gambles starting from a set of marginally desirable gam-
bles GP (of some lower prevision P ) we encountered in §... We men-
tioned GP +R>0 and GP + (LX N )>0 as good options for the correspond-
ing set of desirable gambles (cf. (.) and the surrounding paragraph).
Here, the first difference is that we only take a subset of the marginally
desirable gambles, so we only generate a subset of the desirable gam-
bles. The second difference is that we know all desirable gambles and
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therefore do not need to restrict ourselves to R>0 or (LX N )>0. We will
see further on (cf. (.) and below) that thanks to this, (.)å also
implies that after an observation, the updated sets of desirable gambles
of exchangeable sets of desirable gambes are exchangeable as well.
We have given two definitions of exchangeability: one for previsions
and one for sets of desirable gambles. If we wish to use both types of
uncertainty model interchangeably, we need to show that they are con-
sistent in the sense that the prevision corresponding to an exchangeable
set of desirable gambles is exchangeable and that any exchangeable pre-
vision can be derived from some exchangeable set of desirable gambles.
(i) We first start from an exchangeable coherent set of desirable gam-
blesR. Considering that
(a) (X N ; 0) ∈ clR, soHX N =HX N + ı(X N ; 0)⊂R∪GR , and
(b) HX N is a linear subspace ofX N that contains the zero gam-
ble (X N ; 0), so it lies either entirely on the border GR of the
cone that isR or part of it lies strictly outside of this border,
we must conclude that HX N ⊆ GR . Thus the coherent lower
prevision P corresponding toR satisfies (.)å, because GP =GR .
(ii) Starting from an exchangeable coherent lower prevision P , the cor-
responding least committal coherent set of desirable gamblesRP
(cf. (.)) might not satisfy (.)å. However, the enlarged set
(RP )=(X N ;0)∪
(





(RP )=(X N ;0)∪
(
HX N + (RP )6=(X N ;0)
))
6=(X N ;0)
⊆HX N + (HX N + (RP )6=(X N ;0));
becauseHX N is a linear space, this becomes
=HX N + (RP )6=(X N ;0)
⊆ (RP )=(X N ;0)∪
(
HX N + (RP )6=(X N ;0)
)
.
This enlarged set is coherent, because the set-sum of the linear, par-
tial loss-avoiding, (X N ; 0)-containing setHX N and (RP )6=(X N ;0)
is a cone satisfying (.)–(.). Moreover,HX N + (RP )6=(X N ;0) ⊆
GP + (RP )6=(X N ;0) ⊆GP ∪RP , so the enlarged set’s marginal gam-
bles are the same and therefore so is the corresponding lower
prevision, P .
We mainly work in terms of previsions in this chapter, but when needed,
we use the stronger definition (.)å of exchangeability for desirable
gambles.
The self-conjugacy of exchangeable previsions on gambles of the
form pi f − f has some interesting immediate consequences:
(i) Vacuous previsions cannot be exchangeable: they are only self-
conjugate on constant gambles.
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(ii) All lower previsions that dominate an exchangeable lower pre-
vision are also exchangeable; so its credal set (cf. §..) must
consist of exchangeable linear previsions only:
xchP ⇔MP = (MP )xch. (.)
(iii) We can infer from the identity in (.), using mixed sub and su-
peradditivity (.), that
P (pi f )−P f ≥ 0≥ P (pi f )−P f ,
so we then see that exchangeability implies permutation invari-
ance or permutability (cf. §..):
xchP ⇒∀ f :LX N ;
∀pi :Π1..N ;
P (pi f )= P f .
(.)
The converse does not hold, as vacuous previsions are permutable.
When the sequence distribution P of the sequence of random vari-
ables X is exchangeable, we also call that sequence exchangeable. Con-
sider this to be the case, then any permutation (Xpik |k : 1..N ) is exchange-
able as well and has the same sequence distribution P . Moreover, the vec-
tor formed by any selection of n : 1..N of the random variables in X is also
exchangeable. Its sequence distribution is the exchangeableX n-margi-
nal P n onLX n of P (cf. §..).
In the previous chapter, properties imposed on lower probabilities
restricted the form of these lower probabilities, i.e., they could be written
as a convex combination of a specific set of extreme lower probabilities.
Here, we also impose a property – exchangeability –, now on a lower
prevision. It turns out that this also restricts the form of these lower pre-
visions, but in a different way. This is the subject of the next subsection.
.. Representation in terms of count vectors
We have just seen that the order of an exchangeable sequence of random
variables and thus of a finite sequence of samples x inX ∗ :=⋃n:NX n
is irrelevant. What remains of this length-νx sample sequence after dis-
carding the order can be summarized by a vector m := ∣∣{k : 1..νx |xk = z}∣∣
in NX containing the number of times mz each category z ofX occurs
in x. We call m the count vector of the sequence x. Of course it is also
the count vector of any permutation pix of x.
To the spaceX N of all sample sequences of length N , there corre-
sponds a space of count vectors
NX := {m :NX ∣∣∑m =N}. (.)
 Inference models
The surjective counting map CX :X ∗→NX that maps sequences to
count vectors is defined for every sequence x and every category z ofXTake x := a,b, a and






∣∣{k : 1..νx |xk = z}∣∣, (.)
where νx is the length of the sample sequence x (which is N in this
subsection).
Naturally, some sample sequences have the same count vectors;
to wit, all those which are related by permutation. Given some count
vector m in NX of total size νm :=∑m (which is N in this subsection),







[m] := {y :X νm ∣∣CX y =m}. (.)
Similarly, the atom of a sequence x is
[x] := {pix |pi :Π1..νx }. (.)
For convenience, we extend the definition of the counting map to atoms
with CX [m] :=m and CX [x] :=CX x. The atom’s size follows from count-CX [(2,1)] = 2,1.
ing the number of permutations:
|[(2,1)]| = ( 32,1)













[NX ] := {[m] ∣∣m : NX } (.)
is the partition ofX N generated by all permutations.
With any gamble h on NX we can associate the gamble
h ◦CX =∑m:NX h(m) · I [m] (.)
onX N . Note that the function (•◦CX ) is linear, constant additive, and
supremum-preserving; also note that pi(h ◦CX )= h ◦CX for any permu-
tation pi.
We have now gathered all the ingredients we need to define the
coherent lower prevision Q on L NX induced by some exchangeable
lower prevision P onLX N (cf. §..). For every gamble h on N
X , this
prevision is defined by
Qh = P (h ◦CX ). (.)
This so-called count distribution is a model for the uncertainty about
the count random variable CX X ; it can be seen as a version of P from
which exchangeability is abstracted away by using count vectors.
So what does this essence of exchangeability, which we have ab-
stracted away, look like?
To find that out, we return to the basis of our definition of exchange-
able sets of desirable gambles: somewhat below (.), we found that P
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is zero and linear onHX N = span{pi f − f | f :LX N ;pi :Π1..N }. Now fix
some f inLX N , then P is zero and linear on span{pi f − f |pi :Π1..N }; by





pi:Π1..Npi f − f
)= 0= P( 1N ! ·∑pi:Π1..Npi f − f )






)−P f ≥ 0≥ P( 1N ! ·∑pi:Π1..Npi f )−P f .
So
P f = P( 1N ! ·∑pi:Π1..Npi f ), (.)
which means that the lower prevision of a gamble is equal to the previ-
sion of its mean over all permutations, a result that is very similar to the
permutability (.) of an exchangeable lower prevision.
The full implications of this last equality become clear after an analy-
sis of the right-hand side gamble. It is [NX ]-measurable, i.e., constant
on the atoms of the partition ofX N generated by the set of all permu-
tations: let x be some sequence of samples, the corresponding atom is
[x]= {p¯ix | p¯i :Π1..N } (cf. (.)). So if p¯i is some index permutation, then∑




(p¯i◦pi) f )x =∑pi:Π1..N (pi f )x,
as the set of all permutations is invariant under permutation. Knowing















pi:Π1..N (pi f )x
) · I [m]
=∑m:NX 1|[m]| · ( 1N ! ·∑pi:Π1..N∑x:[m] f (pix)) · I [m]
=∑m:NX 1|[m]| · ( 1N ! ·∑pi:Π1..N∑x:[m] f x) · I [m]
=∑m:NX ( 1|[m]| ·∑x:[m] f x) · I [m]
=∑m:NX Mh( f |m) · I [m] =Mh( f |CX •), (.)
where Mh(•|m) is the exchangeable linear prevision associated with the
uniform distribution on [m] defined by (let g be a gamble on [m]) According to our
notational conven-
tion, Mh( f |m) =
Mh( f[m]|m)
(cf. §..).
Mh(g |m) := 1|[m]| ·
∑
y :[m]g y . (.)
This distribution is known as the multivariate hypergeometric distri-
bution [Johnson et al. , §.], which – not surprisingly – gives
the probability of drawing a sequence x without replacement from an
urn with composition m (or y :X n , when including its marginals for
sequences of length n : 1..N ).
Combining (.), (.), and (.) leads to a nice representation
Cifarelli & Regaz-
zini [] provide




theorem in the spirit of the one for linear previsions by de Finetti [],
but obtained directly for the more general coherent lower previsions.
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It shows that the exchangeability of a sequence of random variables X
or its distribution, the lower prevision P is intimately linked to count
vectors and draws from an urn without replacement:
xchP ⇔P =Q(Mh(•|•)),
with Q := P (•◦CX ).
(.)
The importance of this result is the following: Under an assumption
of exchangeability, we can – and perhaps should, to avoid not taking
into account exchangeability – think in terms of count vectors (using the
count distribution Q); any additional information given as supremum
prices for gambles onX N can be translated to information for gambles
on NX using (.).
We can interpret Mh(•|CX •) as a conditional linear prevision corre-
sponding to the partition [NX ], defined on LX N . This way, the char-
acterization of the sequence distribution P through (.) can also be
seen as the marginal extension of the conditional Mh(•|•) expressing
only exchangeability and a marginal Q expressing all other information
contained in P . An immediate consequence of this is that whenever
P [m] =Qm > 0 for some count vector m, then Mh(•|m) is the unique
solution of the gbr (.).
Each of the marginal sequence distributions P n – also being ex-
changeable – has an induced coherent count distribution Qn onL nX ,
which can be used in a representation similar to the one described
in (.). Because the space NX of count vectors does not have a carte-
sian product structure, these count distributions Qn cannot be viewed
as simple marginals of Q; they can, however, be viewed as induced dis-
tributions (cf. §..).
The function SNn :L nX →L NX characterizing their relationship can
be found by doing the marginalization work on the level of the sequence
distributions P and P n : (let h be a gamble on nX and f := h ◦CX )
Q(SNn h) :=Qnh = P n f = P f˜ =Q
(
Mh( f˜ |•)), (.)
where we have respectively used the definition of the count distribution,
cylindrical extension of f to f˜ to go from marginal to joint distribution
(cf. §..), and finally the representation theorem (.). Let us make
the definition of SNn more explicit; consider some m in N
X , then
(SNn h)m =Mh( f˜ |m)= 1|[m]| ·
∑
x:[m] f˜ x;
any sequence x in [m] can be written as a pair of sequences y, z in⋃
m′:nX∧. m′≤m[m







y :[m′] f y ;
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=∑m′:nX |[m−m′]|·|[m′]||[m]| ·hm′. (.)
This explicit definition will be of use in the next subsection, where we
let N = νm become arbitrarily large.
.. Arbitrary length sample sequences & limiting frequencies
When we consider an infinite sequence of samples, our sequence of De Cooman et
al. [c] give a
more extensive and
detailed treatment
of the ideas we wish
to convey in this
subsection.
random variables becomes X := (Xk |k :N>0). We extend the definition
of exchangeability to such infinite sequences by requiring that any finite
subsequence should be exchangeable, or, equivalently, that for any n
inN>0 the sequence (Xk |k : 1..n) should be exchangeable. The possibility
space now becomesN>0 →X .
We could model the available information about X with its sequence
distribution, a coherent lower prevision P onL N>0→X . The definition
of exchangeability for X implies a definition for the exchangeability
of P : for every n, its coherentX n-marginal P n onLX n has to be an ex-
changeable sequence distribution. Knowledge of the supremum buying
price defined by some marginal P n in some gamble f onX n , defines
the value of P for the cylindrically extended gamble f˜ onN>0 →X with
P f˜ = P n f .
We wish to characterize the exchangeability of sample sequences of LetX := {a,b,c};
elements of nX/n











arbitrary length. However, for this task the possibility space N>0 →X
appears quite awkward to work with and therefore so does P . This is
why we eliminate P from consideration, but preserve its unawkward
marginals (P n |n :N>0) and the information they carry. We can get more
insight by looking at frequency distributions, which are just count distri-
butions under a thin disguise. So first consider, for every n, the coherent
count distribution Qn onL nX corresponding to the marginal sequence
distribution P n . Now, with every set of counts, there corresponds a set
of frequencies
nX/n := {mn ∣∣m : nX }⊂∆X ∩QX , (.)
where ∆X is the unit simplex for the sample spaceX (cf. (.)). We
can define the coherent frequency distribution Rn onL nX/n with
Rn =Qn(•◦ ( 1n ·)) or, equivalently, Qn =Rn(•◦ (n·)). (.)
Now the idea is the following: instead of considering a sequence dis-
tribution P on (some sufficiently rich part of)L N>0→X , we consider a fre-
quency distribution R on (some sufficiently rich part of)L ∆X to model
the information available about X . Its possibility space, the set of all
frequency vectors ∆X , appeals intuitively and – because of its bounded-
ness – technically. Just as the finitely exchangeable marginals (P n |n :N>0)
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contained everything of practical interest in the sequence distribution P ,
they, through the corresponding count distributions (Qn |n :N>0), also
contain everything of practical interest in R. The distributions in these
twoN>0-tuples should therefore be recoverable from R as induced pre-
visions (cf. §..).
Conjuring up the relationships between gambles onX n or on nX
and gambles on ∆X that characterize the relationship of R and its in-
duced previsions, and verifying the consistency of these relationships
takes up the rest of this subsection. As we expect of R that it behaves as
the frequency distributions in (Rn |n :N>0), we look for inspiration to
the relationships between gambles for induced distributions for finite
sequence lengths n and N :N≥n .
Using (.)å and (.)–(.)–, we know that for any gamble h
on nX we must have that
Qnh =QN (SNn h)=RN
(
SNn h ◦ (n·)
)
. (.)
This must hold for N that are arbitrarily large; to see how SNn h ◦ (n·)
behaves in this limit, we write its value in some frequency vector ϑ






The fraction under the sum is the only thing that is affected by the mag-
nitude of N ; we rewrite it, first by applying (.):
|[N ·ϑ−m]| · |[m]|
|[N ·ϑ]| =
(N−n)!∏
z:X (N ·ϑz−mz )!
· |[m]|
N !∏
z:X (N ·ϑz )!
;
it should be understood that the right-hand side is zero whenever ϑz = 0







= |[m]| ·∏z:Xmϑmzz ·
∏
`:1..mz−1(1− `N ·ϑz )∏
`:1..n−1(1− `N )
,
where we have used a notational shorthand that will be useful later on
too: for any α in RX such that α≥ 0 we letXα := {z :X |αz > 0}. Finally,






limk→+∞(Sk !n h)(k ! ·ϑ)=Cm(h|n,ϑ) :=
∑
m:nX hm ·B mϑ, (.)
where on the left-hand sides we consider the limiting sequence to start
at index min{k :N>0 |ϑ ∈ k !X/k !}.
. Exchangeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions 
The left-hand side of (.) provides – after extension to irrational fre- We plot the
monomodal Bern-
stein polynomials
of degree n (which









quency vectors by continuity – a definition of functions B m :∆X →R≥0,
the (multivariate) Bernstein polynomials of degree n [Prautzsch et al.
, §.]. These form a basis for the polynomials on the unit sim-
plex ∆X of degree up to n: for any N inN≥n , any one of them, call it v , is
uniquely defined by some gamble bNv on n
X , which gives the coefficients
of its decomposition in Bernstein polynomials, i.e., v = Cm(bNv |N ,•)




Cm(h|n,•) |n :N>0 ; h :L nX
}
. (.)
In (.), we have introduced the linear prevision associated to what
we call the count-multinomial distribution, which gives the probability
of drawing a count vector m with sum n with replacement from an urn
with a composition characterized by the frequency ϑ.
Based on the intuition gained by calculating the limits above, we
modify (.) into
Qnh =R(Cm(h|n,•)) (.)
and make this our proposal for the relationship between R and Qn ; it
is a constraint that has to be satisfied for all n inN>0 and all gambles h
on nX . It defines R uniquely on the set of all polynomial gambles V∆X .
To show that this is a good proposal, we have to prove that this R is
a coherent lower prevision on V∆X . On top of this, we must not forget
that (Qn |n :N>0) is a tuple of count distributions for an exchangeable
sequence of random variables X , which means that its components




(cf. (.)), for all N inN>n .
To verify that R respects this consistency relationship, let v in V∆X be
of degree n, then Rv =Qn(bnv ), but also Rv =QN (bNv ). This is consistent
only when QN (bNv )=Qn(bnv ), which is indeed guaranteed by bNv = SNn bnv
[Zhou’s formula, Prautzsch et al. , §.] and (.).
Now that we know that the values of R can be consistently assigned,
we only need to check that this does not conflict with the coherence
requirement. Given that V∆X is a linear space, coherence is equivalent to
superlinearity (.) plus accepting sure gains (.).
(i) Superlinearity: (let v and w be polynomials of degree up to n and
let λ and µ be nonnegative reals)
R(λ · v +µ ·w)=Qnbnλ·v+µ·w =Qn(λ ·bnv +µ ·bnw )
≥λ ·Qnbnv +µ ·Qnbnw =λ ·Rv +µ ·Rw,
where bn
λ·v+µ·w =λ·bnv +µ·bnw because bnv provides the coefficients
of the linear decomposition of v into Bernstein polynomials; the
inequality follows from the coherence of Qn .
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(ii) Accepting sure gains: (let v be a polynomial of degree n)
Rv ≥ supN :N≥n min{bNv }=min{v};
the inequality follows from the fact that Rv = QN bNv for all N
inN≥n and from the coherence of these QN ; the equality follows
from the linear and thus uniform convergence of bNv to v for in-
creasing N [Prautzsch et al. , §.; Trump & Prautzsch ].
So now that we know we can find a frequency distribution R, what
is its use? It allows us to conveniently abstract away the essence of the
assumption that the exchangeable sequence of samples we are dealing
with is arbitrarily long: The frequency distribution R is a representation
for all the information contained in the tuple (Qn |n :N>0) of count dis-
tributions apart from this assumption, i.e., that any pair of this tuple is
consistent in the sense of (.). This is formalized with the predicate
∞-cns:×n:N>0 (PL nX )coh →B defined by
∞-cns(Qn |n :N>0)⇔∀n :N>0;
Qn =R(Cm(•|n,•)),
with R :=Qnbn• .
(.)
Of course, we know that the count distributions already abstract
away an implicit finite exchangeability assumption. The uncertainty
model we started with was the tuple (P n |n :N>0) of marginal distribu-
tions for the vectors of random variables (Xk | k : 1..n). For them, we
can abstract away the assumption that we are dealing with an arbi-
trarily long exchangeable sequence of samples: The frequency distri-
bution R is a representation for all the information contained in the
tuple (P n |n :N>0), apart from this assumption. This is formalized with
the predicate∞-xch:×n:N>0 (PLX n )coh →B defined by
∞-xch(P n |n :N>0)⇔∀n :N>0;
P n =R(Mn(•|n,•)),
with R := P n(bn• ◦CX ),
(.)
where, for every ϑ in ∆X , Mn(•|n,ϑ) is the linear prevision associated
to the so-called multinomial distribution [Johnson et al. , §.],
which – not surprisingly – gives the probability of drawing a sequence of
samples x of length n with replacement from an urn with a composition
characterized by the frequency ϑ. It is related to the count-multinomial
by the following relation, which also results in an explicit expression:
(respectively use (.), (.), (.) and (.), and (.))
Mn( f |n,ϑ) :=Cm(Mh( f |•) ∣∣ n,ϑ) (.)
=∑m:nX Mh( f |m) ·B mϑ (.)
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=∑m:nX 1|[m]| ·∑y :[m] f y · |[m]| ·∏z:Xmϑmzz
=∑y :X n f y ·B yϑ, (.)
where we have used a modified type of Bernstein polynomial defined for
any sequence y :X n by
B yϑ :=∏z:{y}ϑ(CX y)zz = 1|[CX y]| ·BCX yϑ (.)
for which it is useful to recall that {y}=XCX y = {z :X |CX y > 0}.
The importance of this subsection’s representation theorems (.)
and (.) is that under an assumption of infinite exchangeability, we
can – and perhaps should, to avoid not taking into account exchange-
ability – think in all generality in terms of frequency vectors (using a
frequency distribution), any additional information given as supremum
prices for gambles on X n or on nX can be translated to information
for gambles in V∆X using (.) or (.). These representation theorems
are direct generalizations to coherent lower previsions of results by de
Finetti [–, §.vol. , ] for linear previsions. Note, however, that
in our derivation we did not need any intermediate step involving linear
previsions. Also, our argument here is very different from any found
in the literature and as such it constitutes a new proof of de Finetti’s
representation theorem.
A last remark before continuing with other matters: we know that
any representing frequency distribution R is uniquely defined on V∆X ,
the set of all polynomials on ∆X . But we can easily say more: the set
of polynomials is uniformly dense in C∆X , the set of all continuous
functions on∆X [this is a consequence of the Stone-Weierstraß theorem,
see, e.g., Pinkus ], which means R is also uniquely defined on C∆X
[Walley , §..(l)]. It is not immediately clear whether R can be
uniquely extended to even larger domains. However, what we do know
is that there exists a – possibly nonunique – coherent extension to the
whole ofL ∆X [Walley , §..].
.. Posterior count distributions & sufficient statistics
We now know how we should, in a situation of exchangeable sampling,
represent the information we have about the still unobserved samples
or the process that generates them: work with counts or frequencies. In
this subsection, we investigate updating under finite exchangeability
and show that updating the sequence distribution can be done entirely
in terms of the corresponding count distribution and the count vector of
the observed sample sequence. This investigation thereby shows that,
once we have assumed exchangeability, the count vector of an observed
sample sequence is a sufficient statistic, i.e., it contains all that is relevant
for inference in that observed sample.
 Inference models
Consider the situation in which we have already observed nˇ : 1..N −1
samples out of N :N>0 observations in total. The sample space is XThe following
mnemonic may
be useful: Checked
variables (such as nˇ)
pertain to observed
sequences, hatted
ones (such as nˆ) to
unobserved ones.
andX N is the corresponding possibility space; also let nˆ :=N − nˇ. De-
note the sequence of observed samples by xˇ :X nˇ and by mˇ :=CX xˇ the
corresponding count vector. We also have some exchangeable set of de-
sirable gamblesR :⊂LX N , the corresponding prior sequence distribu-
tion P onLX N , and its representing coherent prior count distribution Q
onL NX (cf. (.)).
The observed partial sequence of samples gives rise to three condi-
tioning events, each of which differs only in the amount of information
about the sequence order it preserves:
(i) ı xˇ×X nˆ , which preserves all order information and which we can
represent by xˇ itself;
(ii) [mˇ]×X nˆ , which discards the order in which the observed samples
were encountered and which we can represent by mˇ;
(iii) (X N )≥mˇ := {y :X N |CX y ≥ mˇ}, which further discards how the ob-
served samples were distributed among the whole sequence and
thus preserves no order information at all; it can be identified with
the count vector event (NX )≥mˇ ; mˇ+ represents both events.
It is useful to have the expressions for the prevision of some gam-
ble f onX N respectively masked by each of these conditioning events.
This involves the multivariate hypergeometric prevision (.) of these
masked gambles; we calculate these first: (let m : (NX )≥mˇ)
Mh
(
f · I ı xˇ×X nˆ ∣∣m)= 1|[m]| ·∑y :[m] f y · I ı xˇ×X nˆ y
= I (NX )≥mˇ m · 1|[m]| ·
∑
yˆ :[m−mˇ] f (xˇ, yˆ)
= I (NX )≥mˇ m · |[m−mˇ]||[m]| ·Mh
(
f (xˇ,•) ∣∣m−mˇ), (.)
Mh
(
f · I [mˇ]×X nˆ ∣∣m)= 1|[m]| ·∑y :[m] f y · I [mˇ]×X nˆ y




yˇ :[mˇ] f (yˇ , yˆ)






f · I (X N )≥mˇ ∣∣m)= 1|[m]| ·∑y :[m] f y · I (X N )≥mˇ y
= I (NX )≥mˇ m · 1|[m]| ·
∑
y :m f y
= I (NX )≥mˇ m ·Mh( f |m). (.)
Each of the three resulting expressions is built up in the same fash-
ion: the last factor uses the multivariate hypergeometric prevision to
translate the masked gamble to a function on NX ; the first factor is the
translation of the mask to NX ; any middle factors give an m-dependent
weighting to this mask to compensate for the nonbijective character of
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the mask translation process. The functions generating these compen-
sating factors are respectively called sequence and count multivariate
hypergeometric likelihood functions, which deserve their own symbol:
L xˇ :=Mh
(
ı xˇ×X nˆ ∣∣ •)=m : NX ; |[m−CX xˇ]||[m]| (.)
:= mˆ : nˆX ; |[mˆ]||[CX xˇ+mˆ]| , (.)
Lmˇ :=Mh
(
[mˇ]×X nˆ ∣∣ •)=m : NX ; |[m−mˇ]|·|[mˇ]||[m]| (.)
:= mˆ : nˆX ; |[mˆ]|·|[mˇ]||[mˇ+mˆ]| , (.)
For both, we have given an additional definition that extends their do-
main to the space of count vectors for the unobserved samples. For each
first definition, note that L xˇ = I (NX )≥mˇ ·L xˇ and Lmˇ = I (NX )≥mˇ ·Lmˇ because
|[m − mˇ]| ∝ I (NX )≥mˇ m for all m in NX . Also note that Lmˇ = |[mˇ]| · L xˇ
whenever xˇ ∈ [mˇ].
Before moving on, let us give an illustrative annotated table that
makes the quantities we have encountered so far more concrete. For this
example, we takeX := {a,b}, N := 4, nˇ := 3, and xˇ := (a,b, a) or aba; so
then mˇ = (2,1).
m [m] |[m]| Lxˇ m Lmˇ m
4,0 aaaa 1 0 0
3,1 aaab aaba baaa abaa 4 1/4 3/4
2,2 bbaa aabb baab abab abba baba 6 1/6 3/6
1,3 bbba bbab abbb babb 4 0 0
0,4 bbbb 1 0 0X N





The table makes it clear that the likelihood functions give – atom-by-
atom – the relative number of sample sequences present in the event
used. It is a useful exercise to choose some gamble onX N (i.e., attach
a value to each sequence) and see how it gets transformed to a gamble
on NX ; a constant gamble is already quite illuminating.
It is also a useful exercise to fix P – e.g., let it be uniform or vacuous –
and see how the prevision of some gamble onX N is determined by its
corresponding gamble on NX . To do this in general, combine the repre-




f · I ı xˇ×X nˆ )=Q(L xˇ ·Mh( f (xˇ,•) ∣∣ •−mˇ)), (.)
P
(
f · I [mˇ]×X nˆ )=Q(Lmˇ ·Mh(Mh( f[mˇ]×[•−mˇ]|mˇ) ∣∣ •−mˇ)), (.)
P
(
f · I (X N )≥mˇ )=Q(I (NX )≥mˇ ·Mh( f |•)). (.)
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Now, when we let f be identically one, we get the lower probabilities
of the conditioning events:
P (ı xˇ×X nˆ)=QL xˇ (.)
≥Q(NX )≥mˇ ·
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
minmˆ:nˆX L xˇ mˆ,




P (X N )≥mˇ =Q(NX )≥mˇ (.)
≥QLmˇ = |[mˇ]| ·QL xˇ .
The included lower bounds allow us to conclude that these lower proba-
bilities are either all zero or all strictly positive (in which case they are
listed in order of increasing magnitude). So we can use the gbr (.)–
(.) to obtain the updated previsions for either none or all three of
the events. Completely analogous results for the corresponding upper
probabilities imply that regular extension (.) can make a difference
either for all or none of the three events.
At this point we have – in (.)–(.)– – all the elements neces-
sary to obtain the exchangeable updated sequence distributions
(i) P (•|xˇ) onLX nˆ , where we have identified ı xˇ×X nˆ withX nˆ ,
(ii) P (•|mˇ) onL [mˇ]×X nˆ , and
(iii) P (•|mˇ+) onL (X N )≥mˇ .
These are exchangeable in the sense that they correspond to updated
sets of desirable gamblesRı xˇ×X nˆ ,R[mˇ]×X nˆ , andR(X N )≥mˇ that satisfy a
constraint such as (.): (let A be ı xˇ×X nˆ , [mˇ]×X nˆ , or (X N )≥mˇ)
H A+ (RA)6=(A;0) ⊆RA , (.)
where
H A := span{pig − g |g :L A ;pi :Π1..N∧. piA = A} (.)
is the linear subspace of gambles inL A that are marginally desirable
because of a conditional exchangeability assumption.
Constraint (.) holds, because updating sets of desirable gambles
preserves exchangeability: conditioning both sides of (.) on A gives
RA ⊇ (HX N +R 6=(X N ;0))A
⊇ (HX N )A + (R 6=(X N ;0))A ⊇H A+ (RA)6=(A;0),
where the last step follows from (RA)6=(A;0) ⊆ (R 6=(X N ;0))A and
H A = span{(pi f − f )A | f :LX N∧. supp f ⊆ A ;pi :Π1..N∧. piA = A}
⊆ span{(pi f − f )A | f :LX N ;pi :Π1..N }
⊆ (HX N )A .
. Exchangeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions 
This constraint gives rise to representation theorems like (.):
with P (•|xˇ), P (•|mˇ), and P (•|mˇ+) there correspond coherent count distri-
butions Q(•|xˇ), Q(•|mˇ), and Q(•|mˇ+) onL nˆX such that (let g , h, and f
be gambles onX nˆ , [mˇ]×X nˆ , and (X N )≥mˇ , respectively)






∣∣ •) ∣∣∣ mˇ), (.)
P ( f |mˇ+)=Q(Mh( f |mˇ+•) ∣∣ mˇ+). (.)
These representations follow from a completely analogous reasoning as
for (.), but whereas in (.) and (.) the gamble transforma-
tion of interest was 1N ! ·
∑





The conceptually most important steps for working this out in full can
be found in (.)–(.).
The count distributions can be defined via natural extension (.) As P and Q are
assumed to be
coherent here,
lceP = P and
lceQ =Q.
of P to P (•|xˇ), P (•|mˇ), and P (•|mˇ+), respectively; furthermore, (.) is






·Q(L xˇ · fNX ), Q(NX )≥CX xˇ > 0,







·Q(Lmˇ · fNX ), Q(NX )≥mˇ > 0,







·Q fNX , Q(NX )≥mˇ > 0,
min{ f }, otherwise.
(.)
To get the expressions for updating using regular extension (cf. (.)),
replace the condition ‘Q(NX )≥• > 0’ by ‘Q(NX )≥• > 0’ and the mini-
mum by an infimum over {Q :MQ |Q(NX )≥• > 0}.
There are two major final remarks to make about these updated
sequence distributions and their corresponding count distribution:
(i) Observe that Q(•|xˇ) = Q(•|CX xˇ), as LCX xˇ = |[CX xˇ]| ·L xˇ : let the
gamble h used in (.) be the cylindrical extension (cf. §..) to
[CX xˇ]×X nˆ of the gamble g used in (.), then
P (g |xˇ)=Q(Mh(g |•) ∣∣ xˇ)=Q(Mh(h|•) ∣∣CX xˇ)= P (h|CX xˇ).
So we see that, for the count distributions, we can drop one of the
two notations: we choose to drop the first, as the second clearly
shows that the order of xˇ is irrelevant in the updating process
(under an assumption of exchangeability). The sample sequence
order is therefore called an ancillary statistic, in contrast to the
name sufficient statistic that is given to the count vector.
(ii) From (.), we see that the prevision Q(•|mˇ+) is both the count
distribution corresponding to P (•|mˇ+) as well as the updated lower
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prevision obtained by conditioning Q on (NX )≥mˇ – up to the iden-
tification of (NX )≥mˇ with nˆX . The count distribution Q(•|mˇ) (and
thus Q(•|xˇ)) is not an updated lower prevision of Q, even though it
is defined on a possibility space nˆX that is isomorphic to the sub-
set (NX )≥mˇ of the possibility space NX of Q. To terminologically
position it in relation to the prior count distribution Q it is derived
from, it is called a posterior count distribution.
A closing reminder: whenever natural and regular extension differ,
or when they are both vacuous, other previsions can be jointly coherent
updated previsions (cf. the last two paragraphs before §..).
.. Posterior frequency distributions & sufficient statistics
In the last subsection, we have gotten our feet wet with updating under
the finite exchangeability assumption. In this subsection, we are going
to dive headfirst into the foam-headed waves by updating under the
infinite exchangeability assumption of §... We show that updating
a marginal sequence or count distribution can be done entirely in terms
of the corresponding frequency distribution and the count vector of the
observed sample. Our investigation thereby again shows that, once we
have assumed exchangeability, the count vector of an observed sample
is a sufficient statistic, i.e., it contains all that is relevant for inference in
that observed sample.
We now consider the following setting: we have observed nˇ :N>0 sam-
ples out of an infinite number of total possible observations. The sample
space isX andN>0 →X is the corresponding possibility space. Denote
the partial sequence of samples by xˇ :X nˇ and by mˇ :=CX xˇ the corre-
sponding count vector. We also have some coherent prior frequency
distribution R on C∆X and are going to look at what we can learn from
updating the corresponding exchangeable marginal sequence distribu-
tion P n onLX n and coherent count distribution Qn onL nX , where n
is some number in N>nˇ (cf. (.) and (.)). Furthermore, we
introduce the shorthand nˆ := n− nˇ.
Contrary to §.., we here only investigate two of the three con-
ditioning events for P n the partial sequence of samples gives rise to:
ı xˇ×X nˆ and [mˇ]×X nˆ . These events are represented by xˇ and mˇ. The
third, (X n)≥mˇ := {y :X n |CX y ≥ mˇ} would lead to posteriors that are of
little interest to us; although (nX )≥mˇ the one conditioning event for Qn
does play a supporting role.
It is useful to have the expression for the prevision of some gam-
ble f on X n or h on nX , masked by the conditioning events above.
This involves the multinomial prevision (.) and count-multinomial
prevision (.) of these masked gambles; we start with h: (let ϑ :∆X )
Cm
(
h · I (nX )≥mˇ ∣∣ n,ϑ)=∑m:nX hm · I (nX )≥mˇ m ·B mϑ
. Exchangeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions 
=∑m:(nX )≥mˇ hm · B mˇϑ·B m−mˇϑLmˇ m





where for the second equality, the identity Lmˇm ·B m =B mˇ ·B m−mˇ was
used, which follows from (.) and (.); the third equality in-
volves (.). This expression is built up as follows: the last factor uses
the count-multinomial prevision to translate the masked gamble to a
function on the unit simplex ∆X ; the mask itself is translated to the



















[mˇ]×X nˆ ∣∣ •) ∣∣∣ nˆ,•)=Mn([mˇ]×X nˆ ∣∣ nˆ,•) (.)
assigning these weights can therefore be seen as a count-multinomial
likelihood function (we used (.) and (.)). But let us return to
our original goal: expression (.) can be used together with (.),
(.)–(.), and (.)–(.) to obtain the multinomial prevision
of the masked versions of f :
Mn
(
f · I ı xˇ×X nˆ ∣∣ n,ϑ)=B xˇϑ ·Mn( f (xˇ,•) ∣∣ nˆ,ϑ), (.)
Mn
(
f · I [mˇ]×X nˆ ∣∣ n,ϑ)=B mˇϑ ·Mn(Mh( f[mˇ]×X nˆ |mˇ) ∣∣ nˆ,ϑ), (.)










which can be seen as a sequence multinomial likelihood function
B xˇ =Mn
(
ı xˇ×X nˆ ∣∣ nˆ,•). (.)
Note that its relationship with B mˇ is in complete analogy to the relation-
ship between L xˇ and Lmˇ observed in the previous subsection (cf. expres-
sions (.)–(.) and below).
We can now combine the representation theorem (.), equa-
tions (.)–(.), and definition (.) to obtain
P n
(
f · I ı xˇ×X nˆ )=R(B xˇ ·Mn( f (xˇ,•) ∣∣ nˆ,•)), (.)
P n
(
f · I [mˇ]×X nˆ )=R(B mˇ ·Mn(Mh( f[mˇ]×X nˆ |mˇ) ∣∣ nˆ,•)). (.)
When we let h and f be identically one, we get the lower probabilities
of the conditioning events:
P n(ı xˇ×X nˆ)=RB xˇ =RBCX xˇ · 1|[CX xˇ]| , (.)
P n
(
[mˇ]×X nˆ)=RB mˇ . (.)
Whenever CX xˇ = mˇ, both lower probabilities are either zero or strictly
positive (in which case they are listed in order of increasing magnitude).
 Inference models
So we can use the gbr (.)–(.) to obtain the updated previsions for
either none or both of the events. Completely analogous results for the
corresponding upper probabilities imply that regular extension (.)
can make a difference either for both or none of the events.
At this point we have – in (.)–(.)å – all the elements necessary
to obtain, for all n > nˇ and thus for all nˆ > 0, the updated exchange-
able marginal sequence distributions and via (.)–(.) and (.)–
(.) their induced count distributions:
(i) P nˆ(•|xˇ) onLX nˆ and Q nˆ(•|xˇ) onL nˆX and
(ii) P nˆ(•|mˇ) onL [mˇ]×X nˆ and Q nˆ(•|mˇ) onL nˆX .
We introduce two coherent lower previsions on C∆X , respectively R(•|xˇ)
and R(•|mˇ), that are such that (g and h are gambles onX nˆ and [mˇ]×X nˆ ,
respectively)





Mh(h|mˇ) ∣∣ nˆ,•) ∣∣∣ mˇ). (.)
(now let h :L nˆX )
Q nˆ(h|CX xˇ)=R
(
Cm(h|nˆ,•) ∣∣ xˇ), (.)
Q nˆ(h|mˇ)=R(Cm(h|nˆ,•) ∣∣ mˇ). (.)
These frequency distributions R(•|xˇ) and R(•|mˇ) are defined via natural
extension (.) of P n or Qn , the representation theorems (.)
and (.), and under the assumption that the part of an infinitely
exchangeable sequence of random variables that remains after a partial
observation is still infinitely exchangeable: (now let f be a continuous






·R(B xˇ · f ), RBCX xˇ > 0,







·R(B mˇ · f ), RB mˇ > 0,
min{ f }, otherwise.
(.)
To get the expressions for updating using regular extension (cf. (.)),
replace the condition ‘RB• > 0’ by ‘RB• > 0’ and the minimum by an
infimum over {R :MR |RB• > 0}.
There are again two major final remarks to make about these updated
distributions and their corresponding frequency distribution:
(i) From the equations (.)–(.) above, we can see that
∞-cns(Q nˆ(•|CX xˇ) ∣∣ nˆ :N>0), ∞-xch(P nˆ(•|xˇ) ∣∣ nˆ :N>0),
∞-cns(Q nˆ(•|mˇ) ∣∣ nˆ :N>0), ∞-xch(P nˆ(•|mˇ) ∣∣ nˆ :N>0),
with representing frequency distributions R(•|xˇ) and R(•|mˇ) de-
fined by (.)–(.) that moreover coincide. So again we see that,
. Exchangeability, sufficient statistics & likelihood functions 
for these frequency distributions, we can drop one of the two no-
tations: just as for the count distributions, we choose to drop the
first, as the second clearly shows that the order of xˇ is irrelevant in
the updating process. So also here the sample sequence order is
an ancillary statistic and the count vector is a sufficient statistic.
(ii) Of course R(•|mˇ) (and thus R(•|xˇ)) is not an updated lower previ-
sion of R, despite the suggestive notation. This is already evident
from the fact that it is defined on the same domain as R, and thus
on the same possibility space ∆X . To terminologically position it
in relation to the prior frequency distribution R they are derived
from, it is called a posterior frequency distribution.
.. Classical Bayesian updating, likelihood functions
& predictive versus parametric inference
It is instructive to relate the work we did in the last two subsections to
classical Bayesian updating [Bernardo & Smith , §.]. It allows us
to place what we have done in a wider context.
In §.. and §.. likelihood functions appeared naturally in our
derivation of updated finitely and infinitely exchangeable distributions
and posterior count and frequency distributions. It can be educating to
see how likelihood functions come into being, framed more generally
and without the noise generated by other considerations.
Consider a finite possibility space Ω and assume that the uncer-
tainty about which element will be observed is described by a linear
prevision P (•|ξ) on LΩ, the sampling model, where ξ is a parameter
whose possible values form the finite set Ξ. Now assume that there is
uncertainty about the sampling model’s parameter ξ and model this
uncertainty by a coherent lower prevision Q onLΞ which is called the
(parametric) prior.
In such a context, it is useful to patch together the sampling mod-
els for all possible parameters into a conditional linear prevision P (•|•)
onLΩ, as it allows us to find the joint uncertainty model E onLΩ×Ξ de-
fined for any gamble f onΩ×Ξby E f :=Q(P ( f |•))using the marginal ex-
tension theorem (.). Its Ω-marginal, the coherent lower prevision P
onLΩ defined for all gambles h on Ω by Ph := E(h · IΞ)=Q
(
P (h|•)) is
called the predictive prior.
Now assume that at some point A :⊂Ω is observed. As we equate
updating with conditioning, we define the updated joint coherent lower






E(A×Ξ) ·E( fΩ×Ξ · I A×Ξ), E(A×Ξ)> 0,




E( fΩ×Ξ · I A×Ξ)=Q
(
P ( fΩ×Ξ · I A |•)
)
.
When restricting attention to f := g · I A , with g a gamble on Ξ, we
obtain the defining expression for the parametric posterior, the coherent






·Q(g ·K A), QK A > 0,
min{g }, otherwise,
(.)
where K A := P (A|•) is the likelihood function of the observation A [also
see Walley , §..]: it gives the probability of A as a function of the
sampling model’s parameter. When restricting attention to f := h · IΞ,
with h a gamble on A, we obtain the defining expression for the predic-






·Q(P (hΩ · I A |•)), QK A > 0,
min{h}, otherwise.
(.)
In many interesting cases,Ω, P (•|•), and A are such that P (hΩ · I A |•) fac-
torizes into P (hΩ|•) ·K A , and then P (h|A)=Q
(
P (hΩ|•)
∣∣ A) for QK A > 0.
We call A the posterior possibility space.
To update, we could also have used regular extension (.); replace
the minimum in (.) and (.) over MQ by an infimum over all Q
inMQ such that Q
(
P (A|ϕ−1•))> 0 and replace the condition QK A > 0
by QK A > 0 [also see Walley , §J].
Notice that parametric posterior only depends on the observation
through the normalized likelihood function. This observation is calledThe likelihood prin-
ciple can break
down if the sam-
pling model that
lies at its basis is
imprecise [Walley
, §..].
the (finite) likelihood principle see, e.g., Bernardo & Smith [, §..].
Good illustrations of what we have just been discussing can be found
in §.. and §..:
(i) We encountered two related assumptions: finite and infinite ex-
changeability, respectively leading to drawing without and with re-
placement from an urn as sampling models. The resulting paramet-
ric posteriors are defined by (.)–(.) (parameter space NX )
and (.)–(.) (parameter space ∆X ) and the resulting pre-
dictive posteriors by (.)–(.) (posterior possibility spaces
ı xˇ×X nˆ , [mˇ]×X nˆ , (X N )≥mˇ) and (.)–(.) (posterior possi-
bility spaces ı xˇ×X nˆ , [mˇ]×X nˆ , (X N )≥mˇ , and nˆX ).
(ii) The most interesting conditioning events were the observation of a
sample sequence xˇ and the observation of a count vector mˇ, which
corresponds to a permutation class of sample sequences [mˇ]. For
updating under both assumptions, if the difference between these
observations is irrelevant under the assumptions – i.e., mˇ =CX xˇ –,
their likelihood functions are proportional (L xˇ ∝Lmˇ and B xˇ ∝B mˇ)
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and thus – in concordance with the likelihood principle – the pos-
terior previsions are identical (cf. remarks (i) and (i)).
We have talked here about the likelihood principle in a context where
the original sample and possibility spaces are finite. A finite possibility
spaceX N is what we encountered when discussing (finite) exchange-
ability. But when working with infinitely exchangeable sequences and
frequency distributions, the sample space N>0 →X becomes countably
infinite. However, as recalled just above, the likelihood principle still
holds, so we could qualify it as the discrete – instead of just finite – like-
lihood principle [Walley , §..––]. Note that the multinomial
likelihoods are functions of a continuous argument; this means that the
limit arguments we used in the discussion of infinite exchangeability
have resulted in a conditional probability defined on an infinite partition!
In classical Bayesian updating, the likelihood principle is further
taken to hold for continuous sample spaces as well [see, e.g., Bernardo &
Smith , §..––]. In this case the likelihood function is given
more-or-less as a conditional probability density function and Bayes’s
rule is replaced by a variant for density functions [see, e.g., Walley ,
§..]. Walley [, §..––] warns that this continuous likeli-
hood principle can only be relied upon under a potentially very restric-
tive set of assumptions:
(i) the continuous sample space can be seen as an idealization of a
discrete one: measurements have a limited precision;
(ii) the (actual) measurement imprecision is sufficiently small (with
relation to the variation in the continuous likelihood function);
(iii) with every continuous sample, a discrete sample can be associated
that has a measurement imprecision dependent, positive (discrete)
likelihood function;
(iv) the continuous likelihood function is a uniform limit of the suitably
normalized discrete likelihood function for decreasing (idealized)
measurement imprecision;
(v) the (idealized and thus actual) measurement imprecision is con-
stant over the inferential possibility space (i.e., it does not vary
with the likelihood function’s argument).
Continuous sample spaces will appear in the next chapter, ‘Inference
models for exponential families’. So although this warning does not
apply here, it will be very relevant there, where we make the – for the
scope of applicability – potentially restrictive assumption that the con-
tinuous likelihood principle holds.
This whole section, and the updating results of the two previous sub-
sections in particular, provide us with a necessary basis to build concrete
inference models on and a context to place them in. These concrete
inference models are the subject of the next two sections. The first of
these – about predictive inference – builds on the finite exchangeability
 Inference models
assumption; the second – about parametric inference – builds on the
infinite exchangeability assumption.
But before diving into those subjects, it is interesting to know the
distinction we make between predictive and parametric inference. We
follow Geisser []: When the possibility space of the lower prevision
used as an inference model consists of observables, we are dealing with
predictive inference. When it consists of abstract, mathematical objects
that cannot be observed (directly), we are dealing with parametric infer-
ence. Quite often, these abstract objects are related to the sample space
and observational possibility space by some limiting argument.
It is important to realize that, under this definition, what we called
parametric priors and posteriors at the beginning of this subsection can
still be predictive inference models, as long as the parameter space con-
sists of concrete objects. In this section, the first main type of inference
models were unconditional and updated sequence distributions defined
on possibility spacesX N andX nˆ consisting of finite sequences of sam-
ples from a sample space X ; finite sample sequences are eminently
concrete, so these sequence distributions are predictive inference mod-
els. The second main type of inference models, prior and posterior count
distributions, appeared after the introduction of the finite exchange-
ability assumption; their sample spaces NX and nˆX consist of count
vectors, which are concrete as they correspond to (finite sets of) finite se-
quences of samples, so these count distributions are predictive inference
models as well. The third main type, prior and posterior frequency distri-
butions, appeared after the introduction of the infinite exchangeability
assumption; their sample space is the set ∆X of frequency vectors, both
for the prior and the posterior; these frequency vectors are abstract, as
they correspond to (infinite sets of) infinite sequences of samples, so
frequency distributions are parametric inference models.
. Predictive inference: representation insensitive prediction
The setting of this section is already quite familiar: we consider a sub-This section fol-
lows the lines of
De Cooman et al.
[a, b],






ject who is making a sequence of N :N>0 observations of a certain phe-
nomenon. In the previous section we investigated the consequences
of the quite general exchangeability assumption on the form of the se-
quence distribution and how to update it after having observed a partial
sequence of samples.
In this section, we add further assumptions and initially reduce the
scope from predictions about all unobserved samples to one unobserved
sample. With this, we have a similar aim as the one addressed by the
Laplace–Bayes rule of succession [Laplace ] and Carnap’s []
λ-calculus. This section ultimately leads to a predictive inference model
for categorical data that is unique up to a parameter that in some sense
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determines the speed of learning: the imprecise Dirichlet-multinomial
model [Walley & Bernard ].
.. Immediate prediction: previsions, families & systems
Conceptually, we start from some nonexplicit exchangeable set of de-
sirable gamblesRN
X
:⊂LX N (cf. §..), whereX is a finite set of cate-
gories (why we add a sub- and superscript will become clear later on).
With this set of desirable gambles, there corresponds an (equally unexpli-
cated) joint exchangeable sequence distribution P N
X
onLX N , which we
know is fully characterized through the representation theorem (.)
by its coherent prior count distribution QN
X
, defined onL NX .
After the observation of the first nˇ : 1..N −1 samples xˇ :X nˇ with
count vector mˇ : nˇX , there remain nˆ :=N − nˇ unobserved samples. Our
uncertainty about what they turn out to be can be modeled with the (also
nonexplicit) updated joint exchangeable sequence distribution P nˆ
X
(•|xˇ)
onX nˆ (cf. (.)) and its corresponding coherent posterior count dis-
tribution Q nˆ
X
(•|mˇ) onL nˆX (cf. (.)), where mˇ :=CX xˇ.
These unexplicated distributions provide models for our uncertainty
about all the unobserved samples. In this section, we are initially going to
restrict our scope to modeling our uncertainty about (any) one future un-


















(• ∣∣ {ı yˇ | yˇ :X })
PX
(• ∣∣ {ı yˇ | yˇ :X 2})
PX
(• ∣∣ {ı(a, z) | z :X })and P
nˆ
X
(•|xˇ) provide the appropriate coherent
lower previsions; we respectively denote them
by PX and PX (•|xˇ) (so we leave out a super-
script 1); they are both defined on LX . We call
them predictive sequence previsions; they are the
basic unit in the predictive inference framework
we are building. The set of all theX -marginals
σX := ıPX ∪⋃nˇ:1..N−1{PX (•|yˇ) ∣∣ yˇ :X nˇ} (.)
:= ıPX ∪⋃nˇ:1..N−1PX (• ∣∣ {ı yˇ | yˇ :X nˇ}) (.)
is called anX -family of predictive sequence pre-
visions or a predictiveX -family for short. The sec-
ond definition is a reformulation in terms of con-
ditional lower previsions. An example family is
given on the side in an illustration using a proba-
bility tree [see, e.g., Shafer ].
The set of all X -families is denoted by ΣX ;
one X -family differs from another when corre-
sponding member predictive previsions (i.e., having the same condi-
tioning event) have a different value in the same gamble. So predictive
families can be partially ordered by pointwise comparison, lower previ-
sion by lower prevision.
 Inference models
We started out with a certain set of categories X . Often, however,
there is no unique way of categorizing a set of observations; compare
the following two sets of categories for animals, for example: {insect,bird,









PZ PZ (•|?) PZ (•|?,?)
Z := {?}
zation conceivable, we can associate a family of
predictive previsions. Let S denote the collec-
tion of all finite sets. A grouping of families for all
possible categorizations
σ := {σX |X :S } (.)
is called a system of predictive previsions or pre-
dictive system for short. The example family
given earlier can be complemented by other ex-
ample families to give an abstract impression of
what a predictive system looks like.
The set of all predictive systems (for the fixed sample sequence
length N ) is denoted by Σ. Two predictive systems can be compared
family by family and therefore also Σ can be partially ordered.
Now that we know what predictive previsions, families, and systems
are, let us see what is the effect of our assumption that – for each pre-
dictive family – the predictive sequence previsions are marginals of





(•|xˇ)). To this end, consider someX -family. The respective
predictive count previsions (i.e., the induced coherent count distribu-
tions) QX and QX (•|mˇ), which are both defined onL 1X , are then ac-
tually equivalent (as uncertainty models) to the corresponding predic-
tive sequence previsions PX and PX (•|xˇ), due to the isomorphism be-
tweenX and 1X . We therefore consider these predictive count previ-
sions to also be members of an exchangeable predictive family or system
if their corresponding predictive sequence previsions are. To boot, we
let them be implicitly defined onLX as well.
The fact that we can interchange predictive previsions with pre-
dictive count previsions reminds us of the following consequence of








mˇ := mˇ⊥,mˇ> count vector mˇ. This is only the most visible
effect of the exchangeability assumption: even
though this assumption plays no role for these
predictive (count) distributions individually, as
the sequence length of interest has been reduced
to one, there are relationships between them.
The importance of the fact that ‘there are relationships between
them’ is better appreciated if we turn things around. Up until now, we
took a top-down approach: starting from some unexplicated prior set
of desirable gambles, we generated a predictive family by formulating
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things in terms of previsions, conditioning and marginalizing. However,
at times, such a prior is a rather big rabbit to conjure up out of our hat. In
a bottom-up approach, we can just conjure up – or, more mundanely put:
propose – simple building blocks: the predictive previsions themselves.
But now the onus is on us to make sure that these predictive previsions
are marginals of some exchangeable joint sequence distribution (or one
of the exchangeable updated joint sequence distributions).
Ensuring that the relationships between the predictive previsions
are such that they can be seen as marginals of some exchangeable joint
prevision – that need not be unique – is a problem for which I am not
aware if there is a general solution (yet). So this is something we need to
check for every predictive family we propose to use.
Two partial results can ease the pain of our disappointment:
(i) To guarantee the coherence of all these predictive previsions with
the unexplicated joint P N
X
(cf. §..), it is enough to make sure
that each predictive prevision in the family is coherent (.),
or, in other words, to make sure that each conditional prevision
in the family is separately coherent (cf. §.. again). This is a
consequence of the marginal extension theorem (.) [also see
Miranda & De Cooman , Thm ].
A predictive family is called coherent if every member pre-
dictive prevision is, and a predictive system is called coherent
when each member family is. We denote the set of all coherent
X -families by (ΣX )coh and the set of all coherent systems by Σcoh.
(ii) We can obtain a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for ex-
changeability that will be useful later on. Consider two ‘successive’
predictive previsions PX (•|xˇ) and PX
(• ∣∣ {ı(xˇ, z) | z :X }), where xˇ
is either empty – in which case PX (•|xˇ) reduces to PX –, or an ele-
ment of {y :X ∗ |νy <N−1}. To possibly be (updated) marginals of
an exchangeable joint P N
X
, they must respectively be anX -mar-
ginal and a conditional prevision of its updated exchangeable
X 2-marginal P 2
X




∣∣ xˇ) by definition (.), as that is the
least committal (coherent) extension and does not take exchange-
ability into account. Now let f be some gamble on X ; by using
cylindrical extension (cf. §..) and by explicitly showing which
random variable takes up which argument position, we can write
PX ( f |xˇ)= PX
(
f (Xnˇ+1)
∣∣ xˇ)= P 2X ( f˜ (Xnˇ+1, Xnˇ+2) ∣∣ xˇ);
next, we use the permutation invariance of P 2
X
(•|xˇ) that is implied










then, we use the dominance of theX 2-marginal over the marginal






∣∣ xˇ, Xnˇ+1) ∣∣∣ xˇ)
= PX
(
PX ( f |xˇ,•)
∣∣ xˇ), (.)
A predictive family is called exchangeable if its member predictive previ-
sions are marginals of some exchangeable (updated) joint and a predic-
tive system is exchangeable when each member family is. We denote the
set of all exchangeableX -families by (ΣX )xch and the set of all exchange-
able systems by Σxch. (Recall that our exchangeability definition (.)
presupposes and as such includes coherence.)
In this subsection, we have introduced the concept of systems of
predictive previsions, but we still seem far removed from proposals for
concrete predictive systems that can be used in practice. The main prob-
lem is that we have too much choice: requiring exchangeability (and
thus coherence) provides rather few restrictions on the values we can
assign to predictive previsions and, more importantly, almost no guid-
ance on how to assign them. The art of creating inference models is a
difficult one if there is too much freedom. We need more restrictions
than only exchangeability; we need guiding principles to bring order to
the land of predictive systems! In the next subsection, we provide one
such principle.
.. Representation insensitivity
I do not think there are universally valid principles, only principles thatHalpern & Koller
[] provide




are acceptable within a certain context. So if we want to follow some
principle in designing predictive systems, we need to sketch the context
within which this principle is reasonable. We have already assumed
that the order of the samples is irrelevant (exchangeability). Now we
additionally assume that
(i) we start from a state of complete prior ignorance, i.e., we dare not
even hazard a guess as to which categories will be observed;
(ii) the sample data really are categorical in the sense that they do not
belong to a set with any – e.g., ordinal – structure that cannot be
preserved under arbitrary recategorization of the data.
These assumptions, which are reasonable or reasonable approximations
in many practical situations (e.g., for an analyst without any domain
knowledge about the dataset he has been given), allow us to propose
three invariance principles that the predictive systems should satisfy.
The first principle is pooling invariance: because we do not know
how the samples will be categorized, our uncertainty model should not
intrinsically change when we group together (pool) some categories
to form a new category. Mathematically, we can formalize this idea as
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follows: Consider a set of categoriesX and a partitionZ of this setX ; Our pooling prin-
ciple corresponds
to (and is perhaps




this partitionZ can be seen as an alternative categorization formed by
pooling some categories ofX together. Let ϕ :X →Z be the surjective
map corresponding to this partition (cf. §..). Now consider some
gamble f onZ , then we should have that PX ( f ◦ϕ|xˇ)= PZ ( f |ϕxˇ): for
gambles that do not differentiate between original categories in the same
pool, it should not matter whether we consider predictive inferences for
the set of original categoriesX , or for the set of pooled categoriesZ .
The second principle is renaming invariance: as long as no confusion
can arise, it should not matter for a subject’s predictive inferences what
names he gives to the different categories. This may seem too trivial to
even mention, and as far as we know, it is always implicitly taken for
granted in predictive inference. But it will be well to devote some atten-
tion to it here, in order to distinguish it from the category permutation
invariance to be discussed shortly, with which it is easily confused if
we do not pay proper attention. Mathematically, we can formalize it
as follows: Consider two isomorphic but distinct sets of categoriesX
and Y between which we can define a renaming bijection ψ :X ↔Y
that either leaves an element’s name intact or replaces it by a name not
present in the original set. Now consider some gamble f onY , then we
should have that PX ( f ◦ψ|xˇ)= PY ( f |ψxˇ).
The third principle is permutation invariance: in a state of prior We encountered
(weak) permutation
invariance before,






ignorance, a subject has no reason to distinguish between the differ-
ent elements of any set of categoriesX he might use. Mathematically,
we can formalize it as follows: Consider any permutation pi :ΠX of the
categories. With any gamble f on X , there corresponds a pointwise
permuted gamble f ◦pi and with the observed sequence xˇ there corre-
sponds a permuted sequence pixˇ. If a subject has no reason to make
a distinction between a category and its permutation, then we should
have that PX ( f ◦pi|xˇ)= PX ( f |pixˇ).
As both ψ and pi are bijections, renaming invariance and permu-
tation invariance are very similar. But ψ cannot even partly act like a
permutation: it does not allow confusion between original and renamed
categories. However, it is possible that two subsequent renamings result
in a permutation, so it seems rather difficult to mathematically separate
the two concepts. Luckily, this has never been our intention.
It is our intention to consider all three invariance principles simulta-
neously. We call this combination the representation insensitivity princi-
ple. Its mathematical formalization is a straightforward generalization:
LetX andY be any two finite sets of categories that can be related to
each-other with a surjective relabeling map ρ :X →Y and let f be a
gamble onY , then the representation insensitivity of a predictive system
implies the following relation between two of its predictive sequence
previsions: PX ( f ◦ρ|xˇ)= PX ( f |ρxˇ).
 Inference models
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of course also be expressed in
terms of predictive count pre-
visions. Actually, we will use
predictive count previsions to
formulate our central defini-
tion of representation insensi-
tivity, as they already partially
express exchangeability.
To arrive at this definition,
we first of all need to trans-
late sequence relabelings to
count vector relabelings. This
is done as follows: We take the same relabeling map ρ from X to Y
as before, then the count vector mˇ on nˇX is transformed into a count
vector Cρmˇ on nˇY defined for every z inY by (Cρmˇ)z :=∑x:X∧. ρx=z mˇx ,
i.e., we sum up the counts for the categories that have the same label
after relabeling. As a second step towards our central definition, consider
that any gamble f on any set of categoriesX can be seen as a relabeling
map with its own range { f } as the new set of labels.
We can then combine both steps and use representation insensitivity
to rewrite the predictive count prevision of the gamble f in a so-called
standard representation insensitive form, i.e., as part of the exchangeable
{ f }-family:
QX ( f |mˇ)=Q{ f }(id{ f } |C f mˇ). (.)
This standard representation insensitive form shows that QX ( f |mˇ), and
thus also PX ( f |xˇ), only depend on the values that f may assume, and on
the number of times each value has been observed.
Our central definition of representation insensitivity of a predictive
system then expresses that two previsions that have the same standard
representation insensitive form must have the same value. This is for-
malized by the predicate rip:Σ→Bwith
ripσ⇔∀X ,Y :S 2;
∀ f , g :LX ×LY ∧. { f }= {g };
∀QX (•|mˇ),QY (•|mˇ′) :σX ×σY ∧. C f mˇ =C g mˇ′;
QX ( f |mˇ)=QY (g |mˇ′).
(.)
We can denote the set of all (coherent or exchangeable) representation
insensitive predictive systems byΣrip (Σcoh∧rip orΣxch∧rip). In contrast to
what happens for exchangeability (cf. (.)), systems that dominate a
representation insensitive system need not be representation insensitive.
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.. Properties of representation insensitive predictive systems
Definition (.) provides us with a compact characterization of rep-
resentation insensitivity that underlines its basic meaning. It does not
provide us with immediate insight into what its consequences are for
coherent predictive systems. To get this insight, we investigate here some
consequences for the predictive lower and upper probabilities implied
by the member predictive previsions.




∣∣ nˇ−∑mˇA ,∑mˇA), (.)




∣∣ ∑mˇA , nˇ−∑mˇA). (.)








abilities only depend on the total number of observed samples nˇ and the
number
∑
mˇA of them that belong to A. Using the so-called lower prob-
ability function q : {k,` : (N<N )2 |`≤ k}→ [0,1] of the predictive system,
we can compactly write these probabilities; it is defined by
q(k,`)=Q{0,1}(id{0,1} |k−`,`). (.)
It gives the lower probability of seeing an event that has been observed `
times in k trials. Whenever it is needed to avoid ambiguity, we add a
superscript to q to indicate which predictive system it refers to.
The fact that the range of q is [0,1]-bounded follows from the pre-
assumed coherence of the predictive system; i.e., from accepting sure
gains (.) (lower bound) and from normedness (.) and (.)
(upper bound).
Another consequence of coherence that can be translated to the
lower probability function is superadditivity (.). For this, consider
the set {a,b,c} and assume that we observed a sequence with count
vector mˇ = (mˇa ,mˇb ,mˇc )= (`′,`′′, nˇ−`′−`′′), where `′ and `′′ inN≤nˇ are






Remember that due to representation insensitivity, it is enough to prove
the property using any one category set; the one used here was chosen for
its simplicity. So for all k inN<N and all `′,`′′ inN≤k such that `′+`′′ ≤ k
we have
q(k,`′+`′′)≥ q(k,`′)+q(k,`′′). (.)
Some immediate consequences of the second-argument superaddi-
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tivity are: (now let ` :N≤k and `′ :N<k )
q(k,0)= 0,





Two interesting and intuitively appealing conclusions about the predic-
tive lower and upper probabilities that are valid in any representation
insensitive coherent predictive system follow from these:
(i) Equation (.) tells us that the lower probability of observing an
event that has not been observed before is zero; by conjugacy, it
similarly holds that the upper probability of observing an event
that has always been observed before is one.
(ii) Equation (.) tells us that, for a fixed total number of observa-
tions, both the lower and the upper probability of some event do
not decrease if the number of times that event has been observed
increases.
The first of these conclusions has a quite far-reaching consequence:
for any representation invariant coherent predictive system, the ini-
tial predictive prevision of any of itsX -families must be vacuous; i.e.,
PX =min (and QX =min). To see this, consider any nonconstant gam-
ble f onX , then
0≤QX
(
f −min{ f })
=Q{ f }
(
id{ f }−min{ f }
)
≤ (max{ f }−min{ f }) ·Q{ f }{ f }>min{ f }+0 ·Q{ f }{ f }=min{ f }
= (max{ f }−min{ f }) ·q(0,0)= 0,
where the first inequality follows from accepting sure gains (.) and
the second from mixed subadditivity (.). So then constant additiv-
ity (.) allows us to conclude QX f =min{ f }; for constant gambles
this result immediately follows from normedness (.).
Up until now, we have only assumed the predictive system under
scrutiny to be coherent. If we additionally assume it to be exchangeable,
we have the inequality (.) we found earlier (and its reformulation
in terms of predictive count previsions) at our disposal as a restriction.
So consider the set {a,b} and assume that we have observed a sequence
of length nˇ :N<N−1 with count vector mˇ = (mˇa ,mˇb) = (`, nˇ−`), where







∣∣ mˇ+ (1,0)) · I a +Q{a,b}(a ∣∣ mˇ+ (0,1)) · I b ∣∣∣ mˇ)
=Q{a,b}
(
q(nˇ+1,`+1) · I a +q(nˇ+1,`) · I b ∣∣ mˇ)
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=Q{a,b}
(
q(nˇ+1,`)+ (q(nˇ+1,`+1)−q(nˇ+1,`)) · I a ∣∣ mˇ)
and as we know from (.)å that q(nˇ+1,`+1)−q(nˇ+1,`) is nonnegative,
constant additivity (.) and nonnegative homogeneity (.) allow
us to write
= q(nˇ+1,`)+ (q(nˇ+1,`+1)−q(nˇ+1,`)) ·Q{a,b}(a|mˇ)
= q(nˇ+1,`)+ (q(nˇ+1,`+1)−q(nˇ+1,`)) ·q(nˇ,`).
So for all k inN<N−1 and all ` inN≤k we have
q(k,`)≥ q(k+1,`)+q(k,`) · (q(k+1,`+1)−q(k+1,`)). (.)
There is one interesting immediate consequence of this inequality.
We already know that the difference of the second right-hand side term
is nonnegative, so we can drop that term and find
q(k,`)≥ q(k+1,`). (.)
This gives us a third intuitively appealing conclusion, now about the
predictive lower and upper probabilities in any exchangeable represen-
tation insensitive predictive system: The lower probability for an event
for which there are a fixed number of observations does not increase
when the total number of observations increases.
All but one property of predictive systems we have encountered in
this subsection has been expressed in terms of the lower probability func-
tion. These properties are thus geared more towards predictive systems
that can be specified entirely in terms of lower and upper probabilities.
Such a specification would result in predictive systems consisting of
member predictive previsions that are 2-monotone (cf. the third side-
note of §..). In fact, the concrete predictive systems we are going to
propose after the next subsection come from an even more restricted
class: those with predictive previsions that are linear-vacuous mixtures
(cf. the first sidenote of §.).
.. The vacuous & Haldane predictive systems
The fact – discovered in the last subsection – that any representation in-
variant coherent predictive system must have vacuous initial predictive
previsions, when combined with a profound lack of inspiration, results
in our first proposal: the vacuous predictive system σmin. Its defining
property is that all member predictive previsions are vacuous. Put oth-
erwise, this means that its lower probability function qmin is identically
zero. It is dominated by all other coherent predictive systems.
Does this conservative system par excellence satisfy our require-
ments of exchangeability and representation insensitivity? The answer
is yes on both counts:
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(i) Representation insensitivity follows from (let QX (•|mˇ) be a mem-
ber of theX -family σmin
X
and f some gamble onX )




(ii) Exchangeability follows from the fact that, for eachX -family, the
predictive previsions can be seen as marginals of
(a) the exchangeable prior joint sequence distribution P N
X
that is
fully determined by the count distribution QN
X
=min through
the representation theorem (.), and
(b) the exchangeable updated sequence distributions P nˆ
X
(•|xˇ) ob-
tained via natural extension (.), which are in turn fully de-
termined by their count distributions QN
X
=min (cf. (.)).
In the vacuous predictive system, no learning takes place: starting
from a state of prior ignorance, we stay in that state when using this
system. Whatever sequence of samples is observed and whatever its
length, no new inferences are drawn. Of all the coherent (and thus also
of all the exchangeable) predictive systems, it is the least committal one,
in the sense that all other coherent predictive systems dominate it.
At the other end of the spectrum are the maximally committal coher-
ent or exchangeable predictive systems, of which we can conjure up one
out of our hat. In the realm of coherent previsions, the linear ones are
the maximally committal ones (cf. §..); so what we are going to do
is propose a predictive system that consists almost entirely of predictive
linear previsions.
We know that the initial predictive previsions of everyX -family in
the proposed system σmax must be vacuous. For all the other predictive
previsions, we take a weighted average, where the weight for every cat-
egory is the frequency of occurrence of that category in the observed
sample. So we propose that for any QX (•|mˇ) in σmaxX for which nˇ > 0
(let f be a gamble onX )
QX ( f |mˇ)=Wa( f |mˇ), (.)
where we have used the weighted average linear prevision. Letα : (RX )≥0
such that
∑
α> 0 be a vector of weights, then this prevision is defined
for any gamble f onX by
Wa( f |α) := 1∑α ·∑ f ·α=∑ f · α∑α . (.)
As can be seen from the last expression, the weights’ scale does not
matter; i.e., Wa(•|λ ·α)=Wa(•|α) for any positive real λ.
Using a weighted average is a very common idea. We immediately
see that the corresponding lower probability function qmax resulting
from (.) is defined for every k,` in N<N that are such that `≤ k > 0
by qmax(k,`)= `k . This coincides with the inferences from classical fre-
quentist estimation for the (lower and upper) probability of an event
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that has been observed ` times in k trials. It also coincides with the
inferences resulting from a classical Bayesian model with a multinomial
likelihood when using Haldane’s improper prior [see, e.g., Jeffreys ,
§III..]. Because of this, we call σmax the Haldane predictive system.
No other coherent predictive system dominates it.
But, does this maximally committal, classical system par excellence
satisfy our requirements of exchangeability and representation insensi-
tivity? Again, the answer is again yes on both counts:
(i) Representation insensitivity follows from (let nˇ : 1..N −1, mˇ : nˇX ,
and f :LX )
Wa( f |mˇ)=∑ f · mˇnˇ =∑r :{ f }r · (C f mˇ)rnˇ =Wa(id{ f } ∣∣C f mˇ).
The Haldane system is also the unique representation insensitive
system with only predictive linear previsions for nˇ > 0. To see this,
return to (.) and its consequence (.); for k > 0 their in-
equalities become equalities for systems with only predictive linear
previsions for nˇ > 0, which makes the lower probability function
of the Haldane system the only possible one.
(ii) Showing that the Haldane system is exchangeable requires a bit
more work, but it will be worth it in terms of interesting side dis-
coveries. To be exchangeable, the predictive previsions should
be marginals of an exchangeable joint sequence distribution or
an exchangeable updated joint sequence distribution. Because,
for every family, all but one of the predictive previsions is linear,
calculating these joints is a straightforward (but not simple) iter-
ated application of the marginal extension theorem (.); i.e., a
concatenation of the marginals.
To get some feeling for what this concatenation entails, we are
first going to look at the situation where nˇ :=N −2; again xˇ :X nˇ
and, as always, mˇ :=CX xˇ. We let f be a gamble onX 2, then
Introducing the
Kronecker delta:
δab = I a b = I b a.
P 2X ( f |xˇ)=Wa
(
Wa( f |mˇ+CX •)
∣∣ mˇ) (.)




=∑yˆ :X 2 f yˆ · mˇ yˆ1 · (mˇ yˆ2 +δyˆ1 yˆ2 )(N −2) · (N −1) . (.)
Note the invariance of the second factor under permutation of the








the case where nˇ is any number in 1..N −1: (now let f be a gamble
onX nˆ)
P nˆX ( f |xˇ)=
∑





j :1..i−1δyˆ j yˆi
nˇ−1+ i (.)
To prove that this formula is correct, we add an inductive step to
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P nˆ−1X ( f |xˇ,•)
∣∣ mˇ)=∑yˆ0:X P nˆ−1X ( f |xˇ, yˆ0) · mˇ yˆ0nˇ
=∑yˆ0:X (∑yˆ :X nˆ−1 f (yˆ0, yˆ)
·∏i :1..nˆ−1 mˇ yˆi +δyˆ0 yˆi +
∑





=∑yˆ0:X∑yˆ :X nˆ−1 f (yˆ0, yˆ) ·∏i :0..nˆ−1 mˇ yˆi +
∑
j :0..i−1δyˆ j yˆi
nˇ+ i
= P nˆX ( f |xˇ).
Now let us rewrite (.)å:
P nˆX ( f |xˇ)=
∑





j :1..i−1δyˆ j yˆi
nˇ−1+ i






mˇz +|{ j : 1..i −1 | yˆ j = z}|
)∏
i :1..nˆ(nˇ−1+ i )
;
for sequences yˆ that contain observations z for which mˇz = 0, the
numerators are zero, so we can restrict attention toXmˇ ; splitting
the sequence sum into a count vector sum and an atom-restricted
sequence sum, we get




i :0..mˆz−1(mˇz + i )∏
i :1..nˆ(nˇ−1+ i )
=∑mˆ:nˆXmˇ (∑yˆ :[mˆ] f yˆ) ·
∏
z:Xmˇ (mˇz +mˆz −1)!/(mˇz −1)!
(N −1)!/(nˇ−1)! ;
using binomial coefficients and (.), this becomes
= 1(N−1
nˆ
) ·∑mˆ:nˆXmˇ ( 1|[mˆ]| ·∑yˆ :[mˆ] f yˆ) ·∏z:Xmˇ (mˇz+mˆz−1mˆz )
=Dm(Mh( f |•) ∣∣ nˆ,mˇ), (.)
where, in the last step, we spotted the multivariate hypergeometric
prevision (cf. (.)) and introduced the prevision corresponding
to the multivariate negative hypergeometric distribution [John-
son et al. , §..], which we will encounter again later
when we define it under the name of Dirichlet-multinomial previ-
sion (.). The exchangeability of P nˆX ( f |xˇ) is evident from the
expression obtained (cf. (.)).
We only need to check the case where no observations have
yet been made; i.e., we need to check if the prior is exchangeable.
Using the marginal extension theorem (.) again, we find (now
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let f be a gamble onX N )
P NX f = PX
(









f (z,•) ∣∣ •) ∣∣∣N −1,CX z);
now, asXCX z = ız, this can be rewritten as
=miny :{(ız)N |z:X } f y
=minm:NX∧. |[m]|=1 Mh( f |m),
so the prior P N
X
is clearly exchangeable. In the third step, we
also see that the updated prevision P N−1
X
(•|xˇ) after one observa-
tion xˇ :X is extremely committal: it states that we can be practi-
cally sure that only the observed category xˇ will ever be observed
again!
Most updated previsions from this joint, obtained using natural
or regular extension, would be vacuous. However, in this context,
they are not: we started out with them and used them to obtain
this joint, with which they are coherent by construction (cf. (i)).
So, in the Haldane predictive system, learning does take place, but
it seems to be tied very strongly to the observations: the possibility of
getting a sample of a category that has not been observed before is not
taken into account.
For people who love to go from one extreme to the next, this subsec-
tion has been a real treat. Everybody else will also be happy, happy to
know that the two predictive systems we have encountered here – the
vacuous σmin and Haldane σmax –, academic as they may be, form an
excellent foundation to build really practical predictive systems. This is
the subject of the next subsection.
.. Mixing predictive systems
& the imprecise Dirichlet-multinomial model
One way to leave the land of extremes and return to our beloved land of
compromise is to combine the extremes. We can create a whole class
of predictive systems by taking convex mixtures of the vacuous and
the Haldane predictive systems. With this, we will be able to obtain
predictive systems that are exchangeable, representation insensitive,
that learn, and, while doing so, still keep the possibility of observing as
yet unobserved categories open.
These convex mixtures are defined as follows: Consider a so-called
mixing sequence ε in [0,1]N−1, then the mixing predictive system σε
is defined by taking – for eachX -family – convex combinations of the
predictive (count) previsions from σmax and σmin for nˇ : 1..N −1: (let f
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be a gamble onX and mˇ an observed count vector from nˇX )
QX ( f |mˇ) := εnˇ ·Wa( f |mˇ)+ (1−εnˇ) ·min{ f }. (.)
Of course the initial predictive (count) prevision is the vacuous previ-
sion; i.e., PX f =QX f =min{ f }. This is a convex mixture of the initial
predictive previsions in σmax and σmin in a very trivial sense.
The lower probability function qε corresponding to a mixing predic-
tive system σε is the convex combination k,` : (N<N )2∧. `≤ k > 0 ;εk · `k
of the lower probability functions qmax and qmin of the vacuous and Hal-
dane predictive systems. We see that it is necessary for representation
insensitivity that ε be categorization-independent. This is also sufficient,
as representation insensitivity is preserved by taking convex mixtures of
any representation insensitive predictive system.
Let k : 1..N −1, then εk = qε(k,k) and 1−εk = 1−qε(k,k). So εk is the
lower probability of observing a nontrivial event that has always been ob-
served before and 1−εk is the upper probability of observing a nontrivial
event that has never been observed before. The latter characterizes the
imprecision of the predictive prevision; so the imprecision depends on
the number of observations directly through the mixing factor εk . The
lower probability function of a mixing system is additive in its first ar-
gument; e.g., let ` :N≤k , then the lower probability qε(k,`) of observing
a nontrivial event ` times out of k trials is ` times the lower probabil-
ity qε(k,1)= εk · 1k of observing that event once.
The investigation to see under which conditions a mixing predic-
tive system can be exchangeable will take place in a number of more
technical stages. Some readers may wish to skip ahead to the result-
ing expression (.) for the predictive previsions that replaces (.)
– which ensures that exchangeable joints exist – and then continue with
the first paragraph after that.
The first stage consists of drawing an initial conclusion from the nec-
essary condition for exchangeability (.) we derived before. Trans-
lated in terms of mixing sequence components, this condition becomes:
(additionally assume k <N −1)
`
k ·εk ≥ `k+1 ·εk+1+ `k ·εk · ( `+1k+1 ·εk+1− `k+1 ·εk+1),
or (k+1) ·εk ≥ (k+εk ) ·εk+1. (.)
So if εk = 0, then εk+1 must also be zero for the system to be exchange-
able. This means that if we take ε1 = 0, then the predictive system must
coincide with the vacuous predictive system. In other words: if we want
to learn, we must start doing so from the very beginning.
We do want to learn, so from now onwards, we assume ε : ]0,1]N−1.
This assumption is useful in our second stage: we now replace the ex-
pression for the vacuous prevision in (.) by its expression as a lower
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envelope (cf. (.)):




∣∣ εnˇ · mˇnˇ + (1−εnˇ) ·CX z)
where we used the weighted average’s definition (.) twice. To write
the weights more elegantly, divide the numerator and denominator by εnˇnˇ
and define the nonnegative real number snˇ := nˇ · 1−εnˇεnˇ to obtain
QX ( f |mˇ)=minz:X Wa( f |mˇ+ snˇ ·CX z)=mint :∆X Wa( f |mˇ+ snˇ · t ),
where in the second, equivalent expression, the minimization ranges
over the whole simplex and thus over the whole credal set, not only over
its extreme points (cf. (.)). Condition (.), translated, requires that
sk+1 ≥ sk for all k in 1..N −2.
Now, to investigate the exchangeability of predictive systems con-
sisting of predictive previsions of this type, we must look at the joint
(updated) sequence distributions defined by them. For this, we need to
take the same steps as those taken for proving the exchangeability of the
Haldane predictive system in the previous subsection.
This brings us to the third stage, where we start by generalizing the
expression (.) for the situation where nˇ :=N −2. We know that
marginal extension (.) results in the least committal coherent joint,
but that this joint is not necessarily the least committal coherent and
exchangeable joint. Let f be a gamble onX 2, then P 2
X
( f |xˇ) must not be
smaller than the (lower envelope version (.) of) marginal extension
mint :∆X minr :(∆X )X Wa
(
Wa( f |mˇ+CX •+ sN−1 · r•)
∣∣ mˇ+ sN−2 · t). (.)
To be more precise: as P 2
X
(•|xˇ) is exchangeable if and only if its credal set
consists of exchangeable linear previsions only (cf. (.)), this credal set
must be equal to or a subset of the set of exchangeable linear previsions
in the credal set of the marginal extension.
A linear prevision in the credal set of this marginal extension is char-
acterized by the frequency vectors t and rz (z :X ) from∆X : (cf. (.))
Wa
(
Wa( f |mˇ+CX •+ sN−1 · r•)
∣∣ mˇ+ sN−2 · t)
=∑yˆ :X 2 f yˆ · (mˇ+CX yˆ1+ sN−1 · r yˆ1 )yˆ2sN−1+N −1 · (mˇ+ sN−2 · t )yˆ1sN−2+N −2
=∑yˆ :X 2 f yˆ ·
(
(mˇ+ sN−1 · r yˆ1 )yˆ2 +δyˆ1 yˆ2
) · (mˇ+ sN−2 · t )yˆ1
(sN−1+N −1) · (sN−2+N −2)
. (.)
To check that convex combinations can always be rewritten in this
form, let λ : [0,1], t ′, t ′′ : (∆X )2, and t :=λ · t ′+ (1−λ) · t ′′; for all z :Xt , let








· r ′′z . Then
λ ·Wa(Wa( f |r ′•) ∣∣ t ′)+ (1−λ) ·Wa(Wa( f |r ′′• ) ∣∣ t ′′)=Wa(Wa( f |r•) ∣∣ t).
 Inference models
We see that the prevision of (.)å is exchangeable when the second
factor’s numerator is invariant under permutation of the sequence order;
i.e., if for all nonidentical yˆ1 and yˆ2 inX
mˇ yˆ2
sN−2
· r yˆ2 yˆ1 +
mˇ yˆ1
sN−1
· t yˆ2 + t yˆ2 · r yˆ2 yˆ1 =
mˇ yˆ1
sN−2
· r yˆ1 yˆ2 +
mˇ yˆ2
sN−1
· t yˆ1 + t yˆ1 · r yˆ1 yˆ2 .
(.)
In the very specific, simple case where N = 2 andX = {a,b}, mˇ = 0
and we find that the exchangeability condition for joint linear previsions
above reduces to tb · rba = ta · rab (always satisfied for rba = 0= rab), or,
because tb = 1− ta , to ta = rbarba+rab and tb =
rab
rba+rab . So for this case, the
least committal and exchangeable joint lower prevision P 2{a,b} becomes
(cfr. (.)å; f is still a gamble onX 2 and g := z :X ; f (z, z))
min
{
mint :∆{a,b} Wa(g |t ),
minr :(∆{a,b}){a,b}∧. rba+rab>0 Wa
(
Wa( f |CX •+ s1 · r•)
∣∣ (rba ,rab))}.
This expression is already rather complex, given the simplicity of this
case. It forebodes the complexities one encounters when trying to derive
expressions for the least committal and exchangeable joint of more than
two marginals when N > 2 and |X | > 2. It would be very interesting to
obtain these expressions. . . as a future challenge.
In this thesis, we now work towards other interesting expressions,
which correspond to a simpler, more restricted case: Of the exchange-
able linear previsions dominating (.)å, we only consider those for
which the so-called hyperparameters rz and t are equal for all z inX ;
we do this for all concatenations of successive marginal and conditional
previsions. We call this restriction made out of mathematical conve-
nience the ‘constant hyperparameter path’. From (.), it then follows
that sN−1 = sN−2.
Assume s := sN−1 = sN−2 > 0 (otherwise we would have a Haldane
joint), then we now know that
P 2X ( f |xˇ) :=mint :∆X Wa
(
Wa( f |mˇ+CX •+ s · t )
∣∣ mˇ+ s · t)
is the least committal exchangeable constant hyperparameter path joint.
We can use a minimum over the compact unit simplex, because the con-
catenation of two weighted averages results in an expression for a linear
prevision that is a (continuous) polynomial function in t (see (.)å);
this generalizes to the a similar concatenation of an arbitrary number of
weighted averages. TheX -marginals of P 2
X
( f |xˇ) correspond to the pre-
dictive prevision for XN−1 (to understand why they are identical, see the
next-to-last paragraph before §..). Also, mint :∆X Wa(•|mˇ+CX z+s·t )
is a jointly coherent updated prevision after observing XN−1 to be z :X ,
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even when mint :∆X (mˇz + s · tz ) = 0, because then we can use regular
extension (.).
The reasoning leading to the expression for this joint started out by
taking the marginal extension of the predictive previsions for the ran-
dom variables XN−1 and XN . Our fourth stage is based on the fact that it
equally applies when using the marginal extension for all pairs of random
variables Xk and Xk+1, where k : 2..N −1. Therefore, to ensure exchange-
ability when walking the constant hyperparameter path, sk−1 = sk must
hold for all k, or, in other words, the sequence k : 1..N −1 ; k · 1−εk/εk must
be constant. If some s in R>0 is fixed, we get ε := k : 1..N −1 ; k/s+k and
the expression (.) for the corresponding mixing predictive system
becomes (let f be a gamble onX and thus, by isomorphism, on 1X )
PX ( f |mˇ)=QX ( f |mˇ),
QX ( f |mˇ)=Dm( f |1,mˇ, s) :=Wa( f |mˇ, s),
(.)
(.)
where in the last expression we used
Wa( f |mˇ, s) :=mint :∆X Wa( f |mˇ+ s · t ) (.)
= nˇnˇ+s ·Wa( f |mˇ)+ snˇ+s ·min{ f }. (.)
In this expression, s takes a similar role as nˇ, the total number of observed
counts; therefore s is often referred to as ‘the number of pseudocounts’.
(The reason for introducing the notation Dm(•|•,•, s) will become clear
in the next paragraph.)
So now the allowed concatenations of the linear previsions in the
credal sets of the predictive previsions and parameters involved are
constrained in such a way that there is only one possible updated joint
prevision for each sequence of observations xˇ. It is obtained – in this
fifth stage – by retracing the steps leading to the corresponding updated
joint prevision (.) for the Haldane system (concatenating weighted
averages), but substituting mˇ with mˇ+ s · t and minimizing over all t
in ∆X : (let f be a gamble onX nˆ and h a gamble on nˆX )
P nˆX ( f |xˇ)=Q nˆX
(
Mh( f |•) ∣∣CX xˇ),
Q nˆX (h|mˇ)=Dm(h|nˆ,mˇ, s) :=mint :∆X Dm(h|nˆ,mˇ+ s · t ),
(.)
(.)
where we have used the Dirichlet-multinomial linear prevision that cor-
responds to the Dirichlet-compound multinomial distribution. Let k be
some positive integer and α : (RX )≥0∧6=0, then this prevision is defined
for any gamble g on kX by [Johnson et al. , §..]
Generalized bi-
nomial coeffi-














Dm(g |k,α) := 1(∑α+k−1
k
) ·∑mˆ:kXα g mˆ ·∏z:Xα(αz+mˆz−1mˆz ) (.)
=Dm(g ◦ (•X ) ∣∣ k,αXα), (.)
 Inference models
where the second line compactly shows (using trivial extension) the
effect of having components of α that are zero.
For our sixth and final stage, we can rewrite the expression for the
initial predictive prevision as follows: (let f be a gamble onX )
QX f =min{ f }=mint :∆X Wa( f |t )=mint :∆X Wa( f |s · t ),
which has the same form (.)å as all the other mixing system predic-
tive previsions. So in contrast to the calculation of the Haldane prior, the
prior has the same form as the posterior joints: (now let f be a gamble
onX N and h a gamble on NX )






∣∣N , (X ; 0), s) :=mint :∆X Dm(h|N , s · t ),
(.)
(.)
So what we ended up with here is the predictive system charac-
terized by (.)å, augmented by its respectively prior and posterior
joints (.)–(.) and (.)–(.)å. Together, these form Walley
& Bernard’s [] imprecise Dirichlet-multinomial model or idmm. In
some sense, we justified this model by constructing it from first princi-
ples:
(i) requiring that its predictive previsions form a representation in-
sensitive system,
(ii) requiring that this system is exchangeable, i.e., find exchangeable
joints,






tional tax on any
gain above the mini-
mum possible one.
For the idmm, the
rate is ss+nˇ , which
in a sense pun-
ishes speculation.
mathematical convenience, and
(iv) walking the constant hyperparameter path out of mathematical
convenience.
There is only one free parameter in this inference model that has to
be fixed before using it: a positive real number of pseudocounts which
determines the speed of learning; low values beget fast, or even rash
learners, higher values beget slower, more conservative learners. I have
not yet heard any convincing argument to prefer one pseudocount value
over another a priori. My current attitude is that the choice depends on
the specifics of the application the model is used for; e.g., for artificial
intelligence applications in user interfaces, it could be determined with
a usability test. Walley [] and Walley & Bernard [] mainly work
with s := 1 or s := 2.
With our rediscovery of the idmm, we arrived at the most impor-
tant result of this section. The idmm will also be used to bootstrap the
next section about parametric categorical inference. But before we do
that, we show that the idmm predictive system σs – i.e., the one defined
by (.)å – satisfies another very interesting property besides exchange-
ability and representation insensitivity.
. Predictive inference: representation insensitive prediction 
.. Specificity
We now consider the situation where, in addition to the standard as-
sumptions of having observed some sample mˇ, we know that the next
observation belongs to a proper subset A of the category set X . This
could for example be the case when the actual observation has been
made, but it was imperfect. We now ask what our (immediate) predictive
model is, when starting from some mixing system σε characterized by
some mixing sequence ε : [0,1]N−1, and when taking into account the
information gained by the imperfect observation.
To answer this question, we condition the predictive count previ-
sion QX (•|mˇ) on A using the gbr. We know that when QX (A|mˇ) =
εnˇ ·∑mˇA/nˇ = 0, the updated predictive prevision QX (•|mˇ, A) will be vacu-
ous; this can happen when εnˇ = 0 or∑mˇA = 0. Whenever εnˇ ·∑mˇA/nˇ > 0,
we can obtain the updated predictive prevision by using the functional






















)+ (1−εnˇ) · (min{µ,min{ f }}−µ)
The right-hand side can only be zero whenµ≥min{ f }, because by defini-
tion min{ f }≤Wa( f |mˇA). This observation allows us to find the solution














mˇA+nˇ·(1−εnˇ )/εnˇ ·Wa( f |mˇA)+
nˇ·(1−εnˇ )/εnˇ∑
mˇA+nˇ·(1−εnˇ )/εnˇ ·min{ f }
= nˇA
nˇA + snˇ
·Wa( f |mˇA)+ snˇ
nˇA + snˇ
·min{ f },
where in the last line, we have written snˇ := nˇ · 1−εnˇ/εnˇ > 0 and nˇA :=∑mˇA
for convenience. Notice that it also subsumes the case nˇA =∑mˇA = 0,
as well as the case εnˇ = 0 by taking the limit for snˇ going to∞.
It is interesting to compare this expression to







where snˇA := nˇA ·
1−εnˇA
εnˇA
. They are equal whenever
nˇA · (snˇ − snˇA )
(nˇA + snˇ) · (nˇA + snˇA )
· (Wa( f |mˇA)−min{ f })= 0.
















a →⊥, b →>.
rizations X , for all count vectors mˇ, all
events A, and all gambles f , then it must
hold that snˇ = snˇA for every nˇ. To see
this, consider some nontrivial case, e.g.,
X := {a,b,c}, (mˇa ,mˇb ,mˇc ) := (nˇ−1,0,1),
A := {a,b}, and f := I a .)
The above equality is called the speci-
ficity property and any predictive system
satisfying it is called specific. This termi-
nology was first coined by Bernard [].
What we have found in the previous para-
graphs is that idmm predictive systems are
the only specific mixing predictive systems.
From a mathematical point of view, specificity already seems like a
nice property, but when we reflect on its meaning, we see that in some
contexts it is an appropriate and intuitively appealing property for a
predictive system to possess: It ensures that the inferences for the next
observation, when taking into account that that next observation belongs
to some known set of categories, only depend on the relative number
of observations of categories within the known set. For example, when
suggesting a book to a person, it will not help you to know how many
servings of which legumes that person has eaten throughout her life.
That specificity is not always a desirable property must also be clear:
when making guesses about which predator is observed next in some
ecosystem, it might not be prudent to neglect the relative number of
predator-specific prey that have been observed in the area. Moreover, in
such a context with meaningful links between the categories, although
requiring exchangeability may still seem like a good idea, requiring rep-
resentation insensitivity is not. (This remark is just meant to stress once
again that the models we are working with here are not universally valid.)
. Parametric inference: the imprecise Dirichlet model
This section starts with a natural variation on the context of the previous
one: we consider a subject who is making an arbitrary length sequence
of observations of a certain phenomenon. We assume the sequence to
be infinitely exchangeable. In §.. and §.. we have respectively
learned how to model our uncertainty about such sequences – using a
frequency distribution – and how to update this model.
We start this short section by deriving the imprecise Dirichlet model
(idm), a parametric inference model proposed by Walley []. The
second and last subsection discusses conjugate updating and how it
relates to what we have discovered.
. Parametric inference: the imprecise Dirichlet model 
.. From the idmm to the idm via infinite exchangeability
At the end of §.., we discovered the idmm, a predictive inference
model for categorical data – a sequence of N samples – described by a co-
herent set of count distributions Dm(•|nˆ,mˇ, s), where s is some positive
real number of pseudocounts, mˇ is some count vector of size
∑
mˇ = nˇ
(with nˇ : 0..N −1) and nˆ : 1..N − nˇ is the number of observations we are
making predictions about. This set consists of both marginal previsions
(e.g., cf. (.) for nˇ = 1) and prior and posterior exchangeable joint
previsions (.) and (.).
Now, if we let N become arbitrarily large, our uncertainty model
will describe the sample sequence as being infinitely exchangeable if
∞-cns{Dm(•|nˆ,mˇ, s) ∣∣ nˆ :N>0} for all observed count vectors mˇ of all
sizes nˇ :N. In other words, following (.), if we can find a coherent
frequency distribution R on C∆X , or, equivalently, on V∆X , for every mˇ
such that Dm(•|nˆ,mˇ, s)=R(Cm(•|nˆ,•)).















depends on the sign
of the components
of α−1; the same
is seen for higher
dimensions.
is yes. The name of the type of linear prevision that defines the idmm,
the Dirichlet-multinomial prevision, originates from the fact that the
Dirichlet-multinomial distribution can be seen as a compounding of a
multinomial with a Dirichlet distribution [Johnson et al. , §..];
to wit, the Dirichlet distribution is used as a second-order model, to
express uncertainty about the relative frequencies used in the multino-
mial distribution (i.e., the frequency vector ϑ :∆X in (.) or (.)).
Therefore every extreme point Dm(•|nˆ,mˇ + s · t ) of M (Dm(•|nˆ,mˇ, s))
(where t :∆X ) can be written as Di
(
Cm(•|nˆ,•) ∣∣ mˇ+ s · t), where we have
used the Dirichlet linear prevision that corresponds to the Dirichlet dis-
tribution [Kotz et al. , §.]. Let α be a nonnegative nonzero





·∫ ∆Xα hϑX · (∏z:Xαϑαz−1z ) dϑ (.)
=Di(h ◦ (•X ) ∣∣αXα), (.)
where the second line compactly shows (using trivial extension) the
effect of having components of α that are zero. Johnson et al. [,
§..] present the compounding in terms of probability density and
mass functions parameterized by a pointwise strictly positive α; to make
the correspondence with our expressions fit, use (.), (.), and
the fact that Cm(g |k,ϑX )=Cm
(
g ◦ (•X )
∣∣ k,ϑ) for any k :N>0, ϑ : kXα/k,
and any gamble g on kX .
So then
Dm(•|nˆ,mˇ, s)=Di(Cm(•|nˆ,•) ∣∣ mˇ, s), (.)
where
Di(•|mˇ, s) :=mint :∆X Di(•|mˇ+ s · t ), (.)
 Inference models
is the idm-posterior for the observed count vector mˇ and pseudocounts s.
When mˇ = 0, we obtain the idm-prior
Di
(• ∣∣ (X ; 0), s) :=mint :∆X Di(•|s · t ). (.)
Note that we have only defined the idm Di(•|•, s) for continuous gambles
on ∆X (cf. last paragraph before §..). We do not investigate the
interesting question of extension to all (measurable) gambles.
With (.) and (.)å, we have respectively found the coherent
prior and posterior frequency distributions that constitute Walley’s []
imprecise Dirichlet model or idm. In some sense we justified it by deriv-
ing it from first principles. These frequency distributions
(i) model the uncertainty about a sample sequence that is assumed
to be infinitely exchangeable,
(ii) characterize exchangeable representation insensitive mixing pre-
dictive systems (with a mixing sequence determined by s) for arbi-
trary sequence lengths, and
(iii) are the least committal (most conservative) previsions satisfying
these requirements when walking the constant hyperparameter
path.
.. Conjugate updating
We have derived the idm (via the idmm) by starting out with a family of
predictive previsions and using these marginals to build prior and poste-
rior joints. As seen in §.., in classical Bayesian updating one usually
approaches the updating problem differently: a prior joint distribution
is proposed and using Bayes’s rule this is updated with a likelihood func-
tion to a posterior joint distribution.
Seen in such a context, the prior idm (.) is only one among many
possible priors. Because of the way we derived it, we know that it is
special and unique in many ways (and I have actually become quite
attached to it). To its further distinction, the idm has another interest-




of lower and upper
previsions (.).
under categorical sampling with replacement. Roughly speaking, this
means that both the prior and posterior uncertainty models have the
same functional form [Bernardo & Smith , §.]; compare (.)
with (.)å to see that this is indeed the case. This conjugacy property
has the advantage of greatly increasing the mathematical tractability of
the updating process; we know of no behavioral justification for requir-
ing this property.
However, we do know at which point in the construction of the idm
it acquired this property. Using the notation of the previous subsection,
recall that the immediate predictive previsions corresponding to an idm
Di(•|mˇ, s) are linear-vacuous previsions: (let f be a gamble onX , and
. Parametric inference: the imprecise Dirichlet model 
use (.), (.), (.), and (.))
Di
(
Mn( f |1,•) ∣∣ mˇ, s)=Dm(Mh( f |•) ∣∣ 1,mˇ, s)=Wa( f |mˇ, s) (.)
= nˇs+nˇ ·Wa( f |mˇ)+ ss+nˇ ·min{ f }.
Or, in other words, that each of the precise Dirichlet models Di(•|mˇ+s ·t )
– where t :∆X – that defines this idm (cf. (.)) is a weighted average:
Di( f |mˇ+ s · t )= nˇs+nˇ ·Wa( f |mˇ)+ ss+nˇ ·Wa( f |t )=Wa( f |mˇ+ s · t ).
This is a property that characterizes conjugate families of distributions
for many likelihoods, among them the multinomial one [Diaconis &
Ylvisaker , just above the Acknowledgment].
It is therefore no surprise that we find no behavioral justification for
conjugate updating: it is a consequence of our choice to restrict our-
selves to mixing predictive systems out of mathematical convenience
(cf. §..). Linear-vacuous mixtures – also called contamination mod-
els or neighborhood models – are typically used in so-called robust




uncertainty models are better supported by the so-called sensitivity anal-
ysis interpretation of imprecise probabilities [Walley , §..]: There
is an ideal, precise uncertainty model, but due to practical limitations
it cannot be known precisely; so to deal with our limitations honestly,
we should use imprecise-probabilistic models (typically neighborhood
models and parameterized models such as the idm).
One could also say that the idmm is conjugate to the multivariate hy-
pergeometric likelihood, or closed under categorical sampling without
replacement, but this is not typical usage. A reason is that the posterior
lower previsions of the idmm (.) are defined on a different (smaller)
possibility space than the corresponding prior (.). This also cor-
responds to the fact that the multivariate hypergeometric likelihood
functions’ domain varies with the number of already observed samples
(cf. (.)–(.)).
Normally only parametric inference models – and their defining pre-
visions or probability mass or density functions – are said to be conjugate
to some likelihood. Actually, there is a class of likelihood functions for
which a conjugate inference model exists that shares many properties
with the one member we have already encountered, the multinomial
likelihood. The most important of these properties are that
(i) they are all determined by a finite dimensional sufficient statistic,
(ii) and they share a common functional form.
This is the class of the so-called regular exponential families. It turns
out that the analogies between these families and the multinomial one
are so strong that many aspects of what we have seen in this chapter
about learning from categorical samples can be generalized to the other
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sampling models in the class. This is the subject of the next chapter,
‘Inference models for exponential families’.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to some applications of the infer-
ence models we have constructed from first principles.
. Applications
In this section, we apply the idm, i.e., what we have learned up until now
in this chapter, to two slightly more concrete problems. The first problem
concerns learning and decision making in a game-theoretic context (re-
spectively in §.. and §..). Apart from the game-theoretic context,
the main new methods we introduce illustrate the use of the theory of
imprecise probabilities as a basis for a theory of decision making. The
second problem concerns learning the parameters of a Markov chain on
the basis of one or more generated state sequences. Markov chains are
introduced in §.. and we propose our inference models for them
in §...
.. Game-theoretic learning
Consider the situation where our loyal subject finds himself in a sequen-Quaeghebeur [,
] and Quaeghe-





tial decision problem that can be modeled as a game, with the following
characteristics:
(i) It involves two players: himself and his opponent.
(ii) It can consist of an arbitrary number of rounds.
(iii) In any round, his opponent can choose any strategy in a finite set
of strategiesX ; this strategy set is fixed for the whole game.
(iv) With each of his own strategy choices, there corresponds a gamble
onX that represents his possible payoff (winnings or losses).
(v) In any round, both players simultaneously declare the strategy
they have chosen for that round, so our subject can then calculate
his payoff – measured in some linear precise utility (cf. §..) –
for that round; he can also keep track of his opponent’s subsequent
strategy choices.
We suppose that our subject wishes to take a structured approach to
choosing his own strategies: he wants to model his opponent’s behavior
and his own uncertainty about that behavior. Based on that model, which
he updates whenever he receives new information about his opponent’s
behavior, he is going to determine in every round which of his strategies
are optimal and then play one of those optimal strategies.
To model his opponent’s behavior, our subject assumes his oppo-








round the opponent uses the same randomization device to choose his
strategy. In other words, he assumes his opponent behaves as if he had
an urn with colored marbles – where each color corresponds to some
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strategy – from which he draws one with replacement every round; so
he can model his opponent as a multinomial sampling process which is
characterized by some unknown frequency vector in ∆X . He can make
this assumption either to simplify matters or because he has some in-
formation that supports it. This assumption implies that the sequence
of observed strategies is infinitely exchangeable and leads us squarely
to the sensitivity analysis interpretation of the theory of imprecise prob-
abilities as a basis of choosing an uncertainty model (cf. §..): we
know there is a precise model, the urn’s composition.
Given that the opponent has been conceptually replaced by an urn,
what further assumptions do we make about what our subject does or
does not know?
(i) At the start of the game, he has no clue about the setting of the
randomization device.
(ii) He evidently assumes that how he pools or labels his opponent’s
strategies cannot influence the device.
These reasonable-sounding assumptions, together with the infinite ex-
changeability assumption above and the aptness of the sensitivity analy-
sis interpretation make the idm an ideal choice for the inference model
to help our subject learn from his opponent’s behavior.
So our subject chooses some number of pseudocounts s that suits
him, dutifully records the sequence of strategies xˇ his opponent plays
through the rounds, calculates the corresponding strategy count vec-
tor mˇ :=CX xˇ, and stands at the ready with his up-to-date inference
model Di(•|mˇ, s) (cf. (.)). Ready for what? Ready to determine what
strategy to play in the next round, which can be the first round (for which
he uses the prior described by (.)). How to do this is the subject of
the next subsection.
But before we do that, we give a graphical illustration of the evolution
of the subject’s inferences about his opponent’s mixed strategy. This is
done by drawing (in gray) the evolution (with nˇ) in the simplex∆X of the
set mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s of parameters that determine the inference model Di(•|mˇ, s).
Take, for this illustration,X := {a,b,c} and consider the observed strategy
sequence xˇ := bcbbabbaab of total length 10.
s := 2 a
b
c
nˇ := 0 nˇ := 1 nˇ := 2 nˇ := 3 nˇ := 4 nˇ := 5 nˇ := 6 nˇ := 7 nˇ := 8 nˇ := 9 nˇ := 10
s := 10
The fixed mixed strategy I used to generate the strategy sequence was
(ϑa ,ϑb ,ϑc ) := ( 12 , 13 , 16 ); it is indicated with a black dot. This illustration
underlines that one cannot expect the gray set mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s to contain the
black dot mixed strategy. Although increasing the imprecision by in-
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creasing s will improve the chance of this happening, the fact that the
standard deviation decreases in
p
nˇ and the set’s volume in nˇ|X |−1 makes
it almost sure not to happen eventually.
.. Game theoretic decision making
We are now going to show how a strategy can be chosen that is in some
sense optimal. First of all, we assume that the player has a finite set of
strategies 0..i at his disposal, where i is a natural number. With each
strategy j in 0..i , there corresponds a payoff function f j . This is a gamble
on the setX of the opponent’s strategies: after choosing a strategy j , the
resulting payoff is unknown until the opponent has revealed his strategy
choice. The set of all payoff gambles isK := { f j | j : 0..i }. Just like his op-
ponent supposedly does, he can use a randomization device – for which
he is free to change the setting every round – to choose his strategy for
him; i.e., he can play a mixed strategy. With every mixed strategy λ :∆0..i ,
there corresponds a linear gamble fλ :=
∑
j :0..i λ j · f j on ∆X that returns
the expected payoff under this mixed strategy for every one of his op-
ponent’s mixed strategies. We allow our subject to choose any mixed
strategy, so – because choosing a strategy implies choosing a payoff gam-
ble – we allow him to use any (expected) payoff gamble in coK ⊂CX ,Illustrating the con-vex hull operator:
co{0,1} = [0,1]. the convex hull ofK .
To be able to choose a strategy from∆0..i , the subject must determine
which of his payoff gambles and thus strategies are optimal, so he needs
an optimality criterion to guide him [Troffaes , ].
The optimality criterion we are going to use first is maximality [Walley
, §..]. This criterion works as follows: Pairwise comparisons areBecause we are
working with a






made between all the payoff gambles to determine if one is more optimal
than the other, if they are equally optimal, or if their relative optimality
is undecidable. On the basis of these pairwise comparisons, a partial
ordering of the gambles is made. (Note the relationship with preference
orders §...) The maximal elements of this order – i.e., those for which
no other gamble exists that is more optimal – are the optimal payoff
gambles, one of which should be chosen for the next round.
We state the pairwise comparison defining maximality first in generic
terms: Let Ω be some possibility space,N :⊂LΩ, and P some coherent
lower prevision onN . We compare two gambles g and h inN as follows:
(i) g is better than, or dominates, h when P (g −h) > 0: the supre-
mum acceptable price for swapping h for g must be positive; or,
equivalently, using conjugacy (.),
(ii) g is worse than, or is dominated by, h when P (g −h)< 0;
(iii) g and h are equally good when P (g −h)= 0= P (h− g ): one stays
indifferent to the swapping of g for h;
(iv) g and h are incomparable when none of the above holds: one does
not have enough information to decide between the two gambles.
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According to the maximality criterion, those gambles inN that are un-
dominated are optimal. This means that a gamble g is optimal in N
when minh:N P (g −h)≥ 0, where the inequality can of course immedi-
ately be replaced by an equality (take h := g ).
Returning to our game-theoretic context, our subject has a paramet-
ric uncertainty model Di(•|mˇ, s) for all continuous gambles on the pos-
sibility space ∆X of all the possible mixed strategies his opponent can
use. Our subject has to find the optimal payoff gambles for the coming
round, so he has to use the immediate prediction model corresponding
to Di(•|mˇ, s). This is (cf. (.); let f be a gamble onX )
Di
(
Mn( f |1,•) ∣∣ mˇ, s)=Dm(Mh( f |•) ∣∣ 1,mˇ, s)=Wa( f |mˇ, s).
Under the maximality criterion, a payoff gamble g is optimal in coK
when minh:coK Wa(g −h|mˇ, s)= 0, i.e., nonnegative. We can rewrite the
left-hand side, by first writing Wa(•|mˇ, s) as a lower envelope (.)
and then using the minimax theorem [Walley , §E], which can be
applied without worries as both coK and ∆X are compact, convex sets
and Wa(•|•) is linear in both arguments:
minh:coK Wa(g −h|mˇ, s)
=minh:coK maxt :∆X Wa(g −h|mˇ+ s · t )
=maxt :∆X ming :coK Wa(g −h|mˇ+ s · t )
=maxt :∆X
(
Wa(g |mˇ+ s · t )−maxh:coK Wa(h|mˇ+ s · t )
)
.
We see that this expression will be zero and thus g will be optimal, when-
ever there is a frequency vector t for which g maximizes the expected
utility under Wa(•|mˇ+ s · t ). Every frequency vector determines an ex-
pected mixed strategy mˇ+s·tnˇ+s of the opponent, so we can write the set
of mixed strategies the subject expects to be possible choices for his
opponent as mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s . Incorporating this piece of interpretation, we can
formally write down the set of optimal strategies as Prepending arg
in front of an ex-
tremum operator
(e.g., min, max) re-










argmaxλ:∆0.. j Wa( fλ|t ). (.)
In game-theoretic terminology [see, e.g., Friedman ] this would be
called a best reply to mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s .
The maximality optimality criterion only takes into account the un-
certainty model of our subject and the set of strategies (and thus gam-
bles) he can choose from. His attitude towards the game and his oppo-
nent or information (he thinks) he has about the game and his opponent
that was not included in his uncertainty model – e.g., because it was
irrelevant for that purpose or just too complicated to do – can influence
the choice of optimality criterion. As a further step, we consider the case
that our subject thinks his opponent chooses his strategy to minimize
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our subject’s payoff; he may think this because he is a pessimist, or be-
cause he thinks his opponent is evil, or because he knows that the game
he is playing is strictly competitive (each round, the sum of both players’
payoff is constant; zero-sum games are the archetypical example). In
such a context, it is reasonable for our subject to try to minimize his
losses. He can do this by choosing to play a strategy with a gamble that
has the best expected worst-case payoff: he will try to maximize his lower
prevision.
We can formalize this by saying that a payoff gamble g is optimal
when Wa(g |mˇ, s)=maxh:coK Wa(h|mˇ, s). Using similar basic manipula-
tions as in the case of maximality, the set of optimal strategies becomes
argmaxλ:∆0.. j mint : mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s
Wa( fλ|t ), (.)
which can be seen to be a subset of the set of strategies (.)å optimal
under maximality. These optimal strategies are the so-called maximin
strategies for mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s : their gambles maximize the expected payoff, given
that the opponent is expected to choose a strategy in mˇ+s·∆Xnˇ+s that makes
this expected payoff as small as possible.
This concludes our first application of the idm.
.. Markov chains: linking multinomial processes for fun and profit
The second application of the idm we are going to look at is learning (sta-Kemeny & Snell
[] give a good in-
troduction to finite
Markov chains.
tionary) finite Markov chains, a widely used type of stochastic process
[see, e.g., Dayhoff et al. ; Sarukkai ]. This means that we wish
to learn (about) the parameters that completely describe this stochastic
process on the basis of its output. In this subsection, we introduce Mar-
kov chains, their parameters, and their likelihood functions; in the next
subsection we propose two related inference models.
A stationary finite Markov chain can be seen as a discrete stochastic
process, i.e. as an infinite length sequence X of random variables. Each of
the random variables can take a value within some finite setX of states
(or categories). The central assumption that makes a discrete stochastic
process a Markov chain is that the chance that Xk = z – where k :N>1
and z :X – is only influenced by the state (that was observed) for Xk−1
and not on the realization of any ‘previous’ random variable, i.e., with
indices smaller than k−1; this is called the Markov condition or Markov
property. In more formal language, we can say that conditional on the
value that Xk−1 assumes, the random variable Xk is independent from
the random variables X j , with j in N<k−1. (We call the Markov model
stationary to stress that there is no dependence on the sequence index k.)
The Markov condition makes it natural to think in terms of transi-
tions between states, which can be represented by pairs of states. Al-
though imprecise Markov chains can be defined and used [De Cooman
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et al. a, a; Dhaenens ; Škulj ], we assume here that
the observations are generated by a precise Markov chain. So, as in the
previous subsection, we place ourselves squarely in a sensitivity analysis
context.
A precise Markov chain is usually parameterized using a (stochastic)
transition matrixΘ : (∆X )X that contains the transition probabilities: for
every state z, the row θᵀz contains the probabilities θzz′ for a transition Matrix and vector
transposition is
denoted by •ᵀ.
from state z to the next state z ′ :X . So our aim is to build an inference
model that tells us something about these transition probabilities based
on the observed transitions.
When we want to be able to deal with multiple state sequences, we
also need a model for how the initial state of these sequences is cho-
sen. We assume the initial states of the different sequences to form an
exchangeable sequence generated by an unknown multinomial distribu-
tion. This so-called initial distribution is parameterized by a frequency
vector ϑ in∆X that describes the composition of the proverbial urn from
which the initial states are drawn with replacement.
When we observe a partial state sequence xˇ :X nˇ of length nˇ+1 and
indexed from 0 to nˇ, where nˇ :N>0 is the number of observed transitions,
we can associate with it a count matrix Mˇ : nˇX×X . For this, we first define,
for every state z and every sequence xˇ, the subsequence
xˇz := (xˇk+1|k : 0..nˇ−1∧. xˇk = z) (.)
consisting of those states that immediately follow state z in the se-
quence xˇ. Then the row of Mˇ consisting of transitions out of state z
is mˇᵀz :=CX xˇz and the number of observed transitions from z to z ′
is mˇzz ′ .
Because it will be of use later on, we also introduce the frequency
matrix Fˇ :
(
∆X ∪ (X ; 0)
)X , for which each row fˇ ᵀz is defined by fˇz = mˇz∑mˇz
when
∑
mˇz > 0 and is identically zero otherwise. This matrix Fˇ is stochas-
tic in the sense that each nonzero row’s components are nonnegative
and sum to one.
Due to the Markov condition, the sequence xˇz with count vector mˇz
is a multinomial sample. The corresponding sequence and count likeli-
hood functions are B xˇz and B mˇz , respectively (cf. (.) and (.)).
The likelihood function corresponding to a Markov chain is com-
posed of the multinomial likelihoods for each of the different states and
the likelihood of observing the initial state xˇ0. Let xˇ be a state sequence
with count and frequency matrices Mˇ and Fˇ generated by a Markov chain
with transition matrix Θ and initial distribution ϑ, then the probability
of encountering this state sequence is
W xˇ (ϑ,Θ) :=ϑxˇ0 ·
∏
k:1..nˇθxˇk−1 xˇk =ϑxˇ0 ·
∏
z:X B xˇzθz , (.)
which gives rise to (what we call) a Markov linear prevision – or rather,
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one for every possible number of transitions n :N>0 – defined for any
gamble f onX n by
Mv( f |n,•,•) :=∑y :X n+1 f y ·W y . (.)
This prevision is in some sense composed of multinomial previsions (one
for each state and one for the initial distribution). Due to the fact that
the length of the subsequences of states transitioning out of a specific
state – the length parameter for the multinomial for that state – varies
for different state sequences, writing it down in terms of multinomial
previsions is hard.
We have learned so far that W xˇ is the Markov likelihood function cor-
responding to the state sequence xˇ. Because B mˇz ∝B xˇz , this likelihood
is the same for every state sequence with the same count matrix starting
in the same initial state. This means that the pair (xˇ0, Mˇ) is a sufficient
statistic and the order information available in the state sequence xˇ not
expressed by this pair is ancillary, i.e., irrelevant for updating according
to the discrete likelihood principle (cf. §..).
Although we know that the likelihood function corresponding to the
observation of some initial state xˇ0 and some transition count matrix Mˇ
will be proportional to W xˇ , it is interesting to know this proportionality
constant; i.e., to know how many different state sequences correspond
to a given transition count matrix generated by a Markov chain starting
in a given initial state. We know that one factor in this will be the product
of all the proportionality constants between B mˇz and B xˇz for all the
different states z, which express how many conditional state sequences
correspond to each of the matrix’s rows. The fact that in a Markov chain,
after transitioning into a state, one can by definition only transition
out of that same state, means we need another factor to express that a
valid state sequence is not just any collection of valid conditional state
sequences. Whittle [] found that this factor is |1− Fˇ |xˇnˇ xˇ0 , the (xˇnˇ , xˇ0)-The identity matrix
is denoted by 1. cofactor of the matrix 1− Fˇ . In this expression, the final state xˇnˇ appears;
it can be derived from xˇ0 and Mˇ , as all states are transitioned into as
many times as they are transitioned out of, except possibly the initial
and final states: for all states z, it holds that
∑
mˇz −∑mˇ•z = δxˇ0z −δzxˇn .
To see that a compensating factor such as |1− Fˇ |xˇn xˇ0 is necessary,
consider the following example: TakeX := {a,b}, Mˇ := (1 11 1), and xˇ0 := b,
which implies that Fˇ = 12 Mˇ and xˇn = b. Seen as two sets of multinomial
transition samples, there are four ways to order them: aa, ab or ab, aa
and ba,bb or bb,ba. The (b,b)-cofactor of 1− 12 Mˇ is (1− 12 Mˇ)aa = 12 , so
there are only two possible state sequences, i.e., only two of the four
multinomial transitions samples can be patched together: ba, aa with
ab,bb to baabb and ba, aa with bb, ab to bbaab.
Combining the proportionality constants discussed in the next-to-
last paragraph with the expression for the likelihood function (.)å of a
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state sequence, we can write down the likelihood function corresponding
to a given count matrix Mˇ and initial state xˇ0 [also see Billingsley ]:
W xˇ0,Mˇ (ϑ,Θ) :=ϑxˇ0 · |1− Fˇ |xˇnˇ xˇ0 ·
∏
z:X B mˇzθz . (.)
The most interesting thing we have now learned is that not all ma-
trices in nX×X – where n :N>0 – are transition count matrices resulting
from a state sequence with n transitions. We formalize the Markovian
constraint on these count matrices, which guarantees that they result
from a state sequence starting in z, with a predicate z-mkv:nX×X →B
defined for every such matrix M : nX×X by
z-mkv M ⇔∑mz > 0
∧∃z ′ :X ;∀z ′′ :X ;∑mˇz ′′ −∑mˇ•z ′′ = δzz′′ −δz ′′z ′ . (.)
Use this to define the state-agnostic predicate mkv:nX×X →Bwith
mkv M ⇔∃z :X ; z-mkv M . (.)
This state-agnostic predicate allows us to give expressions for the
Markov linear previsions for count matrices (one for every total transition
count n :N>0). It is defined for any gamble h on (nX×X )mkv by
Cv(h|n,•,•) :=∑z:X∑M :(nX×X )z-mkv hM ·W z,M . (.)
Similarly to the sequence Markov prevision (.), this prevision is com-
posed of count-multinomial previsions (one for each state and one for
the initial distribution). Again, it is hard to write it down as such.
.. Learning Markov chains
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functions, and previsions of Markov chains, we are ready to propose
inference models for this type of stochastic process.
Because we already know that the process satisfies the Markov con-
dition, there is no uncertainty about how the sequence of random vari-
ables X can be split up into infinitely exchangeable subsequences Xz
of transitions out of the different states z. The only thing there is uncer-
tainty about is the relative likelihoods of these transitions. So, assuming
representation insensitivity, i.e., that
(i) we start from a state of prior ignorance about these relative likeli-
hoods,
(ii) the states’ names are irrelevant, and
(iii) the grouping of states does not modify the relative likelihoods,
and considering we are working in a sensitivity analysis context, it is rea-
sonable to use one idm per state as the inference model for the unknown
probabilities for transitions out of that state. For example, the idm for
transitions out of state z after observing the count matrix Mˇ – or after
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a string of observations for which the count matrices sum up to Mˇ – is
Di(•|mˇz , sz ), where we wish to draw attention to the fact that we can
choose the number of pseudocounts sz :R>0 to be z-dependent.
Concerning the initial distribution, we have seen in the previous sub-
section that it is assumed to be an unknown multinomial distribution,
for which we will use an idm as well. Let mˇ be the count vector corre-
sponding to the finite sequence of observed initial states and let s be
the number of pseudocounts chosen for learning the initial state, then
the idm used is Di(•|mˇ,s).
Of course, the individual state-dependent idms and the idm for the
initial state need to be combined into a global inference model for the
whole Markov chain. Given our sensitivity analysis context [Walley ,
§..] and the assumed independence of these models resulting from
the Markov condition, we use a type- product (.). All the marginals
– the individual state-dependent idms and the idm for the initial state –
are lower envelopes of Dirichlet previsions. To calculate the type- prod-
uct, we first need to take products of these Dirichlet linear previsions, so
let T be some ‘prior’ transition matrix in (∆X )X with rows tᵀ, s a vector
of pseudocounts in (R>0)X , t a ‘prior’ frequency vector in ∆X for the
initial distribution, then the corresponding precise product prevision,
which we call a precise Markov chain Dirichlet model (or pmcdm), is
MDi
(• ∣∣ mˇ+s · t, Mˇ + s ·T ) :=Di(•|mˇ+s · t)×Di×(• ∣∣ Mˇ + s ·T ), (.)
where
Di×
(• ∣∣ Mˇ + s ·T ) :=×z:X Di(•|mˇz + sz · tz ) (.)
and where s ·T is a row-wise product, i.e., the z-row (s ·T )z of the prod-
uct is sz · tᵀz . The precise Markov chain Dirichlet model is defined for
all continuous gambles on ∆X × (∆X )X . The imprecise Markov chain
Dirichlet model (or imcdm) is then defined as a lower envelope of precise
Markov chain Dirichlet models:
MDi
(• ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s) :=mint:∆X minT :(∆X )X MDi(• ∣∣ mˇ+s · t, Mˇ + s ·T ).
(.)
In the imcdm’s current definition, we have to separately choose a
pseudocounts value sz for each state z. We can simplify this by letting
the pseudocounts be equal for all states (the notation of definition (.)
can be kept, but now with s as a positive real number). However, the
choice of state space can be somewhat arbitrary itself, which means
that for different initial choices for the state space, we can either keep
the individual number of pseudocounts per state constant or the total
number for all the states, but not both.
The former option, using a imcdm with pseudocounts that are con-
. Applications 
stant over the states, currently seems like an entirely reasonable choice
to me: The pseudocounts parameter arose in our derivation of the idmm
(cf. §..), where we saw that it characterized the mixing sequences,
i.e., it characterized how fast we moved from a vacuous system to a
Haldane system for immediate prediction. Given the current state, im-
mediate prediction for a Markov chain is exactly the same as immediate
categorical prediction, so there is no clear reason for me to let the pseu-
docounts depend on the number of other states – which has no relevance
for the immediate prediction.
However, due to where it appears in the formulas defining the id(m)m
(cf. (.) and (.)), the pseudocounts parameter is often given
the intuitive interpretation of a hypothetical sample. Letting the total
number of pseudocounts for the imcdm depend on the somewhat ar-
bitrary choice of the total number of states may seem contradictory in
the context of this intuitive interpretation. The question then becomes:
is it possible to modify the imcdm in such a way that we obtain an in-
ference model for learning Markov chains that is compatible with this
interpretation? The answer is yes.
When keeping the total number of pseudocounts constant, we need
to distribute this total number among the different states. Of course, in
a state of prior ignorance, we have no clue as to how the hypothetical
sample was obtained and thus how it should be distributed over the
different states. Luckily for us, users of the theory of imprecise prob-
abilities, we have the vacuous lower prevision to model this state of
knowledge. So, now letting s :R>0 denote the constant total number of
pseudocounts over all states, the corresponding parametric inference
model becomes
MDj
(• ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s) := infr :∆X MDi(• ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s · r ). (.)
An infimum is used because the imcdm is not defined when for some
state both mˇz = 0 and rz = 0, which can happen for r on the border of
the simplex.
Both the constant per-state pseudocount model MDi
(• ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s)
defined by (.) and MDj
(• ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s), the constant total pseudocount
model defined by (.) derived from it, can be used to define predictive
sequence and count inference models.
Assume first that we are interested in predictions about a future state
sequence with nˆ :N>0 transitions, i.e., of length nˆ+1, then the predictive
inference models will be
MDi
(
Mv(•|nˆ,•,•) ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s) and MDj(Mv(•|nˆ,•,•) ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s).
Both models are defined for all gambles onX nˆ+1 (cf. (.)). When





Cv(•|nˆ,•,•) ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s) and MDj(Cv(•|nˆ,•,•) ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s),
both defined for all gambles on (nˆX×X )mkv (cf. (.)).
The immediate prediction models
MDi
(
Mv(•|1,•,•) ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s) and MDj(Mv(•|1,•,•) ∣∣ mˇ,s, Mˇ , s)
can be used to learn imprecise Markov chains [see, e.g., De Cooman
et al. a, a]: they provide predictions about an unobserved fu-
ture initial state and one ensuing transition. The marginal for the ini-
tial state – which is identical for both prediction models – is Wa(•|mˇ,s);
the updated lower prevision for a given initial state z is Wa(•|mˇz , sz ) or
Wa(•|mˇz , s). These updated lower previsions are obtained by regular ex-
tension (.). Let t be some frequency vector in ∆X , T some Markov
matrix in (∆X )X , xˆ0 some initial state inX , and f a gamble onX ; to





I ı xˆ0×X · f ∣∣ 1,•,•) ∣∣∣ mˇ+s · t, Mˇ + s ·T )
= mˇxˆ0 +s · txˆ0∑
mˇ+s ·Wa( f |mˇxˆ0 + s · txˆ0 ),
because (let ϑ :∆X and Θ : (∆X )X ; cf. (.))
Mv
(
I ı xˆ0×X · f ∣∣ 1,ϑ,Θ)=ϑxˆ0 ·Wa( f |θxˆ0 ).
We use regular extension here because when mˇxˆ0 = 0, we do not want
the updated lower prevision to automatically become vacuous.





mˇz+s ], for every component (z, z
′ :X 2) of the tran-
sition matrix of the Markov chain we are learning about. If the Markov
chain is regular, this forms a consistent sequence of estimators for in-
creasing nˇ [Quaeghebeur ], i.e., it converges in probability to the
true transition matrix.
With this, we end this chapter that has dealt exclusively with finite





Inferencemodels for exponential families
“Ah,” disse il professor Camestres, “come già si diceva
nel primo Liber legis, ogni numero è infinito, e non c’è
differenza!”
“Capisco,” disse Belbo. “Ma non pensa che tutto que-
sto sia un poco oscuro per il lettore comune?”
Camestres quasi sobbalzò sulla sedia. “Ma è asso-
lutamente indispensabile. Chi comprendesse questi
segreti senza la dovuta preparazione precipiterebbe
nell’Abisso! Già nel renderli pubblici in modo velato io
corro dei rischi, mi credano. Io mi muovo nell’ambito
dell’adorazione della Bestia, ma in modo più radicale di
Crowley, [. . . ]”
Eco [, Ch. ]
We wish to learn from samples: make predictions about future sam-
ples or draw conclusions about the process generating the samples. This
is respectively called predictive and parametric inference. The uncer-
tainty model making these inferences based on the given samples is
called an inference model. This was our stated goal at the beginning of
the previous chapter, ‘Inference models’, and it still is.
Whereas in the previous chapter we focused on inference for cate-
gorical sampling, we here expand our view to learning from samples





ence models for ex-
ponential families.
previous chapter we carefully built up the inference models step-by-
step, each time explicitly mentioning the assumptions used, we here
propose – analogously to how the idm was first proposed [Walley ] –
a class of imprecise-probabilistic inference models as generalizations of
a well-known class of Bayesian inference models.
The Bayesian inference models we are going to generalize are the






gate to what? Recall from the subsection §.. on conjugate updating
that there is a class of sampling models described by likelihood func-
tions that have some very interesting properties in common with the
multinomial likelihood that was central in the previous chapter. This is
the class of regular exponential likelihood functions; it will be central to
this chapter.
The first thing we will do, in §., is extensively familiarize ourselves
with the regular exponential families of likelihoods and their classical
Bayesian conjugate parametric and predictive inference models. Once
this is done and digested with the help of some examples, you are ready
155
to follow in my footsteps and take the by now perhaps straightforward
(but not necessarily easy) generalization step of §., where we go
from inference models made up of single linear previsions to imprecise-
probabilistic ones consisting of sets of linear previsions. The last part
of the chapter, §., is meant to show how these specific imprecise-
probabilistic inference models can be applied using the example of naive
credal classification. To supplement the specific exponential families and
their derived inference models given as examples in this chapter, we have
added the Bestiarium, an appendix containing a similar treatment for
a number of additional exponential families.
. Exponential families & friends
In this section, we gather and review information about exponential fam- When talking about
exponential fam-








ilies and related probabilistic objects that can be found in the literature.
It serves as a basis for the next section, where we propose imprecise-
probabilistic parametric and predictive inference models for exponential
families. The theoretical subsections §.., §.. and §.. are com-
plemented by examples in §.., §.., §.., and §...
.. Regular exponential families
Consider a subject who is making an arbitrary number of observations
of a certain phenomenon. These samples can take a value in some sam-
ple space we generically denote byX . In this chapter, contrary to the
previous one, we consider both finite and countably or uncountably
infinite sample spaces. So formally, what we consider is an infinite se-
quence X := (Xk |k :N>0) of random variables drawn from the same sam-
ple spaceX . (These random variables can be scalar or vectorial.)
We assume that the draws are identically distributed according to
some unknown member of a known regular exponential family and that
the draws are independent conditional on the knowledge of the actual
distribution. For example, we could assume that the draws come from
a fixed normal distribution with unknown mean and variance. This as-
sumption holds – under an additional σ-additivity assumption – when
the sequence of random variables is assumed to be infinitely exchange-
able [Kallenberg , Thm .], which is often considered reasonable.










regular exponential families? The main reason is that these families and
their conjugate families have so much in common with, respectively, the
multinomial distributions (which also form an exponential family) and
the Dirichlet distribution, that proposing inference models similar to
the idm is actually quite straightforward. One important property of ex-
ponential family likelihoods is that they are parameterized by sufficient
statistics of finite dimension.
 Inference models for exponential families
For every observed sample z :X generated by some exponential fam-
ily distribution, we can write out the corresponding likelihood function
Ea,τ,ψz :Φ→R>0. It is fully characterized – including the domain and the
set of parameters Φ – by the three functions, a :X ∗→R>0, τ :X ∗→T ,
and ψ :Φ→Ξ, whose role and ranges will be clarified below. What is the
general expression of such an exponential family likelihood function?
Let φ be some parameter in Φ, then
Ea,τ,ψz φ= b(ψφ) ·exp〈ψφ|τz〉 ·az, (.)
where b :Ξ→R>0 is a normalization function and 〈•|•〉 :Ξ×T →R de-
notes a scalar product between the set of so-called canonical parame-
ters Ξ and the so-called set of meansT . The middle factor explains the
epithet ‘exponential family’. A diagram containing the functions and sets






ψ b a τ
〈•|•〉
The choice of shapes (convex or not) for the sets and the relationship
betweenX ∗ andT will become clear later on in this subsection.
With likelihoods of the type (.), there correspond linear previsions
Efa,τ,ψ(•|φ) on the set L˘X of all measurable gambles. Let f be a gambleGambles on dis-
crete spaces are
always measurable.
in L˘X ; for discrete X (using the counting measure) this prevision is
defined by
Efa,τ,ψ( f |φ)=∑z:X f z ·Ea,τ,ψz φ (.)
and for continuousX (using Lebesgue measure) by
Efa,τ,ψ( f |φ)= ∫X f z ·Ea,τ,ψz φ dz. (.)
A set
{
Efa,τ,ψ(•|φ) ∣∣φ :Φ} is what we call an (indexed) exponential family
(of linear previsions). The family is fully characterized by a, τ, and ψ;
given a family, each family member is fully characterized by its parame-
ter φ.
Let us now discuss the functions appearing in (.):




of any exponential family is a σ-finite measure (so exponential
family distributions are σ-additive). We only consider Lebesgue
or counting measure modified by a (measurable) density or mass
function a, which is assumed to be strictly positive, because oth-
. Exponential families & friends 
erwise we could simplify the model by removing those possible
observations that are considered to be practically impossible.
(ii) As is typical in the literature, we takeT and Ξ to be subsets of the
same finite-dimensional vector space Rd on which we place the
Euclidean topology; d is a nonzero natural number. This means
that both τ and ψ are d-dimensional vector functions.
(iii) We assume that the exponential family is minimal, in the sense that
the dimension d is the smallest one that allows Efa,τ,ψ(•|φ) to be
written as it is. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that
the components of τ (which must of course be measurable) and ψ
are affinely independent [Barndorff-Nielsen , Corrolary .].
(iv) We see that Ea,τ,ψz φ only depends on φ through ψ: the parame-
ter space Φ is only used for interpretational purposes, the mathe-
matically relevant space is the space Ξ of canonical parameters.
Whenever ψ= idΦ and thus Φ=Ξ, we are dealing with a so-called
canonical exponential family. For these, we can drop the super-
scriptψ; so Ea,τz is the canonical family likelihood function, related
to a corresponding noncanonical one by
Ea,τ,ψz φ= Ea,τz (ψφ).
We often discuss the properties of an exponential family in terms
of the corresponding canonical one.
(v) The normalization function b is defined for every canonical pa-
rameter ξ in Ξ by Efa,τ(X |ξ)= 1, i.e.,
bξ= 1/∑z:X exp〈ξ|τz〉 ·az or bξ= 1/∫X exp〈ξ|τz〉 ·az dz.
(vi) The set of canonical parameters Ξ is chosen such that it contains
all mathematically acceptable parameters. To wit, it consists of
all ξ such that the linear prevision Efa,τ(•|ξ) can be normalized, i.e.,
such that bξ> 0. This choice results in a so-called full family and
makes Ξ convex: take ξ′ and ξ′′ in Ξ and let λ : ]0,1[, then
b(λ ·ξ′+ (1−λ) ·ξ′′)= 1/∑z:X exp〈λ ·ξ′+ (1−λ) ·ξ′′|τz〉 ·az
= 1/∑z:X (exp〈ξ′|τz〉 ·az)λ · (exp〈ξ′′|τz〉 ·az)1−λ
≥ (1/∑z:X exp〈ξ′|τz〉 ·az)λ · (1/∑z:X exp〈ξ′′|τz〉 ·az)1−λ
= (bξ′)λ · (bξ′′)1−λ,
where Hölder’s inequality [see, e.g., Schechter , §.] was
used in the third step; it follows that b(λ ·ξ′+ (1−λ) ·ξ′′)> 0 and
thus that λ ·ξ′+ (1−λ) ·ξ′′ ∈Ξ. (We assumedX to be discrete; a
completely similar argument works whenX is continuous.)
(vii) We restrict our attention to exponential families that are regu-
lar, i.e., full families for which Ξ is an open set. This technical
 Inference models for exponential families
restriction is necessary for a result from the literature (which we
introduce in (.)).
(viii) From our point of view, the conceptually most important function
is τ. It translates an observation z to a d-dimensional real vector τz
inT and the way in which this is done betrays what is and what is
not considered important in the sample. Whenever τX = idX , the
exponential family is called linear. A linear canonical exponential
family is called natural [Letac ; Kotz et al. , Ch. ].
The function τ as a translation of what is and is not important in a
sample, together with the structure of exponential families described
by (.), and the assumption of conditional independence determines
the sufficient statistic associated with an exponential family.
To see how this works, we consider an observed sample sequence xˇ
inX ∗ of length νxˇ (cf. §..). Due to the assumption of conditional
independence, the corresponding likelihood is the product of the likeli-




= (b(ψφ))νxˇ ·exp〈ψφ ∣∣ ∑k:1..νxˇτxˇk〉 ·∏k:1..νxˇaxˇk
= (b(ψφ))νxˇ ·expνxˇ〈ψφ|τxˇ〉 ·axˇ, (.)
where for any sample sequence x inX ∗, we have used the specifications
τx := 1νx
∑
k:1..νx τxk and ax :=
∏
k:1..νx axk , so these functions are fully
defined by their single-sample case. This product shows that the order
of the samples in a sequence is considered irrelevant: it is an ancillary
statistic.
In this chapter, we restrict the scope of possible applications by as-
suming that the continuous likelihood principle holds (cf. §..). From
this principle, it follows that the proportionality constant axˇ present
in (.) is irrelevant for updating, which means that (νxˇ,τxˇ) is the (d+1)-
dimensional sufficient statistic: it then contains all the information
in xˇ that under the given assumptions is deemed relevant for inference.
When considering sample sequences of arbitrary length, we see that the
rangeT of τ is the convex hull co{τX } of {τX }= {τz | z :X }.
We have already mentioned that one of the most important proper-
ties of exponential family likelihood functions was their finite dimen-
sional sufficient statistic. We see that for exponential families it consists
of the number of observed samples and a d-dimensional real vector that
can more-or-less be seen as an (arithmetic) mean single-sample suffi-
cient statistic. It is instructive to see how the sufficient statistic of two
observed sample sequences xˇ ′ and xˇ ′′ are combined: their total length is
ν(xˇ ′, xˇ ′′)= νxˇ ′+νxˇ ′′ and the new mean single-sample sufficient statistic
τ(xˇ ′, xˇ ′′) becomes the convex mixture νxˇ
′
ν(xˇ′,xˇ′′) ·τxˇ ′+ νxˇ
′′
ν(xˇ′,xˇ′′) ·τxˇ ′′.
The exponential family linear previsions for sequences inY :⊂X ∗
. Exponential families & friends 
that correspond to the likelihood function (.) are (let f be a gamble
in L˘Y )
Efa,τ,ψ( f |Y ,φ)=∑y :Y f y ·Ea,τ,ψy φ, or
Efa,τ,ψ( f |Y ,φ)= ∫ Y f y ·Ea,τ,ψy φ dy.
(.)
(.)
Here,Y is appropriately chosen in the sense that Efa,τ,ψ(Y |Y ,φ)= 1; for
example,Y could consist of the set of sequences of some given constant
length.
To finish this subsection, we direct our attention back to the single
sample case Y =X (cf. (.) and (.)) and to the normalization




of exponential family distributions: κ :=− ln◦b is the so-called cumulant
function of the exponential family distribution. Roughly, this is the loga-
rithm of the moment generating function of the distribution. For us, the
most interesting consequence – as we will see later – is that, vectorially The nabla-symbol ∇
denotes the gradi-
ent operator.Efa,τ,ψ(τ|φ)= (∇κ)(ψφ); (.)
component number i : 1..d of this vectorial expression is Illustrating the
partial deriva-
tive operator: let
f := u :R2 ; u1 ·u22 ,
then (D2 f )(u1,u2)
= 2 ·u1 ·u2.
Efa,τ,ψ(τi |φ)= (Diκ)(ψφ), (.)
which is always defined, even if τi is unbounded [Barndorff-Nielsen ,
Thm .].
To make things more concrete, we give practical examples of expo-
nential families in the next two subsections. The first, the normal family,
is an example of a family defined on a continuous sample space and
the second, the multivariate Bernoulli family, is an example of one that
is defined on a discrete sample space. A lot of other commonly used
sampling models such as exponential sampling and Poisson sampling
also correspond to exponential families; for these two and also some
others, a description in the same vein as the ones below can be found in
the Bestiarium.
.. Continuous example: normal sampling
Our first example is the family of univariate normal distributions [see, Two normal densi-
ties (plot restricted
to [−5,5]): (the




e.g., Bernardo & Smith , §..]; each member has X :=R as a
sample space and is parameterized by its mean and standard deviation,
i.e., a φ := (µ,σ) in Φ :=R×R>0. Let f be any measurable gamble on R;
the normal linear prevision is then defined by
Nl( f |µ,σ) := ∫X f z · 1p2·pi·σ ·exp(− 12 · ( z−µσ )2) dz. (.)
We start by rewriting the corresponding likelihood function in expo-
nential family form: let z be an observed real sample, then this likelihood
 Inference models for exponential families






















∣∣ z, z2〉 · 1p
2·pi .





vector space for this family has dimension d := 2 and that
τ := z :R ; (z, z2), so T := co{z, z2 | z :R}= {t :R2 | t2 ≥ t 21 },
ψ := (µ,σ) :R×R>0 ; ( µσ2 ,− 12·σ2 ), so Ξ :=R×R<0,
(.)
and also that
a :=R ; 1p





2·ξ2 + ln(−2 ·ξ2)
))
. (.)
In principle, constant factors (such as −1/2) can be swapped be-
tween τ and ψ. Our choice for τ was inspired by a possible assump-
tion that justifies using a normal likelihood function: that any sample
sequence xˇ :X ∗ with the same sequence length νxˇ, the same barycen-
ter τ1xˇ, and the same moment of inertia τ2xˇ− (τ1xˇ)2 is equally likely to
occur.
The cumulant function for the normal family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R×R<0 ;− 12 ·
( ξ21
2·ξ2 + ln(−2 ·ξ2)
)
.
So, using (.)å and (.)å, we find – letting ξ :=ψ(µ,σ) – that









i.e., a vector consisting of the mean and the second-order noncentral
moment.
.. Discrete example: multi-category Bernoulli & negative
multinomial sampling
We start our second example by investigating the multi-category Ber-
noulli family of distributions. The archetypical example of a Bernoulli
trial is the drawing of one marble with replacement from a bag of vari-
ously colored marbles. The repetition of Bernoulli trials lies at the basis
of the already quite familiar multinomial sampling process, but also of
others, e.g., the negative multinomial sampling process.
Each multi-category Bernoulli distribution has a nonempty finite
category setX as a sample space and is parameterized by a |X |-dimen-Illustrating the
interior operator:
int[0,1] = ]0,1[.
sional frequency vector φ :=ϑ from the (|X |−1)-dimensional open unit
simplex Φ := int∆X . So strictly speaking, there is a Bernoulli family for
each possible finite setX . Luckily, thanks to our capacity for abstract
thought, we can considerX generically and treat all these families in
one fell swoop.
. Exponential families & friends 
Let f be a gamble onX , the multi-category Bernoulli linear prevision
is then defined by
Br( f |ϑ) :=∑z:X f z ·ϑz =Mn( f |1,ϑ)=Wa( f |ϑ). (.)
Now let z be an observed category, the corresponding Bernoulli like-
lihood is then simply
ϑz =∏z ′:Xϑ(CX z)z′z ′ = exp(∑z ′:X lnϑz ′ · (CX z)z ′),
where CX is the counting map (.) from the previous chapter (also
recall the count vector space notation (.)). This expression is well-
defined becauseϑ> 0, being a member of the open unit simplex. The last
expression already seems to be in the form of (.), but written as such,
it would not correspond to a minimal exponential family: the counts for
the different categories are not affinely independent, i.e.,
∑
(CX z)= 1.
Therefore, we single out some (any) category o :X to allow us to elim-
inate this dependence from the likelihood’s expression. We know that
(CX z)o = 1−∑z ′:X6=o (CX z)z ′ , so
ϑz = exp
(∑
z ′:X6=o lnϑz ′ · (CX z)z ′ + lnϑo ·
(
1−∑z ′:X6=o (CX z)z ′))






∣∣ z ′ :X6=o) ∣∣∣ (CX z)X6=o〉. (.)
Comparing this last expression to (.), we see that the Euclidean TakeX := {a,b,c},
xˇ := cbcacc,








vector space for this family has dimension d := |X6=o | and that




= {t : (R≥0)X6=o ∣∣∑t ≤ 1},





∣∣ z ′ :X6=o), so Ξ :=RX6=o ,
(.)
where we see that restricting the frequency vectors to the open simplex
was necessary to guarantee the openness of Ξ. We also see, using the
identity ϑo = 1−∑z ′:X6=o ϑz ′ , that
a :=X ; 1 and b := ξ :RX6=o ; 1
1+∑z ′:X6=o expξz ′ . (.)
The Bernoulli linear prevision Br(•|ϑ) is fully defined by these functions
and by (.).
Note that there is, again, with the choice of the elimination cate-
gory o, some freedom in the way exponential family likelihoods can be
written in their exponential family form. One should not fear that this
reformulation places this elimination category in a special position: asψ
is invertible, we can always rewrite an expression using canonical pa-
rameters into an elimination-category agnostic form. The reformulation
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in exponential family form is only meant to bring to light the common
mathematical structure of these families. It is this common structure
which is later on exploited to introduce structurally similar imprecise-
probabilistic inference models for all these families at the same time;
it is usually preferable from the interpretational standpoint to use the
original, classical parameterization and form.
The sufficient statistic corresponding to an observed sample se-
quence xˇ in X ∗ is (νxˇ,τxˇ) = (νxˇ, (CX xˇ)X6=o /νxˇ), or, rewriting the in-
formation in a more familiar way, the count vector CX xˇ (cf. §..). We
already know that an assumption of exchangeability is enough to justify
this sufficient statistic and thus the τ used.
The cumulant function for theX -Bernoulli family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :RX6=o ;− ln(1+∑z ′:X6=o expξz ′).
So, using (.) and (.), we find – letting ξ :=ψϑ – that
Br(τ|ϑ)= (∇κ)ξ=
( expξz ′
1+∑z ′:X6=o expξz ′
∣∣∣ z ′ :X6=o)= (ϑz ′ | z ′ :X6=o), (.)
i.e., grosso modo the expectation of the frequency vector τ is the family
member’s defining frequency vector ϑ itself.
For purposes of predictive inference, it is necessary to know the lin-
ear prevision for the type of sequences we wish to make predictions
about. We have already treated the problem of making predictions about
sequences of fixed length extensively in §.. The predictive inference
model we used was the idmm, which is related to its parametric cousin,
the idm, through (count) multinomial previsions (cf. §..). The multi-
nomial prevision Mn(•|n,ϑ) for sequences of length n :N, originally de-
fined by (.), corresponds to the generalization of the Bernoulli
prevision via (.) for the set of sequencesY :=X n .
Other interesting types of sequences can be investigated, e.g., those
that stop after a pre-specified subsequence has been observed or those
that stop after a pre-specified minimum number of observations from
each category has been seen. We quickly work out the latter example:
given a count vector m inNX , we wish to describe the relative likelihoods
of all the sequences with a count vector that only just dominates m in
the sense that the last sample in the sequence is necessary to guarantee
this dominance. So we take
Y := {x :X ∗ ∣∣CX x ≥m ∧ (CX x)xνx =mxνx }.
Using this set and (.), we can write down the expression for the
corresponding negative multinomial prevision: (let f be a gamble onY )
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as the last observed sample xνx plays a distinct role, we separate it:
=∑z:Xm∑y :X ∗∧. CX (y,z)≥m
∧(CX y)z=mz−1
f (y, z) ·ϑz ·∏z ′:Xϑ(CX y)z′z ′ ;
we can group things per atom and replace the last factor by a Bernstein
polynomial (.):
=∑z:Xmϑz ·∑m′:NX∧. m′≥m−CX z
∧m′z=mz−1
∑
y :[m′] f (y, z) ·B yϑ;
and finally, using (.), recognize the multivariate hypergeometric
prevision (.):




f (•, z) ∣∣m′) ·B m′ϑ.
We have worked towards this last expression, because it allows us to
introduce – inspired by the analogy between the sequence and count-
multinomial (cf. (.)) – the negative count-multinomial prevision
(let h be a gamble on {m′ :NX |m′ ≥m ∧∃z :X ; m′z =mz })
Cn(h|m,ϑ) :=∑z:Xmϑz ·∑m′:NX∧. m′≥m−CX z
∧m′z=mz−1
h(m′+CX z) ·B m′ϑ (.)
(To my surprise, this definition turns out to be more general than the
one typically found in the literature [Johnson et al. , §.], which
treats the case of m that are nonzero only in one category.)
We have not only derived the expression (.) for the negative count-
multinomial distribution just because we could. It also allows us to
make a number of remarks about the corresponding likelihood function:
assume we have observed a negative multinomial sample sequence that
ended with a sample z and was reported to further consist of a count
vector mˇ :NX∧. mˇ ≥m ∧∃z :X ; mˇz =mz , then






∣∣ z ′ :X6=o) ∣∣∣ ( mˇ+CX zνmˇ+1 )X6=o〉 · |[mˇ]|,
where the last step summarizes a derivation similar to the one leading
to (.). Not unexpectedly, this expression looks very much like the
one for sequences (.) of Bernoulli samples of length νmˇ+1 with
sufficient statistic mˇ+CX z. It does not fit into that framework entirely,
due to the transition from sequences to counts. Namely, there is an extra
proportionality factor |[mˇ]|, the number of sequences compatible with
the observation – which, because of the likelihood principle, plays no
role in updating –, and of course the way in which the observation is
translated into a mean single-sample sufficient statistic has changed.
This illustrates that apart from the distributions with likelihoods that
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can be put in the classical exponential family form for single samples or
sequences ((.) and (.), respectively), we can also consider those
that are in some way derived from them.
The extensive examples in this and the previous subsection close
our discussion of exponential family likelihoods and previsions. We next
continue with their friends.
.. Conjugate linear previsions
The friends we refer to, are classes of parametric and predictive linear
previsions, one for each exponential family. They will constitute the
basic building blocks for the imprecise-probabilistic inference models
for exponential families that form the subject of this chapter.
We have seen in §.. that in a classical Bayesian context, updating
is done by combining a prior linear prevision with the likelihood func-
tion for the observation using Bayes’s rule. Or, when using exponential
family likelihoods, Bayes’s rule for density functions [see, e.g., Walley ,
§..]. The reason for this is that the prior prevision is then defined
on a continuous possibility space, the set of parameters Φ or its image
under ψ, the convex set of canonical parameters Ξ (cf. (vi)), and that
we here only consider prior linear previsions that can be written using
density functions (i.e., that are – technically speaking – σ-finite additive
functions of the Lebesgue measurable subsets of Ξ that are absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on Ξ).
Let R be some linear prevision on the set of all measurable gam-
bles L˘Ξ defined by the probability density function r :Ξ→R≥0 (so with∫
Ξ r = 1); i.e., if f is a gamble in L˘Ξ, then
R f = ∫ Ξ( f · r ).
If we use this prevision as a prior for our uncertainty about the param-
eter of a sampling process that we assume to be distributed according
to a regular (canonical) exponential family with defining functions a
and τ, then, after observing a sample sequence xˇ, the posterior linear
prevision R(•|νxˇ,τxˇ) on L˘Φ is defined by
R( f |νxˇ,τxˇ)= 1
REa,τxˇ
·R( f ·Ea,τxˇ ), (.)




· r ·Ea,τxˇ .
Of course this only holds whenever REa,τxˇ > 0; otherwise, if REa,τxˇ = 0,
the updated prevision is vacuous (cf. the for linear previsions identi-
cal (.) and (.)). Note that we represent the conditioning event
using the sufficient statistic and not the observed sequence itself; this
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was done to stress that all other information in the observation is ancil-
lary: irrelevant for inference purposes.
Out of considerations of mathematical tractability, we are going
to limit ourselves to conjugate priors (cf. §..). Let us recall that,
roughly speaking, this means that the prior and posterior uncertainty
models have the same functional form. The prior and posterior uncer-
tainty models we consider here are completely determined by their prob-
ability density functions. In the previous paragraph we have seen that
the posterior density function is proportional to the product of the prior
density function and the likelihood function. So the probability density
functions of the conjugate family of some exponential family must have
a form that remains essentially unchanged after multiplication by the
exponential family likelihood (.). This consideration leads to the
following proposed expression for a linear prevision that could be used
as a prior parametric inference model for the exponential family defined
by a and τ: ( f is still a measurable gamble on Ξ)
Cfa,τ( f |s, t ) := ∫ Ξ f ξ ·c(s, t ) · (bξ)s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ, (.)
where the possible values of the so-called hyperparameters s and t
are limited to R>0 and intT to guarantee normalizability [Diaconis
& Ylvisaker , Thm ] and allow for a nice interpretation. The func-
tion c :R>0× intT →R>0 provides the normalization factor; it is defined
by
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ(bξ)s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ. (.)
When working with noncanonical parameters – belonging to a set Φ
related to Ξ by a function ψ :Φ→Ξ –, we can derive a conjugate pre-
vision defined on L˘Φ from (.) [Burrill , Thm -]: (let g be a





Cfa,τ,ψ(g |s, t ) := ∫ Φgφ ·c(s, t ) · (b(ψφ))s ·exps〈ψφ|t〉 · |∣∣(∇ψ)φ∣∣| dφ,
(.)
where ∇ψ stands for the transformation’s Jacobian function (the gradi- Arnold et al. []
give the most gen-
eral conjugate
families; Kotz et al.
[, §..]
and Gutiérrez-Peña
& Smith [] give
an overview of the
relevant literature.
ent is applied componentwise to the vector function ψ). We have not
defined the conjugate prevision directly in terms of noncanonical param-
eters (i.e., the above expression, but without the Jacobian and with an
appropriately modified normalization factor), because in general it does
not possess the interesting posterior weighted average prediction prop-
erty (.) [Gutiérrez-Peña & Smith ], which we will encounter
later.
The nice interpretation we can attach to the two hyperparameters
becomes apparent when we update the prior (.) after the observation
of a sample sequence xˇ. Following (.), we need only squeeze (.)
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under the integral sign to see that – as intended – the posterior linear
prevision belongs to the same family:
Cfa,τ( f |s, t ,νxˇ,τxˇ)=Cfa,τ( f ∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ )
= ∫ Ξ f ξ ·c(s+νxˇ, s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ ) · (bξ)s+νxˇ
· exps+νxˇ〈ξ ∣∣ s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ 〉 dξ
(.)
has the same form as the prior (.)å, but with updated hyperparame-
ters s+νxˇ in R>0 and s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ = ss+νxˇ · t + νxˇs+νxˇ ·τxˇ in intT . As both Ea,τxˇ
and the prior conjugate prevision’s density function are strictly positive,
Cfa,τ(Ea,τxˇ |s, t )> 0, so the posterior prevision is never vacuous.
We see that s can be interpreted as a hypothetical number of counts
that gives the weight of the prior assessment; it is called the number of
pseudocounts. Similarly, t can be seen as a hypothetical mean single-
sample sufficient statistic which we call the pseudomean. Due to the
additivity of counts and the taking of weighted averages of mean single-
sample sufficient statistics in the updating procedure, it does not matter
for the final result if the updating is done in a step-by-step fashion – one
sample (sequence) at a time – or in batch – i.e., in one updating run, after
lumping all samples together in one big sequence (also see the end of
the paragraph before (.)).
The posterior (.) can be rewritten in terms of a noncanonical
parameter in a completely analogous way to how (.)å was derived
from (.)å. Also, in this section we are not going to give explicit poste-
rior expressions anymore, as they can be derived from the prior expres-
sion by substituting s+νxˇ for s and s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ for t .
.. Predictive linear previsions
A typical use of the conjugate parametric priors and posteriors intro-
duced in the previous subsection is as a basis for predictive inference:
Consider the case of a subject who wishes to make predictions about still
unobserved samples (e.g., future samples). She knows or assumes that
the samples are drawn from an unknown member of a known exponen-
tial family of distributions. To model her uncertainty about the member
– through its defining parameter –, she uses a prior or posterior conjugate
prevision of the type we have just seen. Such a conjugate prevision can be
used as a second-order model, the first-order model being the exponen-
tial family prevision with unknown parameter. So, given the exponential
family-based sampling model characterized by the setY :⊂X ∗ of possi-
ble unobserved sample sequences (cf. (.)–(.)), the corresponding
prior predictive linear prevision Pfa,τ(•|Y , s, t ) on L˘Y is defined by (let f
be a gamble in L˘Y )
Pfa,τ( f |Y , s, t )=Cfa,τ(Efa,τ( f |Y ,•) ∣∣ s, t); (.)
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which becomes, using the prior’s expression (.) and the exponential
family prevision’s expression (.) for continuous sample spaces:
= ∫ Ξ(∫ Y f y ·Ea,τy ξ dy) ·c(s, t ) · (bξ)s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ;
writing out the likelihood functions’s expression (.) and using Fubini’s
theorem to switch the order of integration gives us
= ∫ Y f y ·ay ·c(s, t ) · (∫ Ξ(bξ)s+νy ·exps+νy〈ξ ∣∣ s·t+νy ·τys+νy 〉 dξ) dy.
Then (.) allows us to write this as





An entirely similar derivation holds for discrete sample spaces: in the first
step we use (.) instead of (.), the rest of the steps stay essentially
the same; this results in the defining expression





Remark that due to our choice of conjugate prevision, these predictive
previsions are independent of the parameterization used for the expo-
nential family. For immediate prediction – i.e., whenY =X – we need
not and do not mentionY .
Note that the probability mass or density functions for both the dis-
crete and continuous case have the same form. As we need it further on
in §.., we give the explicit expression for the immediate prediction
case: (let z be a potential sample fromX )





As it is composed of strictly positive factors (see (i) and (.)), this
probability mass or density is strictly positive everywhere onX .
Derivations similar to (.)–(.)–, but now starting from a
posterior conjugate prevision (.), lead to expressions for the poste-
rior predictive linear previsions. As mentioned, they are identical to the
prior ones above up to the substitution of s+νxˇ for s and s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ for t .
Therefore s+νxˇ+νy must be substituted for s+νy and the weighted
average s·t+νxˇ·τxˇ+νy ·τys+νxˇ+νy for
s·t+νy ·τy
s+νy .
To close this subsection, there is one interesting property of the
conjugate and immediate predictive previsions we must mention. We
have seen in (.) that Ef
a,τ(τ|•)=∇κ, where, recall, κ is the cumulant
function of the exponential family distribution. So then (.) tells us
 Inference models for exponential families
that
Pfa,τ(τ|s, t )=Cfa,τ(∇κ|s, t )= t , (.)
where we used vectorial notation and where the second equality is
a nontrivial result by Diaconis & Ylvisaker [, Thm ]. We call this
the posterior weighted average prediction property: the posterior pre-
vision of a single-sample sufficient statistic is the weighted average
s
s+νxˇ · t + νxˇs+νxˇ ·τxˇ of the pseudomean t and the observed mean single-
sample sufficient statistic τxˇ. Actually, this property characterizes the
conjugate families we used for all regular exponential families on a con-
tinuous possibility space [Diaconis & Ylvisaker , Thm ] and for many
common regular exponential families on a discrete possibility space [Di-
aconis & Ylvisaker , Thms  & ; Johnson ]: the members of these
conjugate families are the only nondegenerate ones that possess the
posterior weighted average prediction property.
It is now time to make the things discussed here more concrete with
our two example exponential families.
.. Conjugate & predictive linear previsions for normal sampling
We first return to our example of normal sampling, first introduced
in §...
The information in (.) and (.) fully defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all mea-
surable gambles on Ξ=R×R<0 and the domain of possible parameters
is intT = {t :R2 | t2 > t 21 }. The one thing that we do not yet know explic-
itly is the normalization factor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real
number and t : intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ exps( 12 · ( ξ212·ξ2 + ln(−2 ·ξ2))) ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.
It can be calculated more easily when starting from the noncanonical pa-
rameterization given by the function ψ′ := (µ,λ) :R×R>0 ; (µ ·λ,− 12 ·λ),
where µ is the normal distribution’s mean and λ its precision (related to
the standard deviation σ by λ= 1/σ2):
c(s, t )= 1/∫ R×R>0 exps( 12 · (−µ2 ·λ+ lnλ)+µ ·λ · t1− 12 ·λ · t2)
· |∣∣(∇ψ′)(µ,λ)∣∣| dµ dλ;
applying the Fubini theorem [Burrill , §-] gives
= 1/∫ R>0(∫ Rλ s2 · exps(− 12 · (λ ·µ2−2 ·λ ·µ · t1)− 12 ·λ · t2)
· |
∣∣∣∣λ 0µ − 12
∣∣∣∣| dµ) dλ;
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completing the square of the exponent’s first term gives
= 1/∫ R>0(∫ Rλ s2 ·exps(−λ2 · (µ− t1)2− λ2 · (t2− t 21 )) · 12 ·λ dµ) dλ
= 2/∫ R>0(∫ Rλ 12 ·exp(− s·λ2 · (µ− t1)2) dµ)
·λ s+12 ·exp(− s2 · (t2− t 21 ) ·λ) dλ
= 2 ·
( s




·p s2·pi . (.)
The last step follows from the fact that the inner integral is proportional Some gamma densi-
ties (plot restricted
















2 · (t2− t 21 )
)
, where (let f :L˘R>0 )
Ga( f |α,β) := ∫ R>0 f r · βαΓα · rα−1 ·exp(−β · r ) dr (.)
is the gamma linear prevision [see, e.g., Bernardo & Smith , §..],
with strictly positive real parameters α and β.
For quite obvious reasons the conjugate family is called the normal-
gamma family. The normal-gamma linear prevision [see, e.g., Bernardo
& Smith , §..] is defined by (now let f be a measurable gamble
on the space R×R>0)
Ng( f |µ,ρ,α,β) :=Ga(Nl( f |µ,1/pρ · •) ∣∣α,β), (.)
with parameters restricted as before: µ – not to be confused with earlier
uses of this symbol – can be any real number, but ρ must be strictly
positive. So the prior parametric linear prevision is
Ng
(• ∣∣ t1, s, s+32 , s2 · (t2− t 21 )). (.)
(Note that not every normal-gamma prevision belongs to the conjugate












On the side, we have given a graphical illustration of how the
parameters are updated. We used a number of pseudocounts
s := 2 and an observed sample xˇ of length 2; thus, taking into ac-
count the definition of τ, the two updated mean single-sample
sufficient statistic parameters are
t ′ := 23 · t + 13 · (xˇ1, xˇ21),
t ′′ := 34 · t ′+ 14 · (xˇ2, xˇ22)= 12 · t + 12 · (xˇ1+ xˇ2, xˇ21 + xˇ22).
Note how the proportions appearing in these expressions also
appear in the illustration.
Using (.), (.), and (.), we can obtain the prior immediate
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bution. The Student linear prevision [see, e.g., Bernardo & Smith ,
§..] is defined by (let f be a measurable gamble on R)




whereµ – which is the distribution’s mean – must be a real number andα
and σ – which is not the distribution’s standard deviation, σ ·p αα−2 is –
must be strictly positive. (Note that Student’s distribution converges to





∣∣∣ s+3, t1,√t2− t 21 ·p s+1s+3 ). (.)
The posterior is obtained by the same substitution as for the conjugate
posterior.
From (.), we know that the components of the pseudomean
for the normal conjugate and predictive family can be interpreted re-
spectively as a hypothetical mean and second-order noncentral mo-
ment. This interpretation is further supported by what we can learn
from (.): the parametric prevision of the mean and the noncentral
second-order moment, or, in other words, the immediate predictive pre-
vision of τ1 and τ2 are the Student distribution’s mean t1 and noncentral





∣∣ t1, s, s+32 , s2 · (t2− t 21 ))= ss+1 · (t2− t 21 ),
is not the Student distribution’s variance. It cannot be found using the
predictive prevision.)
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.. Conjugate & predictive linear previsions for Bernoulli & negative
multinomial sampling
We now continue our example of Bernoulli sampling started in §...
The information in (.) and (.) fully defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all mea-
surable gambles on Ξ= RX6=o – where, recall, o is some (any) category
chosen for technical elimination – and the domain of possible parame-
ters is intT = {t : (R>0)X6=o ∣∣∑t < 1}. The one thing we do not yet know
explicitly is the normalization factor (.): (let s be a strictly positive
real number and t : intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ(1+∑z:X6=o expξz)−s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.
It can be calculated more easily when starting from the original non-
canonical parameterization ψ = ϑ : int∆X ;
(
ln ϑzϑo
∣∣ z :X6=o), where ϑ is









c(s, t )= 1/∫ int∆X ϑso ·exps(∑z:X6=o ln ϑzϑo · tz) · |∣∣(∇ψ)ϑ∣∣| dϑ
= 1/∫ int∆X ϑso · (∏z:X6=o (ϑzϑo )s·tz ) · |∣∣(1ϑX6=o )−1+ 1ϑo ∣∣| dϑ
= 1/∫ int∆X ϑs·(1−∑ t )o · (∏z:X6=oϑs·tzz )
· |∣∣(1ϑX6=o )−1∣∣ · ∣∣1+ϑX6=o (X6=o ; 1ϑo )ᵀ∣∣| dϑ;
writing out the first determinant and using Sylvester’s determinant theo-
rem [a particularization of Bernstein , §..] on the second, we
find







· |1+ (X6=o ; 1ϑo )
ᵀϑX6=o | dϑ;
as 1+ (X6=o ; 1ϑo )ᵀϑX6=o = 1+
1
ϑo
·∑z:X6=o ϑz = 1+ 1−ϑoϑo = 1ϑo , this becomes
= 1/∫ int∆X ϑs·(1−∑ t )−1o · (∏z:X6=oϑs·tz−1z ) dϑ
= Γs
Γ(s−∑s · t ) ·∏z:X6=o Γ(s · tz ) . (.)
The last step follows from recognizing the Dirichlet integral (which we
already encountered in (.)). However, instead of being defined for
all continuous gambles on the closed unit simplex ∆X , it is now defined
for all measurable gambles f on the open unit simplex int∆X :




·∫ int∆X f ϑ · (∏z:Xϑαz−1z ) dϑ, (.)
where α is a strictly positive real vector onX .
 Inference models for exponential families
So, as we already knew, the conjugate family is the Dirichlet fam-
ily. The technical difference in domain between the one obtained here
and the one found in §.. is due to the approach taken. The prior
parametric linear prevision is
Dj
(• ∣∣ (s · t , s−∑s · t )), (.)
where it should be understood that the parameter’s last component is
the o-component. The posterior is obtained by substituting s+νxˇ for s













On the side, we have given a graphical illustration of how
the parameters are updated. We used a number of pseudo-
counts s := 2 and an observed sample xˇ := xˇ1xˇ2 = ac; thus,
taking into account the definition of τ, the two updated mean
single-sample sufficient statistic parameters are
t ′ := 23 · t + 13 · (1,0),
t ′′ := 34 · t ′+ 14 · (0,1)= 12 · t + 12 · ( 12 , 12 ).
Note how the proportions appearing in these expressions
also appear in the illustration.
Using (.), (.)å, and (.), we can obtain the prior immedi-
ate predictive prevision. Its probability mass for z inX6=o is
1 · Γs
Γ(s−∑ s · t ) ·∏z ′:X6=o Γ(s · tz ′ )
Γ(s+1)
Γ(s−∑ s · t ) ·∏z ′:X6=o Γ(s · tz ′ + (CX z)X6=o )
= ΓsΓ(s+1) ·
∏
z ′:X6=o Γ(s · tz ′ +δzz ′ )∏
z ′:X6=o Γ(s · tz ′ )
;
and thus, because Γ(α+1)=α ·Γα for any real α,
= 1s · s · tz = tz .
Similarly, the probability mass for o is 1−∑ t . so the prior immediate
predictive prevision is the weighted average prevision (cf. (.))
Wa
(• ∣∣ (t ,1−∑t )). (.)
The posterior is obtained by the same substitution as for the conjugate
posterior.
From (.), we know that the pseudomean for the Bernoulli conju-
gate and predictive family can be interpreted as a hypothetical frequency
vector. This interpretation is further supported by what we can learn
from (.): the parametric prevision of this frequency vector, or, in
other words, the immediate predictive prevision of τ, is the weighted
average’s (normalized) vector of weights t .
. Imprecise-probabilistic inference models for exponential families 
Not only the previsions for immediate prediction can be derived
using (.), of course. But immediate predictive previsions can also be
derived in terms of a noncanonical parameterization, mirroring (.).
For example, given some count vector m inNX , we can use
Dj
(
Cn(•|m,•) ∣∣ (s · t , s−∑s · t ))
as a predictive linear prevision for negative count-multinomial sampling
(cf. (.)). Also see §.. to spot the parallels with how the Dirichlet-
multinomial as the predictive prevision for multinomial sampling can
be seen as a combination of the Dirichlet prevision and multinomial
prevision.
. Imprecise-probabilistic inference models
for exponential families
Now that we have had an overview of the theory of exponential families
and the related conjugate parametric and predictive families, we are
ready to use those related families to construct imprecise-probabilistic
parametric and predictive inference models for exponential families.
This is done in the first subsection; in the two other subsections our two
examples continue.
.. Parametric & predictive inference models
We consider a process that is assumed to generate samples that are
distributed according to an unknown member of a well-specified regular
exponential family distribution (cf. §..), so the functions a, τ, and ψ
defining the exponential family are known, but the parameter value φ
defining the actual member is not. In §.. and §.., we have made
the acquaintance of its conjugate parametric and predictive families. The
members of these families come in pairs, consisting of a linear prevision
from each defined by the same hyperparameters: a number of counts
– a strictly positive real number, interpretable as a sample size – and
some scalar or vector that can be interpreted as a mean single-sample
sufficient statistic.
The parametric prevision can be used to describe our subject’s uncer-
tainty about the parameter value and the predictive prevision to describe
his uncertainty about the value of future samples. Before observing any
sample, prior previsions Cfa,τ(•|s, t ) or Cfa,τ,ψ(•|s, t ) and Pfa,τ(•|Y , s, t ),
where Y :⊂X ∗, or Pfa,τ(•|s, t ) would be used, characterized by a num-
ber of pseudocounts s and a pseudomean t . After the observation of a
sample sequence xˇ, these priors can be updated to posteriors with the
same functional form, but with respective updated pseudocounts s+νxˇ
and pseudomean s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ .
 Inference models for exponential families
At this point, the question becomes: how should our subject choose
his number of pseudocounts s and his pseudomean t? Actually, consid-
ering Pfa,τ(τ|s, t )= t by (.), it would only be reasonable to be so
specific as to restrict his choice to only a single t in intT if he is pre-
pared to bet accordingly precise at any for him reasonable stake. This
should only be the case when he has sufficient information supporting
this precise assessment. Quite often this is not the case, and his initial
assessment is better captured by bounds, i.e., supremum acceptable
buying prices and infimum acceptable selling prices for the component
gambles of τ. This would result in an initial assessment represented by
a convex subset of the set intT of mean single-sample sufficient statis-
tics. Any other (possibly nonconvex) subset of intT could also be used,
as a result of some convenient ad-hoc reasoning or of a more compli-
cated elicitation procedure involving assessments other than just the
predictive assessments for the components of τ.
The number of pseudocounts could be seen as the weight accorded





∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ )= s·t+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ = ss+νxˇ · t + νxˇs+νxˇ ·τxˇ,
the chosen number s determines what could be seen as the speed of
learning, i.e., how many samples need to be observed before the influ-
ence of the pseudomean in the prevision is equal to the influence of
the observed mean single-sample sufficient statistic. Based on this, our
subject must make a choice for s that is appropriate for the application
at hand; to me it seems that in general any more specific advice cannot
be given.
Now the moment has come to introduce the promised imprecise-
probabilistic parametric and predictive inference models – or, respec-
tively, icefm and ipefm , for short. As explained, a number of pseudo-
counts s :R>0 must be chosen as well as a subsetU of intT . This deter-
mines the prior parametric and predictive lower previsions using lower
envelopes: (letY :⊂X ∗)
Cfa,τ(•|s,U ) := inft :U Cfa,τ(•|s, t ),
Cfa,τ,ψ(•|s,U ) := inft :U Cfa,τ,ψ(•|s, t ),
Pfa,τ(•|Y , s,U ) := inft :U Pfa,τ(•|Y , s, t ),





The posterior lower previsions after observing some sequence xˇ inX ∗
are obtained by substituting s+νxˇ for s and s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ forU , where we
have used elementwise addition. As lower envelopes of standard Bayes-
ian models, all these lower previsions are coherent [Walley , §..].
. Imprecise-probabilistic inference models for exponential families 
In the literature, relatively little can be found on inference models Walley [,
§..] also for-
mulated a number
of ideas about using
sets of conjugate
priors.
with imprecision for sampling from exponential families (but of course
much more can be found about specific families). For comparative pur-
poses, let us quickly mention two ideas:
(i) Boratyn´ska [] – working in a robust Bayesian context – con-
siders a conjugate linear prior by fixing s · t and then performs a
sensitivity analysis by varying this quantity.
(ii) Coolen [] – working in an imprecise probabilities context –
uses proportional lower and upper conjugate density functions to
define an imprecise-probabilistic inference model.
Both papers consider one-parameter families.
There are a number of remarks we can make about s,U and their
influence on the model:
(i) Independent of whetherU is convex or not, the prior and posterior
parametric and predictive credal sets are of course closed convex
sets. Even though s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ may be a subset of U , the posterior
credal sets will in general be disjunct from the prior ones through
the effect of the modification of the count parameter to s+νxˇ.
(ii) It is important to realize that s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ , the posterior set of mean
single-sample sufficient statistics, will remain unbounded in the
directions of Rd for whichU is. A consequence is that there will
be a class of gambles for which no learning will take place, i.e., the
posterior lower or upper prevision (or both) of these gambles will
not differ from the prior ones. The prime example of this is the
predictive lower and upper prevision of the components of τ corre-
sponding to the unbounded directions: Let i : 1..d be the index of




∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ )= supt :U s·ti+νxˇ·τi xˇs+νxˇ
= supt :U s+νxˇ·τi xˇ/tis+νxˇ · ti
= supt :U ss+νxˇ · ti
= supt :U ti = Pfa,τ(τi |s,U ).
(iii) Quite often, the initial assumptions made and the information
available correspond to a state of so-called prior ignorance in
which takingU equal to intT would be the reasonable thing to
do; the corresponding prior is then called a near-ignorance model
[for a more general definition, see Walley , §..,§..].
But because no learning takes place for unbounded directions More than ten





inU , such near-ignorance models are only really practical when-
everT is bounded. So for exponential families for whichT has
unbounded directions, an effort should be made to arrive at some
finite bound, however large, if one wishes learning to take place in
the unbounded directions ofT .
 Inference models for exponential families
(iv) We have already seen that the number of pseudocounts s charac-
terizes the speed of learning, i.e., which amount of observations
carries the same weight as the initial assessments. The number of
pseudocounts also determines the evolution of the imprecision of
the inferences generated by the model. To be precise, the relative
volume ss+νxˇ of the posterior set of mean single-sample sufficient
statistics to the prior one can be seen as a stakes-independent




∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ ),Pfa,τ(τi ∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ )]
= ss+νxˇ · [inft :U ti , supt :U ti ]+ νxˇs+νxˇ ·τi xˇ
= ss+νxˇ · [Pfa,τ(τi |s,U ),Pfa,τ(τi |s,U )]+ νxˇs+νxˇ ·τi xˇ.
This example must not, however, leave the impression that this
imprecision measure determines the imprecision for all gambles
(of both the parametric and predictive models). There are even
situations (exponential families and generated sample sequences)
and gambles for which the imprecision increases; an example is
given in the Bestiarium, near the end of §B... It is still unclear
if the proposed inference models are dilation prone [Seidenfeld &
Wasserman ], i.e., if there are gambles for which the impreci-
sion increases no matter what single-sample observation has been
made.
(v) Whenever τxˇ ∉ clU when starting from a state of prior ignorance,Illustrating the
closure operator:
cl]0,1[ = [0,1].
there is so-called prior-data conflict [see, e.g., Walley , §..],
the more so the further τxˇ is from U . Apart from getting more
samples and hoping that the conflict will disappear, there are two
immediate options for modifying the inference model to deal with
the conflict (by increasing the imprecision):
(a) EnlargingU to encompass τxˇ; this seems appropriate when,
after observing the sample, the subject realizes his bounds
were not chosen wide enough.
(b) Allowing the number of pseudocounts to vary (e.g., in an in-
terval ]0,u], with u :R>0), which allows the weight accorded to
the conflict-creating hypothetical initial sample to be reduced
[Walley , §.].
Currently, I prefer the first option, mainly because the possible
effects of the second one are not yet clear to me; research into this
second option is currently being done by Walter & Augustin [].
(vi) Why not vary (s, t ) over a subset of R>0× intT instead of just vary-
ing t in T ? We were led to this choice because of the intuitive
interpretation attached to both parameters: s as a hypothetical
number of counts determining the learning speed – of which a
unique choice for the whole model seems natural –, t as a mean
. Imprecise-probabilistic inference models for exponential families 
single-sample sufficient statistic – which through the posterior
weighted average prediction property (.) allows for a straight-
forward expression of prior uncertainty. Of course it is also math-
ematically convenient to not consider subsets of R>0× intT : we
avoid ending up with more complex models.
We have said that the expressions (.)–(.) for the prior lower
previsions of the icefm and ipefm are but a substitution away from the
posterior lower previsions. However, intuitively appealing though it may
be, we have not yet justified this. What we need to show is that this fol-
lows from one of the two updating procedures, natural extension (.)
or regular extension (.). Just below (.) we mentioned that
Cfa,τ(Ea,τxˇ |s, t )> 0 for any t in intT . So in any case Cfa,τ(Ea,τxˇ |s,U )> 0.
When clU ⊆ intT , then Cfa,τ(Ea,τxˇ |s,U )> 0, so in this case natural ex-
tension would result in the substitution posterior, as then
ext
(
MCfa,τ(•|s,U ))⊆ {Cfa,τ(•|s, t ) ∣∣ t : clU }.
However, when clU ∩ (T \ intT ) 6= ;, then possibly Cfa,τ(Ea,τxˇ |s,U )= 0,
in which case natural extension would not give the substitution posterior,
but the vacuous lower prevision. Luckily for us, regular extension always
does what we want: As{
Cfa,τ(•|s, t ) ∣∣ t :U }⊂ {R :MCfa,τ(•|s,U ) ∣∣REa,τxˇ > 0},
we know that the substitution posterior dominates the regular extension.
But we can say something even stronger: they coincide. To wit, the sub-
stitution posterior is coherent and for any measurable gamble f on Ξ
it holds that Cfa,τ( f |s +νxˇ, s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ ) ≥ 0 when Cfa,τ(Ea,τxˇ |s, t ) > 0 and
Cfa,τ( f |s,U )≥ 0. These two properties characterize the regular extension
[Walley , end of §J].
We close this subsection by generalizing the posterior weighted aver-
age prediction property (.) to our imprecise-probabilistic inference
models. Let i : 1..d , then we have
Pfa,τ(τi |s,U )=Cfa,τ(Diκ|s,U )= inft :U ti ,
Pfa,τ(τi |s,U )=Cfa,τ(Diκ|s,U )= supt :U ti .
(.)
(.)
We call this the posterior contamination prediction property: the pos-
terior predictive lower prevision of a single-sample sufficient statis-
tic’s i -th component is νxˇs+νxˇ · τi xˇ + ss+νxˇ · inft :U ti , i.e., the contamina-
tion of the observed mean single-sample sufficient statistic τxˇ with
[inft :U ti , supt :U ti ].
For gambles that can be written as affine combinations of the com-
ponents of τ – which, recall remark (iii), are affinely independent – or,
equivalently, of the components of ∇κ, this property allows for a greatly
increased efficiency in the computation of their prevision. Let α be a
 Inference models for exponential families
vector of coefficients in Rd and β a real number, then
Pfa,τ
(
β+∑α ·τ ∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ )
=Cfa,τ(β+∑α ·∇κ ∣∣ s+νxˇ, s·U+νxˇ·τxˇs+νxˇ )
=β+ νxˇs+νxˇ ·
∑
α ·τxˇ+ ss+νxˇ · inft :U
∑
α · t .
(.)
We see that the only computationally nontrivial part of the right-hand
side expression is inft :U
∑
α · t , i.e., to optimize a linear function overU .
Knowing thatT itself is convex (cf. §..) and having some leeway in
choosing the bounds that defineU , it is a good move to let these bounds
be defined by convex functions. This guarantees that the above optimiza-
tion problem is a convex optimization problem, for which many com-
putationally efficient algorithms exist [see, e.g., Boyd & Vandenberghe
]. Of course, this may also be the case for other types of gambles
than these affine combinations, but these are not as easily identifiable.
There is an interesting balance with regard to the optimization prob-
lems that need to be solved when calculating immediate predictive
lower (and upper) previsions (.) of our inference models: The more
complex a model is – i.e., the higher the number d + 1 of scalar pa-
rameters relative to the size (cardinality or dimension) of the sample
space X –, the larger the space span
(
{τ}∪ ı(X ; 1)) of gambles is for
which these optimization problems are efficiently solvable. For paramet-
ric lower previsions (.) the dimension d of the domain Ξ of the
objective functions always is practically the same as the dimension d +1
of span
(
{∇κ}∪ ı(Ξ ; 1)).
This concludes the theoretical presentation of the icefm and ipefm.
What remains to be done is first illustrate what we have seen here in the
next two subsections and then, in the next section illustrate how these
models can be used in an application.
.. Inference models for normal sampling
We again take up our normal sampling example previously looked at
in §.. and §... We already know all the functions and sets
((.) and (.)) that characterize the normal family as a regular
exponential family and we have discovered that the conjugate linear
prevision (.) is a normal-gamma prevision and that the immediate
predictive linear prevision (.) is a Student prevision.
Then all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models
of the type of (.)–(.) for normal sampling is to choose a number
of pseudocounts s inR>0 and a bounded subset of intT = {t :R2 |t2 > t 21 }.
The choice of bounds can be guided by the interpretation given to the
components of t :T . Bounding t1 corresponds to bounding the mean;
bounding t2 corresponds to bounding the second-order noncentral mo-
ment; bounding t2−t 21 corresponds to bounding the variance (times s+1s ,
. Imprecise-probabilistic inference models for exponential families 
cf. just above §..). Combining the last and the first, which might
be an intuitively attractive idea, gives rise to a nonconvex setU and is







On the side, we again give a graphical illustration of how
the parameters are updated (cfr. the corresponding illustration
in §..). We use a number of pseudocounts s := 2, the ini-
tial set of mean single-sample sufficient statisticsU is defined
by choosing an upper bound for the second component (i.e.,
bounding the second-order noncentral moment), and we take
an observed sample xˇ of length 2. Thus, taking into account
the definition of τ, the two updated sets of mean single-sample
sufficient statistics are
U ′ := 23 ·U + 13 · (xˇ1, xˇ21),
U ′′ := 34 ·U ′+ 14 · (xˇ2, xˇ22)= 12 ·U + 12 · (xˇ1+ xˇ2, xˇ21 + xˇ22).
Note again how the proportions appearing in these expressions are
reflected in the illustration.
Due to the fact that τ= z :R ; (z, z2), the computation of the immedi-
ate predictive lower and upper previsions of all quadratic gambles on R
can be efficiently handled wheneverU is convex. For example, when
takingU as in the illustration above, with an upper bound ζ :R>0, i.e.,
equal to {t :R2 | ζ > t2 > t 21 }, and looking at a gamble a · τ2 + b · τ1 + c,
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for finding the immediate previ-
sion of this (continuous) gamble
is essentially mint :clU a · t2+b · t1
(cf. (.)). The straightforward so-
lution to this problem is summa-
rized in the illustration next to this:
U can be partitioned in a num-
ber of subsets (using dashed lines);
each of these contains the solution
set to a subset of the possible (a,b)-
values (presented on a light gray
background).
.. Inference models for Bernoulli sampling
We now take up our Bernoulli sampling example, previously looked
at in §.. and §... We already know all the functions and sets
((.) and (.)) that characterize the Bernoulli family as a regular
exponential family and we have rediscovered that the conjugate linear
prevision (.) is a Dirichlet prevision and that the immediate predic-
tive linear prevision (.) is a weighted average prevision.
 Inference models for exponential families
Then again all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference
models of the type of (.)–(.) for Bernoulli sampling is to choose a
bounded subset of intT = {t : (R>0)X6=o ∣∣∑t < 1} and a number of pseu-
docounts s in R>0. As intT already is a bounded set, the easiest choice
is takeU := intT and start with a near-ignorance prior, unless there is
so much prior information about the Bernoulli process that would make











τxˇ = ( 12 , 12 )
On the side, we again give a graphical illustration of
how the parameters are updated (cfr. the corresponding il-
lustration in §..). We use a number of pseudocounts
s := 2, the initial set of mean single-sample sufficient statistics
isU := intT , which corresponds to a near-ignorance prior,
and we take an observed sample xˇ := xˇ1xˇ2 = ac . Thus, taking
into account the definition of τ, the two updated sets of mean
single-sample sufficient statistics are
U ′ := 23 ·U + 13 · (1,0),
U ′′ := 34 ·U ′+ 14 · (0,1)= 12 ·U + 12 · ( 12 , 12 ).
Note again how the proportions appearing in these expressions are
reflected in the illustration.
As the components of τ= z :X ; (CX z)X6=o form the set {I z
′ | z ′ :X6=o}
of indicator functions on X , their affine hull is the set of all gambles
onX . So then we know from (.) that the computation of the im-
mediate predictive lower and upper previsions of all gambles can be
handled efficiently. This is not a big surprise: we already know that this
prevision is a linear-vacuous mixture.
. Application: naive credal classification
In this section, as an illustration of a practical application of the ipefm
introduced in the previous section, we explain how they can be used
for credal classification. In the first two subsections, §.. and §..,
we describe what we understand by classification and zoom in, first on
credal classifiers and then on naive credal classifiers. This last type of
classifier, as introduced by Zaffalon [], is what we are going to gener-
alize in §.., the last subsection, by replacing some of the predictive
inference models that form its building blocks by ipefms.
Of course, apart from using these inference models as such and for
credal classification, other potential applications exist. We should at least
mention one: the application to linear regression by Walter et al. [].
.. Credal classification
Let us first begin by explaining what we understand by classification:
This is the task of assigning one or more predefined classes to a – possibly
. Application: naive credal classification 




of attributes, which are labels or numerical values that each characterize
some aspect of the object. So, formally, for us a classifier is a function
that maps attribute tuples belonging to some attribute set A to a subset
of the discrete set C of predefined classes.
Of course, not just any function in A→℘C is a good classifier. Only
those classifiers are considered to be good that manage to assign sets of
classes to an object that are considered fitting by some external criterion.
This external criterion can be classification by a human or a later revela-
tion of the true class through the discovery or appearance of some extra
attribute(s). We are not going to discuss these external criteria here.
An example classification task could consist of finding the disease
that corresponds with a number of symptoms observed in a patient. The
true disease is ideally in the set of diseases picked by the classifier; it
could be revealed by a positive response to some treatment or a post-
mortem examination.
The type of classifier we are going to look at – the credal classifier –
uses, to classify an object with attribute tuple a in A, a coherent lower
classifying prevision E(•|a) onL C; it expresses our uncertainty about
the class the object belongs to. To classify the object, we use this previ-
sion and some decision criterion. A possible, simple criterion is interval
dominance [see, e.g., Troffaes ]: choose the set consisting of those
classes for which the upper probability is never lower than the lower
probability of any of the other classes.
The criterion we are going to use, however, is maximality (for a de-
scription, see §.., paragraphs three and four). For this, we need
to associate a utility function (also known as a gain function, or, via its
negation, a loss function) with every class c in C; it is a gamble Uc on C
that returns the utility Ucd when the object is classified in the class c and
turns out to belong to the class d. Once these utility functions have been
chosen, the credal classifier generates the set of those classes c for which
mind:CE(Uc−Ud|a)≥ 0. In other words: a pairwise comparison between
all classes d and e is performed by seeing how E(Ud−Ue|a) strictly com-
pares to 0 and then the classifier generates the maximal elements of the
resulting strict partial order.
When for each attribute tuple a a linear prevision is used instead of
the coherent lower prevision E(•|a) onL C, the classifier can be called
a Bayesian classifier. In this case, interval dominance reduces to plain
dominance – i.e., maximizing probability – and for maximality, the or-
der becomes total and the classifier selects to classes that maximize
expected utility [Troffaes ]. In both cases, the classifier only gener-
ates singletons or sets of classes that are deemed equivalent, in contrast
to credal classifiers, which can and often do generate sets of classes that
are deemed incomparable. This is also the main advantage of credal
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classifiers over Bayesian classifiers: they can take the amount of data
in the learning set into account and give cautious classifications (sets
containing a relatively large number of classes) when relatively little data
is available.
Until now, we have given a description of the classification procedure
once all the necessary elements – the classifying previsions and utility
functions – are in place. We do not focus on how to choose appropriate
utility functions, but use simple, reasonable ones: indicator functions,
i.e., we let Uc := I c. We do focus on the construction of the classifying
previsions, which is done in two main steps:
(i) We first build a joint class-attribute model, a coherent lower pre-
vision on L C×A, that contains all information we know about
the idealized process that generates classified objects, i.e., class-
attribute pairs. A number of basic assumptions are made that form
the skeleton of the class-attribute model and then its soft tissue
is learned from a learning set of pre-classified objects, i.e., a finite
sequence xˇ : (C×A)∗ of class-attribute pairs.
(ii) The classifying previsions are then obtained as updated previsions
of the class-attribute model, roughly speaking, by conditioning on
the observed attribute tuple a using natural or regular extension.
The details of both steps are worked out for a special subset of credal
classifiers in the next subsection.
After learning a classifier, its performance should be validated, i.e., it
must be checked if it is a good (enough) classifier. We are not going to
discuss validation procedures in this thesis.
.. The naive credal classifier
Zaffalon’s naive credal classifier [, , ] is a credal classifier
for categorical data: both the set of classes and the attribute sets must
by good enough approximation be discrete and unordered. One can
apply it to problems with attributes that take values in a continuous set
by performing a discretization of the data. It is efficient and has been
successfully applied to a number of problems [see, e.g., Zaffalon ;
Zaffalon et al. ].
What makes a credal classifier naive? Any credal classifier is based on
a class-attribute model for the possibility space C×A. When the number
of attributes is not small, this space is too big to be practical: it grows
exponentially in the number of attributes; for example, adding a binary
attribute doubles its size. And why is this not practical? Because the
learning set (normally) does not grow exponentially in the number of
attributes, but usually stays constant. So this means the relative number
of different object types (attribute tuples) something is learned about
sharply decreases with the number of attributes and therefore also the
generalizing, thus classifying power of the model decreases. The obvious
. Application: naive credal classification 
solution is to add assumptions that increase the generalizing power of
the class-attribute model. The assumption that is made in the naive





success of the naive
Bayesian classifier.
pendent; this is a very strong and thus naive assumption indeed, as it is
seldomly satisfied in practice. However, despite of this, the resulting clas-
sifier is surprisingly successful in practice. (Remark that if some specifics
about dependencies between attributes are actually known, it would be
even better to use this information to increase the generalizing power, if
possible.)
Mathematically, naiveness implies that for every class c, there is a
global attribute model, a coherent lower prevision P (•|c) onLA, that
can be written as a product of individual attribute models (cf. §..).
We are only going to consider the case of individual attribute models
that can be easily specified as lower envelopes and – out of mathematical
convenience – use a type- product (.) to combine them. Let J be
the finite index set describing the different components of the attribute
tuple, so A :=×j :JA j . For every class c and for each j in J , we have an
individual attribute model, a coherent lower prevision P j (•|c) onLA j
that can be written as a lower envelope of a set {Pγ j (•|c) |γ j :Γ j } of linear
previsions onLA j .
Let Γ :=×j :JΓ j ; by the naiveness assumption, the per-class global
model can then be written as an independent lower envelope (.):
P (•|c)= infγ:Γ×j :J Pγ j (•|c). (.)
We collect these per-class global attribute models in an attribute model,
a conditional lower prevision (cf. (.) and (.))
P (•|C) :=∑c:CP (•|c) · I c. (.)
We separately learn each of the per-class individual attribute models
from the learning set. We also learn a class model, a coherent lower
prevision P onL C. What this learning entails practically will become
clear when we turn attention to concrete attribute and class models (in
a paragraph or three).
Because the class model P is then (trivially) only specified on gam-
bles that are measurable with respect to the partition of the conditional
lower prevision P (•|C) that is the attribute model, we can use marginal
extension (cf. §..) to calculate their natural extension, the class-
attribute model
E := P(P (•|C)). (.)
With the structure of the naive credal classifier’s class-attribute model
in place, we can make things more concrete: First of all, the class model P
and the per-class individual attribute models P (•|c) all need to say some-
thing about concrete things, the unknown class and attributes of one
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unobserved object, and not about any parameter that describes the pro-
cess that generates these objects. So they are all immediate predictive
lower previsions.
Given the fact that both the classes as well as each of the individual
attributes are restricted to categorical variables, using idmm’s (.)
is an option we are already familiar with. It is also the option taken by
Zaffalon [].
Plugging (.) into (.)–(.)å results in
E :=Wa(∑c:CI c ·P (•|c) ∣∣ mˇ, s), with for each c in C
P (•|c) :=min{×j :J Wa(•|mˇ j |c+ s j |c · t j ) ∣∣ t :×j :J∆A j }, (.)
where
(i) s is the strictly positive real number of pseudocounts chosen for
the class model,
(ii) mˇ is the count vector for the classes observed in the learning
set (which can be thought of as a sequence xˇ in (C×A)∗), with
nˇ :=∑mˇ,
(iii) s j |c is the strictly positive real number of pseudocounts chosen for
the j -th individual attribute model contingent on class c,
(iv) mˇ j |c is the count vector for j -th attribute of those objects in the
learning set that belong to the class c, with mˇc = nˇ j |c :=∑mˇ j |c.
Notice that we do not need to pay much attention to the learning as-
pect here, as we can just pick the appropriate inference model from the
toolbox we have built up.
Let us include a toy example of how a learning set relates to the dif-
ferent count vectors mentioned above, to clarify and complement the
explanation just given: Consider a classification problem with a class set
C := {dead,alive} and two attributes, citric acid response, with attribute
set aa := {contraction,still}= {c,s} and a time on ice (in hours), with at-
tribute set Ah := {< 10,[10,20[,≥ 20}; it concerns oysters. The learning
set is given in the following table:
vitality citric acid response time on ice
dead still < 10
dead still ≥ 20
alive contraction < 10
dead contraction [10,20[
alive contraction [10,20[
dead still ≥ 20
It corresponds to the following count vectors:


















In (.), we still have the freedom to choose the values for the dif-
ferent pseudocounts. If these parameters are interpreted as just deter-
mining the learning speed, a logical choice would be to keep them con-
stant and independent of each other. However, if they are interpreted
as a number of hypothetical samples, it would be logical to impose, for
each j , the constraint s = ∑c:C s j |c; i.e., the hypothetical samples are
distributed among the classes. (Recall that when we were learning Mar-
kov chains in §.., we also encountered this issue and discussed
it between (.) and (.).) The former option leads to easier
optimization problems, but here we choose the latter path to stay in line
with Zaffalon []; however, the former path will be chosen in the next
subsection, where keeping the optimization problems simple is far more
critical. Zaffalon [] distributes the hypothetical sample according to
the class model, so (.) becomes
E =minr :∆C Wa
(∑
c:CI
c ·P (•|c) ∣∣ mˇ+ s · r ), with for each c in C
P (•|c)=min{×j :J Wa(•|mˇ j |c+ s · rc · t j ) ∣∣ t :×j :J∆A j }. (.)
Here, the per-class attribute models cannot be seen separately from the
class model.
Now, to classify an object with attribute tuple a, we need to be able
to decide, for each pair of classes d and e, whether or not E(Id− I e|a)> 0
(the maximality decision criterion).
(i) To calculate the updated prevision in case E(C× ıa)> 0, both nat-
ural extension (.) and regular extension (.) give
E(Id− I e|a) ∝E((Id− I e) · Ia),
with the positive proportionality constant 1/E(C× ıa). So we then
have E
(
(Id− I e) · Ia)> 0 as a criterion.
(ii) To calculate the regular extension in case E(C× ıa)= 0, some lin-
ear previsions have to be omitted fromME , but doing so cannot
change the sign of the criterion. We can therefore keep these previ-
sions.
(iii) In case E(C×ıa)= 0, the natural extension and, in case E(C×ıa)= 0,
also the regular extension is the vacuous lower prevision PC; so
then E(Id− I e|a)=−1< 0 for any pair (d,e), which means that no
class is undominated and thus all classes are incomparable.
Zaffalon [] implicitly uses regular extension and as the idmm by
construction never assigns upper probability zero to any event, he can
always use the criterion E
(
(Id − I e) · Ia) > 0. Using (.) and (.)
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then leads us to checking the sign of
E
(






(mˇ j |d)a j +s·rd·(t j )a j
nˇ j |d+s·rd




(mˇ j |e)a j +s·re·(t j )a j
nˇ j |e+s·re
∣∣∣ t :×j :J∆A j })
∝minr :∆C
(
(mˇd+ s · rd) ·∏ j :J (mˇ j |d)a jnˇ j |d+s·rd − (mˇe+ s · re) ·∏ j :J (mˇ j |e)a j +s·renˇ j |e+s·re )
=minr :∆C
(
(mˇd+ s · rd)1−|J | ·∏ j :J (mˇ j |d)a j
− (mˇe+ s · re)1−|J | ·∏ j :J ((mˇ j |e)a j + s · re));
if we fix rd and re such that rd+re ∈ [0,1[, then we can lower the function’s
value by increasing one of them (re for |J | ≤ 1, rd for |J | > 1), so we may
assume without loss of generality that rd+ re = 1:
=minr :[0,1]
(
(mˇd+ s · (1− r ))1−|J | ·∏ j :J (mˇ j |d)a j
− (mˇe+ s · r )1−|J | ·∏ j :J ((mˇ j |e)a j + s · r )).
This last, one-dimensional optimization problem can be solved straight-
forwardly [Zaffalon ].
We have now familiarized ourselves enough with the structure and
important aspects of the naive credal classifier to be able to generalize
it to individual attribute models (and perhaps even class models) that
are not restricted to the idmm, i.e., to categorical data. This is the topic
of the next subsection.
.. Generalizing the naive credal classifier
In the previous subsection, we became really committed to learningQuaeghebeur &
De Cooman []
and Quaeghebeur




from categorical data in the paragraph preceding (.). Let us go
back one step, to (.)–(.), which presents the structure of the
class-attribute model after imposing naiveness. Of course, instead of
using idmms for the class model and individual attribute models, other
immediate predictive lower previsions can be plugged in.
For example, so-called nonparametric immediate predictive infer-
ence models could be used as either a drop-in replacement for the idmms
used [Coolen & Augustin ], or even to model one-dimensional con-
tinuous attributes [Augustin & Coolen ]. These models have no
tuning parameter that characterizes the speed of learning. In this, they
are very different from the idmm, where the pseudocounts parameter
takes this role. Apart from post-data exchangeability, these models also
make no explicit assumptions about the process generating the objects
and their attributes. In this, they are very different from the class of infer-
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ence models we have introduced in §.., which are meant for situa-
tions where the object’s attributes are assumed to be generated by some
known exponential family sampling model with unknown parameter
(and which are otherwise completely characterized by pseudocounts).
Although it is good to realize that other, less specific options are
available, it is of course this last group of inference models – the imme-
diate predictive variants (.), to be precise – we are going to use
here to generalize the naive credal classifier to noncategorical attributes.
Replacement of the class model by a noncategorical one (to one for,
e.g., Poisson sampling or normal sampling) would transform the classi-
fication problem we started out with into a regression problem, which
would lead us too far, so we stick to the assumption that the class model
is indeed categorical and we keep on using an idmm for it.
The first thing that we do is write down the general form of the class-
attribute models for which the attribute models are now allowed to be
immediate predictive previsions of the form (.): we replace (.)
by
E :=Wa(∑c:CI c ·P (•|c) ∣∣ mˇ, s), with for each c in C
P (•|c) := inft :×j :JU j×j :J Pfa j |c,τ j |c(• ∣∣ nˇ j |c+ s j |c, τ j |c xˇ j |c+s j |c·t jnˇ j |c+s j |c ) (.)
where s, the s j |c, and mˇ are defined as before, in (i)–(ii), but now with
the additional restriction that the pseudocounts parameters are all spec-
ified separately from one another. Furthermore,
(i) a j |c and τ j |c are the functions characterizing which exponential
family sampling model is assumed to generate the j -th individual
attribute contingent on class c (cf. §..), and
(ii) xˇ j |c is the sample sequence extracted from xˇ for the j -th attribute
of those objects in the learning set that belong to the class c, with
nˇc := νxˇ j |c.
Let us return to the toy example of §.. and see what changes
we have to make to the list of processed data, when instead of modeling
the time on ice attribute as a categorical variable, we model it as being
generated by a gamma sampling model (see §B.. for more details on
this exponential family) We do this for both the ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ case.
The new learning set is given in the following table: (only the last column
has been modified)







 Inference models for exponential families
Of course, we can keep the previously obtained class count vector mˇ, and
the count vectors mˇa|dead, and mˇa|alive for the citric acid test (which are
generated by τa :=C {c,s}). For the time on ice attribute, however, we have
to replace the count vectors mˇh|dead and mˇh|alive by the mean sufficient
statistics for the gamma model, whose generating function for both the
‘dead’ and ‘alive’ case is given by τh := z :R>0 ; (z, ln z) (cf (B.)):








Now, as before, to classify an object with attribute tuple a, we need
to be able to decide, for each pair of classes d and e, whether or not
E(Id − I e|a) > 0 (the maximality decision criterion). However, if any
of the attributes has a continuous sampling model, then in general
E(C× ıa) = 0. In this case, updating on ıa using natural and regular
extension would result in a vacuous model and all classes would be in-
comparable. This vacuity can be circumvented by making the additional
assumption that the values of the continuous attributes are idealizations
of events with at least positive upper probability [Walley , §.];
i.e., we make the assumption that the measurement procedure has a
finite precision.
Updating then consists of first applying Bayes’s rule for density func-
tions [Walley , §..] to each of the predictive linear product








, with for each c in C
Pt (•|c)=×j :J Pfa j |c,τ j |c(• ∣∣ nˇ j |c+ s j |c, τ j |c xˇ j |c+s j |c·t jnˇ j |c+s j |c )
that define the class-attribute model E = infr :∆C;t :×j :JU j Er,t and then
taking the lower envelope of the resulting updated linear previsions
[Walley , §..––]:
E(•|a) := infr :∆C
t :×j :JU j
1
Pr (pt (a|C)) ·Pr
(• ·pt (a|C)),
where P = infr :∆C Pr is the class model and pt (•|C) is the conditional
probability density or mass function corresponding to one of the lin-
ear previsions Pt (•|C) defining attribute model P (•|C) = inft :×j :JU j Pt
(cf. (.)).
Bayes’s rule for density functions can be applied without worries, as
the predictive probability density or mass function (.) for exponen-
tial families is strictly positive on its domain for all allowed parameter
values. So in particular, we know that
Pr (pt (a|C))=∑c:C mˇc+s·rcnˇ+s ·∏ j :J pt j (a j |c)> 0,
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where for each c in C we have used the shorthand
pt j (a j |c) := pfa j |c,τ j |c
(
a j
∣∣ nˇ j |c+ s j |c, τ j |c xˇ j |c+s j |c·t jnˇ j |c+s j |c ). (.)
(Cf. (.) for the expression of the right-hand side probability density
or mass.) Also, the sign of E(•|a) and infr :∆C;t :×j :JU j Pr
(• ·pt (a|C)) is the
same, so we can replace the criterion by
infr :∆C;t :×j :JU j Pr
(
(Id− I e) ·pt (a|C)
)> 0,
whose left-hand side can be rewritten as follows:
minr :∆C
( mˇd+s·rd
nˇ+s · inft :×j :JU j
∏
j :J pt j (a j |d)
− mˇe+s·renˇ+s · supt :×j :JU j
∏




(mˇd+ s · rd) ·∏ j :J inft j :U j pt j (a j |d)
− (mˇe+ s · re) ·∏ j :J supt j :U j pt j (a j |e));
or, considering the expression between parentheses is linear in the com-
ponents of r ,
= mˇd ·∏ j :J inft j :U j pt j (a j |d)− (mˇe+ s) ·∏ j :J supt j :U j pt j (a j |e).
This last expression is the simplest one we can obtain without specifying
the individual per-class attribute models.
Our decision criterion for ordering the classes consists of check-
ing whether this last expression is strictly positive. The computational
complexity of doing this is determined by the 2 · |J | uncoupled opti-
mization problems that appear. For some exponential families – most
notably for multinomial sampling – analytical solutions can be found for
these optimization problems, for the others – such as for gamma sam-
pling §B.. – recourse to numerical methods is necessary. Although I
expect that these optimization problems will not pose insurmountable
challenges for most common exponential families, I cannot at this point,
without having investigated the behavior of (.) for all these families,
make any more definite statements.
As regards the quality of the resulting classifier: for this we need to
wait for an actual implementation, which unfortunately does not exist







he talks in maths
he buzzesLikeAfridge
hes like a detuned radio.
Radiohead []
Dear reader, if you have worked your way mostly linearly through all
or a large part of the pages preceding this one: I salute you. To those who
landed here after a nonlinear or inversely linear flight: welcome.
In these conclusions, I will reflect upon the topics presented in the
four main chapters of this thesis. I will highlight my contributions and
muse on the question “What next?”
.. Modeling uncertainty
In Chapter , ‘Modeling uncertainty’, I presented an overview of a
large part of the basic theory of coherent lower previsions. The primary
intention of this chapter was to serve as a basis for the rest of the thesis.
However, if it had only served that purpose, I could have achieved the
same goal by extensively citing the literature (read: Walley’s [] book).
One other, selfish reason was that writing things out oneself can be
extremely enlightening: I understand the basic theory much better now.
I also wished to present the theory slightly differently, with the hope
of making it more accessible, or at least serve as inspiration for later
accessible introductions, for which there is a genuine need. The main
difference is the stronger focus on desirability as a basis for defining both
unconditional and conditional previsions and working more explicitly
with sets of desirable gambles [this focus is influenced by others, e.g.,
De Cooman & Miranda , §]; the emphasis on marginally desirable











An important advantage of sets of desirable gambles is that they allow
for simple, intuition-building graphical illustrations of many concepts
in the theory of imprecise probabilities.
From my experience with writing this chapter, working with and
thinking in terms of sets of desirable gambles can be very fruitful for
obtaining theoretical and perhaps even practical results. I think that
desirability can serve as an excellent basis for an accessible basic in-
troduction to the techniques of the theory of imprecise probabilities.
191
Previsions and credal sets would then be introduced as derived con-
cepts. The treatment should be restricted to finite possibility spaces, as
infinities often only create technical problems and provide little or no
additional insight.
.. Extreme lower probabilities
In Chapter , ‘Extreme lower probabilities’, I gave an overview of the
current state-of-the-art knowledge about extreme lower probabilities
on finite possibility spaces. In most cases, the sets of lower probabilities
that satisfy some property form a convex polytope in a – with regard to
the size of the possibility space – high-dimensional space. The extreme
points of these polytopes, which provide a complete characterization,
are the extreme lower probabilities. Most interesting properties lower
probabilities can possess are expressed using sets of constraints, which
more or less correspond to the polytope’s faces. To pass from constraints
to extreme points, vertex enumeration algorithms are used.
Although vertex enumeration is a commonly used technique, my
contribution lies in applying it to this particular problem, for which it
was first necessary to generate a manageable set of constraints for the dif-
ferent properties of interest. The computer program I wrote allowed the
discovery of many hitherto unknown sets of extreme lower probabilities
for a lot of properties. I also gave an analysis of a number of interesting
cases, wherever possible guided by the adjacency graph of the set of
lower probabilities under scrutiny. Some regularities were uncovered
by this analysis, which I continued in the Herbarium, but the most
striking fact was the combinatorial explosion of the number of extreme
coherent lower probabilities with the size of the possibility space.
This combinatorial explosion, which limits the practicality of cal-
culating and thus working with extreme lower probabilities (it was our
original hope to use extreme lower probabilities for approximation pur-
poses), leads me to believe that not much more can be learned by using
more powerful computers to obtain results for larger possibility spaces.
Rather, to gain more insight, and perhaps even to find a clue that indi-
cates analytical results are possible, further research should focus on
manageable possibility spaces, but move from lower probabilities to
lower previsions; to wit, apart from indicators, add more and more other
gambles into the mix and see how the set of extreme points changes with
each gamble added.
.. Inference models
In Chapter , ‘Inference models’, I reported on research – done in close
collaboration with Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda – about ex-
changeable lower previsions and about immediate prediction under
representation insensitivity. However, the wish to combine these two
 Conclusions
subjects as seamlessly as possible, in combination with my fascination
for marginally desirable gambles, led me to propose a novel concept of
finite exchangeability for sets of desirable gambles, that – according to
my taste – better captures the idea behind exchangeability. This allowed
me to evade a number of bothersome technicalities that had previously
prevented us from finding an important result: that the idmm (idm) is
the unique inference model for categorical data that is (infinitely) ex-
changeable, representation insensitive and simple in the sense that it
produces linear-vacuous immediate predictions, under the added con-
dition, however, that one follows the constant hyperparameter path (a
new bothersome technical requirement). To show how easily applicable
the id(m)m is, I decided to not just point to the literature for examples
of applications, but present two which I have worked on myself: game-
theoretic learning and learning of Markov chains.
Discovering how to derive the id(m)m from first principles is in itself
nice, but in some sense even nicer is the idea that led to the removal
of the obstacles on the path to this discovery: a definition for the ex-
changeability of sets of desirable gambles. This idea can lead to a fully
worked out theory of exchangeable sets of desirable gambles. (Gert de
Cooman is making progress on this even as I write!) This idea could also
be translated to other invariance assumptions. It would also be a very
interesting challenge to see where one lands by not following the con-
stant hyperparameter path. Concerning future work on the presented
applications: the inference model for Markov chains needs to be tested
in practice.
.. Inference models for exponential families
The id(m)m’s first appearance far preceded our derivation from first prin-
ciples: it was introduced by Walley [] as a generalization of a group
of classical, Bayesian inference models for categorical data and has been
one of the most widely used imprecise-probabilistic inference models
ever since. In Chapter , ‘Inference models for exponential families’,
we added another generalization step. Categorical sampling is described
by a multinomial likelihood function and the id(m)m is based on the con-
jugate family of Dirichlet distributions, for which the parameters are split
into a part interpretable as a number of counts and a part interpretable
as an average one-sample sufficient statistic. Now, the multinomial like-
lihood is part of a class of formally similar regular exponential family
likelihoods. For all of these, introducing an inference model based on
the conjugate family is as easy as it was with the id(m)m. To boot, the
parameters of these families can be split up the same way as was done
with the id(m)m.
The more I think about it, the more it seems to me that this general-
ization was waiting to happen ever since the id(m)m appeared. Although
Conclusions 
there is some merit in having read the right books and papers, realizing
that the pieces fit, and getting the idea out in the wild, I still have qualms
about the fact that I have not yet managed to put the proposed inference
models into practice. If this line of research is to be continued, this is one
of the first things that need to be remedied. To this end, I have worked
out how this can be done for credal classification. The lack of a simple
analytical expression for immediate prediction for many exponential
families could be a bothersome, but not insurmountable problem.
It would be an interesting and very challenging research program
to see if, apart from the id(m)m, other imprecise-probabilistic inference
models for exponential families could be derived from first principles.
For starters, this would entail identifying the assumptions encoded in
the likelihood function (both about invariances and about the domain’s
structure) and struggling with a number of limiting arguments (from fi-
nite to infinite sample sequences and perhaps also from finite to infinite
possibility spaces). One element already seems to be in place: the infer-
ence models I have proposed are simple in the sense that they satisfy the
posterior contamination prediction property, i.e., the immediate predic-
tive lower prevision of a single sample sufficient statistic is a mixture of
a linear prevision with a (near-)vacuous lower prevision. (And why not
try to do all this in terms of desirable gambles?)
On the more practical side, it could be very interesting to follow
Walley & Bernard’s [] lead and derive predictive lower and upper
cumulative distribution functions. These allow us to make comparisons
with frequentist methods that produce confidence intervals. Such com-
parisons are probably essential to be able to communicate with the
many statisticians in the field using these methods and convince them




A basket of extreme lower probabilities
The staple source of carbohydrates in Ethiopia is injera, a
large, pancake-shaped substance made from tef, a nutty-
tasting grain that is unique to Ethiopia and comes in
three varieties: white, brown and red.
Briggs [, p. ]
Coherent lower probabilities are a source of reasonable uncertainty
models; they can be written as a convex combination of extreme lower
probabilities (cf. ‘Extreme lower probabilities’). These lower probabili-
ties and their extreme building blocks come in many varieties, depending
on the properties they have to satisfy.
In this appendix, we include some additional sets of extreme lower
probabilities as well as two technical lemmas necessary to derive the
feasible definitions for avoiding sure loss (.) and coherence (.).
A. Selected extreme lower probabilities
In §. of the chapter ‘Extreme lower probabilities’, we presented
and commented on several adjacency graphs and a list of extreme lower
probabilities. In this section, we add one more list (containing the pre-
viously unknown extreme coherent lower probabilities on a possibility
space of cardinality 4) and several adjacency graphs (for different cases
involving permutation invariance). As in §., all results are based on
numerical output from my ‘constraints’ computer program.
A.. Coherent on four
We have discovered the  extreme coherent lower probabilities on a
possibility space of 4 elements (let Ω := {a,b,c,d}). They are listed below,
grouped by the maximal denominator occurring in their components.
As the adjacency graph for this case would be far too complex, this way
of presenting things is an invitation to focus more on the combinatorial













The first group ( permutation classes) is
the one formed by the  extreme coherent
lower probabilities with maximal denomina-
tor 1. These are the vacuous lower probabilities,
all of which are completely monotone. Only one
is permutation invariant.
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The second group ( permutation classes) is formed by the  ex-
treme coherent lower probabilities with maximal denominator 2. One is
permutation invariant. Half of the classes are 2-monotone. Two classes









































The third group ( permutation classes) is formed by the  extreme
coherent lower probabilities with maximal denominator 3. One is per-




















































The fourth group ( permutation classes) is formed by the  extreme





































The next-to-last group ( permutation classes) is formed by the 


































































The last group ( permu-
tation classes) is formed by
the  extreme coherent lower
probabilities with maximal de-
nominator 6.
None of the classes among
the last three of the groups is
2-monotone, permutation in-
variant, or has non-3-dimen-
sional credal sets.
A.. Staring at sub-cubical dice in various ways
In §.., we looked at the adjacency graph of the set of permutation
invariant 2-monotone lower probabilities on a possibility space of cardi-
PΩ
∞


























0 0 1 2
nality 6; we presented them as possible models
for dealing with the uncertainty involved in bet-
ting with common six-faced cubical dice about
which we have no face-specific information. In
this subsection, we do the same, but for possibil-
ity spaces of lower cardinality; we combine per-
mutation invariance with coherence or k-mono-
tonicity (for each relevant k inN≥2).
For |Ω| = 2 (flipping or spinning a coin), we
give the graph for the coherent case, which coin-
cides with the completely monotone case.
For |Ω| = 3 (e.g., tossing a very uncommonUnfolding an elon-
gated triangular
dipyramidic die:
elongated triangular dipyramidic die, the downward facing side counts),
we first give the completely monotone case and then the coherent case,
which coincides with the 2-monotone case.
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We give, for |Ω| = 4 (tossing a less uncommon
tetraedric die), respectively above from left to right, the
completely monotone, 3-monotone, and 2-monotone
cases and then, on the side, the coherent case. Notice
that the first three adjacency graphs correspond to tetra-
hedra whose points can be written as a unique convex
combination of the vertices, whereas for the coherent
case, we find a pyramid with a quadrangular base and




4 1 in the apex.
The decomposition is not unique anymore, for example:
0 0 14
1
2 1= 34 · (0 0 13 12 1)+ 14 · (0 0 0 12 1)
= 34 · (0 0 13 23 1)+ 14 ·PΩ.
The situation for |Ω| = 5 (e.g., an elongated pentagonal dipyramidic Unfolding an elon-
gated pentagonal
dipyramidic die:
die) is similar. On the left we have the completely, 4-, 3-, and 2-monotone
cases (pentachora, the 4-dimensional version of the tetrahedra); on the
right the coherent case (also 4-dimensional, which can be seen by re-
























































































































This section contains two technical lemmas used in the construction of
feasible definitions for avoiding sure loss in §.. and for coherence
in §... For both, we assume that some finite possibility space Ω is
given.
A.. Elimination of linear dependence
In this lemma, we consider a set of constraints on a fixed vector qThis lemma
is inspired by
Walley [, §A].
in ℘Ω→R. Each constraint is characterized by a set of eventsC :⊆℘Ω
and coefficients λ in (R6=0)C such that
∑
C :C λC · I C = ρ, where ρ is some
fixed real number. The lemma states that by eliminating those setsC for
which {I C −qC |C :C } is linearly dependent, this set can be reduced to
one that defines the same polyhedron. (Recall from §.. that for func-
tion application, subscripting is used for coefficients and postplacement
is used otherwise.)
To state this lemma more formally, suppose℘Ω is partitioned intoA
and B, where A and B will correspond to the positive and negative
components of λ, respectively. The lemma then gives two equivalent
formulations for set of constraints on q we are interested in, the original
one and the useful one, respectively:
∀C :⊆℘Ω;
∀λ : (R<0)C∩A × (R>0)C∩B∧.∑C :C λC · I C = ρ;
sup
{∑
C :C λC · (I C −qC )
}≥ 0 (A.)
is equivalent to
∀Cˆ :⊆℘Ω∧. ¬dep{I C −qC |C : Cˆ };
∀λˆ : (R<0)Cˆ∩A × (R>0)Cˆ∩B∧.
(∃ρˆ :R ;∑C :Cˆ λˆC · I C = ρˆ);
sup
{∑
C :Cˆ λˆC · (I C −qC )
}≥ 0.
(A.)
(Readers less interested in technical derivations can immediately skip
the rest of this subsection.)
To prove this equivalence, start from (A.) and consider those C for
which {I C − qC |C :C } is linearly dependent. Then, following (.),
there is a µ in RC such that µ 6= (C ;0) and∑C :C µC · (I C −qC )= 0. So the
sum appearing in the expression for these constraints can be rewritten
as ∑
C :C λC · (1+γ · µCλC ) · (I
C −qC ),
where the real number γ can be freely chosen.
Choosing γ :=−λD/µD , where D in C is such that µD 6= 0, reduces the
constraint to an equivalent one not explicitly dependent on D, which
A. Technical lemmas 
can therefore be removed from C ; other C in C , for which 1+γ · µCλC = 0,
can also be removed. Possibly after repeating this procedure, one ob-
tains a replacement Cˆ :⊂C for which the set {I C −qC |C : Cˆ } is linearly
independent.
For any C inC , the signs of λC and λˆC :=λC · (1+γ · µCλC ) are the same
when 0≤ 1+γ · µCλC = 1−
λD
µD
· µCλC . This can be guaranteed for all C in Cˆ by
choosing D such that |λD /µD | =minC :C∧. µC 6=0|λC /µC |, so the sign of the
components of λˆ corresponds to the same partition {A ,B} of ℘Ω.
Remark that∑
C :Cˆ λˆC · I C =
∑
C :C λC · (1+γ · µCλC ) · I
C
=∑C :C (λC · I C +γ ·µC ·qC )
= ρˆ := ρ+∑C :C γ ·µC ·qC ,
so λˆ also satisfies a condition like the one given for λ,
∑
C :C λC · I C = ρ.
Also notice that ρ and ρˆ need not have the same sign.
A.. Preservation of linear independence
In this lemma, we consider sets of functions of the type {I C −qC |C :C },
determined by some set of events C :⊆℘Ω and some vector q in C →R.
We show that if there are coefficients λ in RC such that
∑
C :C λC · I C = 1
(the ‘assumption of the lemma’, which also implies λ 6= (C ; 0)), then
linear (in)dependence of this set of functions is equivalent to linear
(in)dependence of {I C |C :C }, in which q does not appear.
So, formally, what we want to prove is
∀C :⊆℘Ω∧. (∃λ :RC ;∑C :C λC · I C = 1);
∀q :C →R;
dep{I C −qC |C :C }⇔ dep{I C |C :C }.
(A.)
(Readers less interested in technical derivations can skip the rest of this
subsection.)
First, we prove that linear dependence of {I C − qC |C :C } implies
linear dependence of {I C |C :C }: If {I C − qC |C :C } is linearly depen-
dent, then, following definition (.), there is a µ in RC such that
µ 6= 0 and such that ∑C :C µC · I C = ∑C :C µC ·qC . Now define the map
c :=µ :RC ;∑C :C µC ·qC . Due to the assumption of the lemma,∑
C :C cµ ·λC · I C =
∑
C :C µC ·qC =
∑
C :C µC · I C .
So with µˆ :=µ− cµ ·λ, we find that ∑C :C µˆC · I C = 0 and thus we have
shown that {I C |C :C } is linearly dependent.
Now we prove that linear independence of {I C−qC |C :C } implies lin-
ear independence of {I C |C :C }: If {I C−qC |C :C } is linearly independent,
 Herbarium
then for all µ in RC such that µ 6= 0, it holds that∑
C :C µC · I C 6=
∑
C :C µC ·qC = cµ.
Again due to the assumption of the lemma, we find it holds for all µ that∑
C :C (µC − cµ ·λC ) · I C 6= 0. So if for all µˆ in RC such that µˆ 6= (C ; 0) there
is a µ such that µˆ=µ− cµ ·λ, then {I C |C :C } is linearly independent and
the lemma is proven.
To finish the proof, we have to show, under the given conditions
on µ and µˆ, that the linear system µˆ = µ− cµ ·λ of equations in µ can
always be solved for µ when {I C −qC |C :C } is linearly independent. Or,
using the expression for cµ and considering that µ= 0 implies µˆ= 0, it







determinant. To do this, we create a well-chosen matrix, and rewrite it





















Taking the determinant gives∣∣∣∣ 1 λqᵀ 1
∣∣∣∣= |1−λqᵀ| = 1−qᵀλ.
So |1−λqᵀ| 6= 0 when 1 6=∑C :C λC ·qC . Or, because of the assumption of
the lemma, when
∑
C :C λC · I C 6=
∑
C :C λC ·qC . This is satisfied because





A list of exponential families & their friends
A cow’s strategic and commercial sensibilities are not
highly developed.
Graves [, §.]
The list of regular exponential families one could come up with is
uncountable, that much is clear from their description in §..: we
can already construct a linear canonical exponential family for almost
any sample space one can come up with. It is another question entirely
which ones out of this panoply of families is practically useful as a sam-
pling model. In ‘Inference models for exponential families’ we have
encountered two of them already: the normal and multi-category Ber-
noulli sampling models (in §.. and §.., respectively).
In this appendix, we have a look at some other exponential families
that have proven their worth as sampling models. As we have done for
the normal and multi-category Bernoulli sampling models, we derive
the corresponding conjugate family and – for some – the immediate
predictive family (cf. §.. and §..). For each, we also give a pos-
sible choice for the set of parameters that determines an icefm or ipefm;
but except for one family (§B..), we do not illustrate the updating
procedure (as was done in §.. and §..).
The material in this appendix is not original in the sense that the con-
jugate and predictive distributions derived here can be found elsewhere.
What is more original is our focus on the parameterization in terms of
the number of observations and their mean single-sample sufficient
statistic.
This appendix can be of interest as a partial reference, but is written
with the idea that it should allow the reader to get acquainted with a
number of different exponential families and their friends. The treated
exponential families are split up into those defined on continuous and
discrete sample spaces – §B. and §B. respectively. Each exponential
family is accorded its own subsection, the structure of which is always
the same: first the family itself is presented and its characteristics are
derived; then the form of its conjugate parametric prevision and its
normalization factor are derived; for some, the immediate predictive
prevision is found in a third step; each subsection always ends with a
suggestion on how to choose a bounded convex set of single-sample
sufficient statistics to build icefms or ipefms starting from the parametric
and predictive linear previsions.
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B. Continuous families
This section with exponential families on continuous sample spaces is
divided in three parts. One of these parts, §B..–§B..–, is inhab-
ited by families that are a restriction or generalization of the normal
family we have treated extensively in ‘Inference models for exponential
families’. Another, §B.., contains the interesting von Mises family,
which is mainly used to model planar directional sampling. The third,
consisting of §B.. and §B.., is devoted to the gamma family and
the exponential exponential family (sic), which are too common to be
omitted.
B.. Centered normal sampling
The centered normal family is the subset of the normal family we saw Two centered nor-
mal densities (plot
restricted to [−5,5]):
(the mean 0 is indi-
cated with a dot)
σ= 2
σ= 0.6
in §.. for which the mean is 0. It can be used whenever the mean µ
in R is known; one just needs to do a coordinate translation over −µ.
Each member hasX :=R as a sample space and is parameterized by its
standard deviation, i.e., a φ :=σ in Φ :=R>0. The centered normal linear
prevision is Nl(•|0,σ) (cf. (.)).
Following the derivation in §.., we can easily derive the likeli-
hood in exponential family form: let z be an observed real sample, then















∣∣ z2〉 · 1p
2·pi .
Comparing this last expression with (.), we see that the Euclidean
vector space for this family has dimension d := 1 and that
τ := z :R ; z2, so T := co{z2 | z :R}=R≥0,
ψ :=σ :R>0 ;− 12·σ2 , so Ξ :=R<0,
(B.)
and also that
a :=R ; 1p
2·pi and b := ξ :R<0 ;
√
−2 ·ξ. (B.)
The cumulant function for the centered normal family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R<0 ;− 12 · ln(−2 ·ξ).
So, using (.) and (.), we find – letting ξ :=ψσ – that
Nl(τ|0,σ)= (∇κ)ξ=− 12·ξ =σ2, (B.)
i.e., the variance.
The information in (B.) and (B.) completely defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all mea-
surable gambles on Ξ=R<0 and the domain of possible parameters is
 Bestiarium
intT =R>0. The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normal-
ization factor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t an
element of intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ(√−2 ·ξ)s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.
It can be calculated more easily when starting from the noncanonical
parameterization given by the function ψ′ :=λ :R>0 ;− 12 ·λ, where λ is
the centered normal distribution’s precision (related to the standard
deviation σ by λ= 1/σ2):
c(s, t )= 1/∫ R>0λ s2 ·exps(− 12 ·λ · t) · |∣∣(∇ψ′)λ∣∣| dλ








which is easily found after recognizing that the integral is proportional
to one over the normalization factor of Ga
(• ∣∣ s+32 , s2 · t) (cf. (.)). So
the prior parametric linear prevision is just this gamma prevision.
Using (.), (B.), and (B.)å, we can obtain the immediate prior






































· (1+ 1s·t · z2)− s+3+12 ,
which is the probability density of the centered Student’s distribution
with prevision St
(• ∣∣ s+3,0,pt ·p ss+3 ). The posterior is obtained by the
typical substitution (cf. §..).
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models
of the type of (.)–(.) for centered normal sampling is to choose a
number of pseudocounts s in R>0 and a bounded subset of intT =R>0.
As this set is already bounded from below, the simplest choice is to only
take an upper bound for t , i.e., an upper bound on the variance.
B.. Scaled normal sampling
The scaled normal family is another subset of the normal family we
saw in §.., now consisting of the elements for which the standard
deviation is 1. It can be used whenever the standard deviation σ :R is
B. Continuous families 
known; one just needs to do a coordinate scaling with a factor 1/σ. Each Two scaled normal
densities (plot
restricted to [−5,5]):





member hasX :=R as a sample space and is parameterized by its mean,
i.e., a φ :=µ in Φ :=R. The scaled normal linear prevision is Nl(•|µ,1)
(cf. (.)).
Following the derivation in §.., we can easily derive the likeli-
hood in exponential family form: let z be an observed real sample, then
this likelihood can be written as
1p
2·pi ·exp
(− 12 · (z−µ)2)= 1p2·pi ·exp(− z22 ) ·exp(z ·µ) ·exp(−µ22 )






Comparing this last expression with (.), we see that the Euclidean
vector space for this family has dimension d := 1 and that
τ := idR, so T := coR=R,
ψ := idR, so Ξ :=R,
(B.)
(so this is a linear canonical exponential family) and also that





2·pi and b := ξ :R ; exp
(− ξ22 ). (B.)
The cumulant function for the scaled normal family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R ; ξ22 .
So, using (.) and (.), we find – letting ξ :=ψµ – that
Nl(τ|µ,1)= (∇κ)ξ= ξ=µ, (B.)
i.e., the mean.
The information in (B.) and (B.) completely defines the canoni-
cal form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all
measurable gambles on Ξ=R and the domain of possible parameters
is intT =R. The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normal-
ization factor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t an
element of intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ exps(− ξ22 ) ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ
Because of its linear canonicality, we do not need to change parameteri-
zations to find this normalization factor:





(− s2 · t 2), (B.)
which is easily found after completing the square and recognizing that
the integral is proportional to one over the normalization factor of the
 Bestiarium
normal prevision Nl
(• ∣∣ t , 1ps ) (cf. (.)). So the prior parametric linear
prevision is just this normal prevision.
Using (.), (B.)å, and (B.)å, we can obtain the immediate prior


























s+1 · t 2−2 · ss+1 · z · t + 1s+1 · z2
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which is the probability density of a normal distribution with prevision
Nl
(• ∣∣ t ,p1+1/s). The posterior is obtained by the typical substitution
(cf. §..).
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models
of the type of (.)–(.) for scaled normal sampling is to choose a
number of pseudocounts s in R>0 and a bounded subset of intT = R.
The simplest choice is to only take an upper bound for |t |, i.e., an upper
bound on the absolute value of the mean.
B.. Multivariate normal sampling
The family of `-variate (` :N>0) normal distributions [Kotz et al. ,
§] is the last of the normal families we are going to treat. Each
member has X :=R` as a sample space and is parameterized by its
mean vector and precision matrix – the inverse of the covariance ma-
trix –, i.e., a φ := (µ,Λ) in Φ :=R`×R`×`pod , where R`×` is the set of square
`-dimensional matrices and the symmetric positive definiteness predi-
cate pod is defined by (let M be a square matrix of size `)
pod M ⇔M =Mᵀ ∧∀v : (R`)6=0 ; vᵀM v > 0. (B.)
Recall that any positive definite matrix is invertible. We later also need
the related concept of symmetric positive semidefiniteness and sym-
metric negative definiteness, expressed by the predicates psd and ned
respectively, which are defined by
psd M ⇔M =Mᵀ ∧∀v : (R`)6=0 ; vᵀM v ≥ 0, (B.)
ned M ⇔M =Mᵀ ∧∀v : (R`)6=0 ; vᵀM v < 0. (B.)
B. Continuous families 
Let f be any measurable gamble on R`; the multivariate normal linear
prevision is then defined by
Nr( f |µ,Λ) := ∫X f z ·p |Λ|(2·pi)` ·exp(− 12 · (z−µ)ᵀΛ(z−µ)) dz. (B.)
We start by rewriting the corresponding likelihood function in expo-
nential family form: let z :R` be an observed sample, then this likelihood
can be written as The trace func-
tion tr applied to
a square matrix





(− 12 · (z−µ)ᵀΛ(z−µ))
=p |Λ|
(2·pi)` ·exp
(− tr(Λzzᵀ)2 + µᵀΛzσ2 − µᵀΛµ2 )
= exp(−µᵀΛµ2 + ln|Λ|) ·exp〈µᵀΛ,−Λ2 ∣∣ z, zzᵀ〉 · 1p2·pi` .
Here, we used the fact that vᵀM v = tr(M v vᵀ) for square matrices M and
real vectors v of the same dimension [Bernstein , (..)]. Also,
in contrast to all the other scalar products we have used for exponential
family notation above or will use below, it is not just a product or sum
of products: the second part of the scalar product involves taking the
trace of a matrix product (cf. Frobenius norm [see, e.g., Bernstein ,
§..]). This expression and the ensuing derivations below can be
rewritten in the vectorial language, however, but we opted not to do this
to stress the strong parallels between the univariate and multivariate
normal families.
Comparing the expression with (.) and taking the symmetries
of Λ and the positive semidefinite dyadic (or outer) product zzᵀ, we
see that the Euclidean vector space for this family has d := `+ `·(`+1)2 =
`·(`+3)
2 as its dimension and that
τ := z :R` ; (z, zzᵀ), so T := co{z, zzᵀ | z :R`}
= {t :R`×R`×`psd ∣∣ t2− t1tᵀ1 ∈R`×`psd },
ψ := (µ,Λ) :R`×R`×`pod ; (Λµ,−Λ2 ), so Ξ :=R`×R`×`ned ,
(B.)
Some extra clarification of the definition of the setT of pseudomeans,
each of which has one matrix component, is in order:
(i) Any symmetric positive semidefinite matrix can be seen to be a
convex combination of dyadic products via its spectral decompo-
sition [Bernstein , §.. and §.].
(ii) By construction, for any element t of T , the difference t2− t1tᵀ1
is a covariance matrix (i.e., of the probability measure described
by the convex combination determining t ) and thus a symmetric
positive semidefinite matrix, as these two concepts coincide [see,
e.g., Wikipedia b].
From the expression of the likelihood in exponential-family form, we
 Bestiarium
can also deduce that
a :=R ; 1p
2·pi`













The cumulant function for the multivariate normal family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R`×R`×`ned ;− 12 ·
( ξᵀ1ξ−12 ξᵀ1
2 + ln(−2 · |ξ2|)
)
.












i.e., a vector consisting of the mean (vector) and the (matrix of) second-
order noncentral moments.
The information in (B.)å and (B.) completely defines the canon-
ical form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all
measurable gambles on Ξ= R`×R`×`ned and the domain of possible pa-Every neighbor-
hood (Frobenius





to the negative reals.
rameters is
intT = {t :R`×R`×`pod ∣∣ t2− t1tᵀ1 ∈R`×`pod}.
The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normalization fac-
tor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t : intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ exps( 12 · ( ξᵀ1ξ−12 ξ12 + ln(−2 · |ξ2|))) ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.
It can be calculated more easily when starting from the original non-
canonical parameterization ψ:





2 · (−µᵀΛµ+ ln|Λ|)+ tᵀ1Λµ+ tr
(−Λ2 t2))





|Λ| s2 · exps
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∣∣∣∣Λ Oµᵀ − 12
∣∣∣∣| dµ) dΛ;






|Λ| s2 · exps(− 12 · (µ− t1)ᵀΛ(µ− t1))
· exps(− tr( 12 · (t2− t1tᵀ1 )Λ) · 12 · |Λ| dµ) dΛ





|Λ| 12 ·exp(− s2 · (µ− t1)ᵀΛ(µ− t1)) dµ)
· |Λ| s+12 ·exp(− tr( s2 · (t2− t1tᵀ1 )Λ) dΛ
= 2 ·
( s








The last step follows from the fact that the inner integral is proportional The generalized
gamma function





·∏i :1..`Γ 2·α+1−i2 .







2 · (t2− t1tᵀ1 )
)
, where (let f :L˘
R`×`pod
)
Wi( f |α,β) := ∫
R`×`pod
f r · |β|αΓ`α · |r |
α− `+12 ·exp(− tr(βr )) dr (B.)
is the Wishart linear prevision [see, e.g., Bernardo & Smith , §..],
a multivariate generalization of the gamma prevision, with parameters
α :R>(`−1)/2 and β :R`×`pod .
For obvious reasons the conjugate family is called the normal-Wish-
art family. The normal-Wishart linear prevision [see, e.g., Bernardo &
Smith , §..] is defined by (now let f be a measurable gamble
on the space R`×R`×`pod )
Nw( f |µ,ρ,α,β) :=Wi(Nr( f |µ,ρ · •) ∣∣α,β), (B.)
with parameters restricted as before: µ – not to be confused with earlier
uses of this symbol – can be any vector in R` and ρ must be a strictly
positive real number. So the prior parametric linear prevision is
Nw
(• ∣∣ t1, s, s+`+22 , s2 · (t2− t1tᵀ1 )). (B.)
(Note that not every normal-Wishart prevision belongs to the conjugate
family.) The posterior is obtained by the typical substitution (cf. §..).
We are not going to derive an expression for any predictive prevision
here, as the per-subsection critical tedious manipulation limit would
then surely be crossed.
All it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models of the
type of (.)–(.) for multivariate normal sampling is to choose a
number of pseudocounts s in R>0 and a bounded subset of
intT = {t :R`×R`×`pod ∣∣ t2− t1tᵀ1 ∈R`×`pod}.
If sufficient information is available, specific bounds may be imposed
for each of the components of the means vector (first part of t ) and the
components of the matrix of noncentral second moments (second part
of t ). In case almost no information is available, specifying a very high
upper bound on the Frobenius norm of the matrix of noncentral second
moments is a compact way to obtain a model for near-ignorance.
 Bestiarium
B.. Von Mises planar directional sampling




to the circle, the
mean angle µ is in-




tional sampling in the plane [Fisher et al. , §..]; each mem-
ber has an interval of length 2 ·pi as a sample space and is parame-
terized by its mean angle (measured counterclockwise from the ref-
erence direction (0,1)) and so-called concentration, i.e., a φ := (µ,χ) in
Φ := ]−pi,pi]×R≥0 (the exact choice of interval forµ is of course arbitrary).
Let f be any measurable 2 ·pi-periodic gamble on R, the von Mises linear
prevision is then defined by
vM( f |µ,χ) := ∫ ]µ−pi,µ+pi] f z · 12·pi·I 0χ ·exp(χ ·cos(z−µ)) dz, (B.)
where I 0 is the zeroth-order modified Bessel function [Abramowitz &
Stegun , §.], with I 00 = 1. When χ = 0, this prevision reduces
to the uniform one, which has no mean angle. The integration bounds
were chosen in a way to limit some technical issues related to the choice
of sample space; it results in an only seemingly µ-dependent sample
spaceX := ]µ−pi,µ+pi].
We start by rewriting the corresponding likelihood function in expo-





χ ·cos(z−µ))= 12·pi·I 0χ ·exp(χ ·cosµ ·cos z+χ · sinµ · sin z)
= 1I 0χ ·exp〈χ ·cosµ,χ · sinµ|cos z, sin z〉 ·
1
2·pi .
Comparing this last expression with (.), we see that the EuclideanTake z := pi6 and
xˇ := (− pi7 , 3·pi5 , 5·pi6 ):
T τX
τzτxˇ
vector space for this family has dimension d := 2 and that (let S= {τX }
be the unit circle and ‖•‖ :=
√∑•2 the Euclidean norm)
τ := (cos,sin), so T := coS= {t :R2 ∣∣‖t‖ ≤ 1},
ψ := (µ,χ) : ]−pi,pi]×R≥0 ; (χ ·cosµ,χ · sinµ), so Ξ :=R2,
(B.)
and also that
a :=X ; 12·pi and b := ξ :R2 ; 1I 0‖ξ‖ . (B.)
The cumulant function for the von Mises family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R2 ; ln(I 0‖ξ‖).
So, using (.) and (.), we find – letting ξ :=ψ(µ,χ) – that
vM(τ|µ,χ)= (∇κ)ξ= I 1‖ξ‖I 0‖ξ‖ ·
1
2 · 2·ξ‖ξ‖ =
I 1χ
I 0χ
· (cosµ, sinµ), (B.)
where we have used the fact that DI 0 = I 1 [Abramowitz & Stegun ,
§..].
The information in (B.) and (B.) completely defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all measur-
able gambles on Ξ=R2 and the parameter set is intT = {t :R2 ∣∣‖t‖ < 1}.
B. Continuous families 
The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normalization fac-
tor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t : intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ 1(I 0‖ξ‖)s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.




angle of its argu-
ment (an element
of (R2) 6=0) with rela-
tion to the reference
direction (0,1).
c(s, t )= 1/∫ ]−pi,pi]×R≥0 1(I 0χ)s ·exp(s ·∑(χ ·cosµ,χ · sinµ) · t)
·|∣∣(∇ψ)(µ,χ)∣∣| dµ dχ
= 1/∫ R≥0 1(I 0χ)s · (∫ pi−pi exp〈s · t ·χ|cosµ, sinµ〉 · |∣∣ cosµ sinµχ·sinµ −χ·cosµ ∣∣| dµ) dχ
= 1/∫ R≥0χ · 1(I 0χ)s · (∫]t+pi]t−pi exp〈s · t ·χ|cosµ, sinµ〉 dµ) dχ
= 1/∫ R≥0χ · 2·pi·I 0(s·‖t‖·χ)(I 0χ)s dχ, (B.)
where the last step consisted in recognizing that the inner integral is one
over the normalization factor of vM
(• ∣∣]t , s · ‖t‖ ·χ). Further simplifica-
tion of the normalization factor is not evident.
So the prior parametric linear prevision is
vC(•|s, t ) :∝∫ R≥0 vM(• ∣∣]t , s · ‖t‖ ·χ) ·χ · I 0(s·‖t‖·χ)(I 0χ)s dχ. (B.)
Considering that we do not have the normalization factor (B.) available








On the side, we have given a graphical illustration of how
the parameters are updated. We use a number of pseudocounts
s := 1 and an observed sample xˇ of length 2. Thus, taking into ac-
count the definition of τ, the two updated mean single-sample
sufficient statistic parameters are
t ′ := 12 · t + 12 · (cos xˇ1, sin xˇ1),
t ′′ := 23 · t ′+ 13 · (cos xˇ2, sin xˇ2)
= 13 · t + 23 · (cos xˇ1+cos xˇ2, sin xˇ1+ sin xˇ2).
Note how the proportions appearing in these expressions are
reflected in the illustration.
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference mod-
els of the type of (.)–(.) for von Mises sampling is to choose
a number of pseudocounts s in R>0 and a bounded subset of intT ={
t :R2
∣∣‖t‖ < 1}. As this is already a bounded set, the easiest choice is to
takeU := intT and start with a near-ignorance prior, unless there is so
much prior information about the von Mises process that would make it







On the side, we have given a graphical illustration of how the
parameters of the imprecise-probabilistic model are updated.
We again use a number of pseudocounts s := 1, the initial set
of mean single-sample sufficient statistics isU := intT , which
corresponds to a near-ignorance prior, and take an observed
sample xˇ of length 2. Thus, taking into account the definition
of τ, the two updated sets of mean single-sample sufficient
statistics are
U ′ := 12 ·U + 12 · (cos xˇ1, sin xˇ1),
U ′′ := 23 ·U ′+ 13 · (cos xˇ2, sin xˇ2)
= 13 ·U + 23 · (cos xˇ1+cos xˇ2, sin xˇ1+ sin xˇ2).
Note again how the proportions appearing in these expressions are
reflected in the illustration.
Considering τ = (cos,sin), the set of gambles for which we know
the predictive lower and upper prevision can be efficiently calculated
(cf. (.)) consists more or less all the sinusoidal functions with angu-
lar frequency 1 and arbitrary phase. After a cursory look, this does not
seem a very interesting set of gambles. Similarly, as
(∇κ)(ψ(µ,χ))= I 1χI 0χ · (cosµ, sinµ),
the same holds for the set of gambles for which we know the parametric
lower and upper prevision can be efficiently calculated.
This does not mean that calculating the lower and upper prevision of
all other gambles is hard. For example, the lower and upper parametric
prevision of the mean: let g := id]−pi,pi] ·IR≥0 and use the parameters and
observations of the graphical illustration above, then
[vC(g |1,U ),vC(g |1,U )]= [−pi,pi],
[vC(g |2,U ′),vC(g |2,U ′)]= [− 1136 ·pi, 2536 ·pi],
[vC(g |3,U ′′),vC(g |3,U ′′)]= [−pi,pi],
where vC(•|s,U ) := inft :U vC(•|s, t ). Remark how the inferences for this
gamble dilate after the second observation.
j
The von Mises family (also called the circular normal family) is part
of a class of families – one for every dimensionality – used for modeling
directional sampling, the von Mises–Fisher class [see, e.g., Dhillon & Sra
]. Apart from the von Mises family, they are usually written in terms
of unit vectors and not angles; Barndorff-Nielsen [, Ex. .] shows
that as such they are all linear regular exponential families. Mardia &
El-Atoum [] give a short discussion of Bayesian inference for these
families.
B. Continuous families 
B.. Gamma sampling
The gamma family is commonly used, for example when modeling Some gamma
densities (plot
restricted to ]0,5]):






waiting times [Johnson & Kotz , §.]. Each member Ga(•|α,β)
(cf. (.)) hasX :=R>0 as a sample space and, as seen in §.., is
parameterized by two strictly positive real parameters, a shape parame-
ter α and a rate parameter β.
Writing the likelihood in exponential family form is straightforward:
let z be an observed waiting time, then the likelihood can be written as
βα
Γα · zα−1 ·exp(−β · z)=
βα
Γα ·exp〈−β,α−1|z, ln z〉.
Comparing this last expression with (.), we see that the Euclidean
vector space for this family has dimension d := 2 and that
τ := z :R>0 ; (z, ln z), so T := coR2>0 =R2>0,
ψ :=α,β :R2>0 ; (−β,α−1), so Ξ :=R<0×R>1,
(B.)
and that
a :=R≥0 ; 1 and b := ξ :R<0×R>1 ; (−ξ1)
ξ2+1
Γ(ξ2+1) . (B.)
The cumulant function for the gamma family becomes










Ga(τ|α,β)= (∇κ)ξ= (αβ ,Ψα− lnβ), (B.)
a vector with as the first component the mean waiting time and as the
second component a quantity that has no immediately unambiguous
interpretation to me (perhaps “the mean logarithm of the waiting time”,
“the logarithm of the geometric mean waiting time”, or even “the mean
Neperian order of magnitude of the waiting time”).
The information in (B.) and (B.) fully defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all measur-
able gambles on Ξ=R<0×R>1 and the set of parameters is intT =R2>0.
The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normalization fac-
tor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t : intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ( (−ξ1)ξ2+1Γ(ξ2+1) )s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.






(Γα)s ·exp(−β · s · t1+ (α−1) · s · t2) · |
∣∣(∇ψ)(α,β)∣∣| dα dβ
= 1/∫ R>0 exp((α−1)·s·t2)(Γα)s · (∫ R>0βα·s ·exp(−β · s · t1) dβ) · |
∣∣∣∣ 0 1−1 0
∣∣∣∣| dα
 Bestiarium
= 1/∫ R>0 Γ(α·s+1)·exp((α−1)·s·t2)(Γα)s ·(s·t1)α·s+1 dα, (B.)
where the last step consisted in recognizing that the inner integral is one
over the normalization factor of Ga(•|α·s+1, s ·t1). Further simplification
of the normalization factor is not evident [also see Miller ].
So the prior parametric linear prevision is
Gc(•|s, t ) :∝∫ R>0 Ga(•|α · s+1, s · t1) · Γ(α·s+1)·exp((α−1)·s·t2)(Γα)s ·(s·t1)α·s+1 dα. (B.)
Given we do not have the normalization factor (B.) available in closed
form, we are not going to give explicit expressions for any predictive
prevision.
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models
of the type of (.)–(.) for Gamma sampling is to choose a number
of pseudocounts s in R>0 and a bounded subset of intT =R2>0. As both
components are already bounded from below, the simplest choice is
to only take an upper bound for t , i.e., an upper bound on the mean
waiting time and an upper bound on the mean order of magnitude of
the waiting time.
The next family is a subfamily of the gamma family for which α := 1;
it presents fewer analytical difficulties.
B.. Exponential sampling
The exponential exponential family (sic) is widely used, for exampleTwo exponen-
tial densities
(plot restricted
to [0,10]): (1/β in-
dicated with a dot)
β= 1
β= 0.2
when modeling the time between independent events [Johnson & Kotz
, §.]. Each member has the set of all finite time differences
X :=R≥0 as a sample space and is parameterized by the rate of the oc-
currence of events, i.e., aφ :=β inΦ :=R>0. Let f be a measurable gamble
on R≥0, the exponential linear prevision is then defined by
Ex( f |β) := ∫ R≥0 f z ·β ·exp(−β · z) dz. (B.)
Writing the likelihood in exponential family form is trivial: let z be
an observed time difference, then the likelihood can be written as
β ·exp(−β · z)=β ·exp〈−β|z〉.
Comparing this last expression with (.), we see that the Euclidean
vector space for this family has dimension d := 1 and that
τ := idR≥0 , so T := coR≥0 =R≥0,
ψ :=β :R>0 ;−β, so Ξ :=R<0,
(B.)
(so this is a linear exponential family) and also that
a :=R≥0 ; 1 and b := ξ :R<0 ;−ξ. (B.)
B. Discrete families 
The cumulant function for the exponential exponential family be-
comes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R<0 ;− ln(−ξ).
So, using (.) and (.), we find – letting ξ :=ψβ – that
Ex(τ|β)= (Dκ)ξ= 1β , (B.)
which is the mean time between event occurrences.
The information in (B.) and (B.) fully defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all mea-
surable gambles on Ξ=R<0 and the domain of possible parameters is
intT =R>0. The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normal-
ization factor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t an
element of intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ(−ξ)s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.
It can be calculated more easily when starting from the original non-
canonical parameterization ψ:
c(s, t )= 1/∫ R>0βs ·exp(−s · t ·β) dβ= (s·t )s+1Γ(s+1) , (B.)
which is easily found after recognizing that the integral is one over the
normalization factor of Ga(•|s+1, s · t ) (cf. (.)). So the prior para-
metric linear prevision is just this gamma prevision.
Using (.), (B.), and (B.), we can obtain the immediate prior




Γ(s+2) = (s+1) · (s·t )
s+1
(s·t+z)s+2 = s+1s·t · 1(1+ zs·t )s+2 ,
for which gamma-compound exponential density would be an apt name.
The posterior is obtained by the typical substitution (cf. §..).
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models
of the type of (.)–(.) for exponential sampling is to choose a
number of pseudocounts s in R>0 and a bounded subset of intT =R>0.
As this set is already bounded from below, the simplest choice is to
only take an upper bound for t , i.e., an upper bound on the mean time
between event occurrences.
B. Discrete families
This section with exponential families on discrete sample spaces con-
tains only one common family, the one formed by the Poisson distribu-
tions (§B..æ). The class of Bernoulli-type discrete families for sampling
from finite sets of unordered categories, has already seen ample atten-
tion in ‘Inference models for exponential families’. The last family
 Bestiarium
treated here, in §B.., is an artificial one; it is designed out of frustra-
tion, to compensate for my all too limited number of encounters with
distributions for sampling from finite, structured sets.
B.. Poisson sampling
The Poisson family of distributions is widely used, for example whenThree Poisson mass
functions (plot re-
stricted to 0..20):
(the mean is indi-




modeling the number of events occurring in a time interval of fixed
length [Johnson et al. , §.]. Each member has the set of nat-
ural numbers X :=N as a sample space and is parameterized by the
mean number of occurrences per interval, i.e., a φ :=λ in Φ :=R>0 (0 is
excluded for technical reasons). Let f be a gamble on N, the Poisson
linear prevision is then defined by
Pn( f |λ) :=∑z:N f z ·exp(−λ) · λzz! . (B.)
Writing the likelihood in exponential family form is straightforward:
let z be an observed number of occurrences, then the likelihood can be
written as
exp(−λ) · λzz! = exp(−λ) ·exp〈− lnλ|z〉 · 1z! .
Comparing this last expression with (.), we see that the Euclidean
vector space for this family has dimension d := 1 and that
τ := idN, so T := coN=R≥0,
ψ :=λ :R>0 ; lnλ, so Ξ :=R,
(B.)
(so this is a linear exponential family) and also that
a := z :N ; 1z! and b := ξ :R ; exp(−expξ). (B.)
The cumulant function for the Poisson family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R ; expξ.
So, using (.) and (.), we find – letting ξ :=ψλ – that
Pn(τ|λ)= (Dκ)ξ=λ, (B.)
which is the mean number of occurrences per interval.
The information in (B.) and (B.) fully defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all mea-
surable gambles on Ξ = R and the domain of possible parameters is
intT =R>0. The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normal-
ization factor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t an
element of intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ exps (−expξ) ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ.
B. Discrete families 
As nearly always, it can be calculated more easily when starting from the
original noncanonical parameterization ψ:
c(s, t )= 1/∫ R>0 exp(−s ·λ) ·λs·t · |∣∣(∇ψ)λ∣∣| dλ
= 1/∫ R>0 exp(−s ·λ) ·λs·t · 1λ dλ
= 1/∫ R>0λs·t−1 ·exp(−s ·λ) dλ= ss·tΓ(s·t ) , (B.)
which is easily found after recognizing that the integral is one over the
normalization factor of Ga(•|s · t , s) (cf. (.)). So the prior parametric
linear prevision is just this gamma prevision.
Using (.), (B.), and (B.), we can obtain the immediate











) · ( ss+1 )s·t · (1− ss+1 )z ,
which is the expression for a negative binomial probability mass function.
The negative binomial linear prevision [see, e.g., Johnson et al. , Three negative
binomial mass func-
tions (plot restricted
to 0..20): (the mean







the same mean are
given.
§.] is defined by (let f be a measurable gamble onN)
Nb( f |r,ϑ) :=∑z:N f z · (r+z−1z ) ·ϑr · (1−ϑ)z , (B.)
where ϑ in [0,1] is a frequency and r is a strictly positive real number; its
mean is r · 1−ϑϑ . (Note that the negative binomial distribution converges
to the Poisson distribution for increasing r .) So the immediate prior
predictive linear prevision is Nb
(• ∣∣ s · t , ss+1 ). The posterior is obtained
by the typical substitution (cf. §..).
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models of
the type of (.)–(.) for Poisson sampling is to choose a number of
pseudocounts s inR>0 and a bounded subset of intT =R>0. As this set is
already bounded from below, the simplest choice is to only take an upper
bound for t , i.e., an upper bound on the mean number of occurrences
per interval.
B.. Sampling balanced ternary numbers
After having browsed through compendia of probability distributions
[such as, e.g., Johnson et al. , ; Kotz et al. ] for a while, it has
happened to me multiple times (twice at least) that I wondered: Where
are all the probability distributions for finite, structured sets? (Do not
read too many technicalities into the word ‘structured’: I was thinking
about things like three collinear or four coplanar points.)
It might be that they are not practically useful, that I have browsed
over them, or that they hide in that part of the literature I have not ac-
cessed or have no access to. After getting intoxicated by the exponential
families, I did not care for these possibilities. I was convinced I could
brew my own exponential family and define an inference model for it,
which is what we are now going to do.
 Bestiarium
Let us consider sampling from X := {−1,0,1}, the base set for the
balanced ternary number system [Wikipedia a]. To keep things
as simple as possible, our own exponential family – let us call it the
Ternouilli family – is going to be the linear canonical one for this sample
space. To immediately break our vow of simplicitly – without regrets –,
let us take a := z :X ; 1/2|z| as the basic mass function (cf. (i)), chosen
just because it lets my favorite hyperbolic function appear in the next
paragraph. But before leaving this one, it is good to mention that the
Ternouilli family likelihood function is proportional to exp〈•|z〉 ·1/2|z|
(cf. (.); z is some observed sample from {−1,0,1}).
As all possible samples are real numbers, this means that the Eu-
clidean vector space for this family has dimension d := 1 and so the set
of canonical parameters Ξ is a subset of the reals. Recalling first the
standard expression for a discrete exponential family prevision (.),
for every tentative canonical parameter ξ in R, the normalization factor’s
value – if defined – is given by (cf. (v))
bξ= 1/∑z:{−1,0,1} exp〈ξ|z〉 ·az = 1exp(−ξ)· 12+1+exp(−ξ)· 12 = 11+coshξ .
We see that it is well defined for all ξ in R, so Ξ :=R (cf. (vi)) and the
likelihood of ξ is
1
1+coshξ ·exp〈ξ|z〉 ·1/2|z|.
Thus for any ξ in Ξ, the Ternouilli linear prevision is defined by (let
f :L˘R)
Tr( f |ξ) :=∑z:{−1,0,1} f z · 11+coshξ ·exp(ξ · z) · 12|z| . (B.)
To recapitulate, the Ternouilli family’s characteristics are
τ := id{−1,0,1}, so T := co{−1,0,1}= [−1,1],
ψ := idR, so Ξ :=R,
(B.)
and
a := z : {−1,0,1} ; 1
2|z| and b := ξ :R ; 11+coshξ . (B.)
The cumulant function for the Ternouilli family becomes
κ :=− ln◦b= ξ :R ; ln(1+coshξ).
So, using (.) and (.), we find that
Tr(τ|ξ)= (Dκ)ξ= sinhξ1+coshξ , (B.)
which is just the mean, of course, as the family is linear. This indicates
that working with the mean parameterization (i.e.,ψ :=µ : ]−1,1[ ; ln 1+µ1−µ )
might have been more intuitive. Ah, well; as we say in Dutch: gedane
zaken nemen geen keer.
The information in (B.) and (B.) fully defines the canonical
form (.) of the conjugate family prevision: it is defined on all measur-
B. Discrete families 
able gambles on Ξ=R and the domain of parameters is intT = ]−1,1[.
The one thing we do not yet know explicitly is the normalization fac-
tor (.): (let s be a strictly positive real number and t : intT )
c(s, t )= 1/∫ Ξ( 11+coshξ )s ·exps〈ξ|t〉 dξ
= 1/∫ R( 11+coshξ )s ·exps (ξ · t ) dξ;
which, using the substitution ζ := expξ, becomes
= 1/∫ R>0 2s · ζs·t−1(2+ζ+ζ−1)s dζ
= 2−s /∫ R>0 ζs·(t+1)−1(1+ζ)2·s dζ= 2−s ·Γ(2·s)Γ(s·(1+t ))·Γ(s·(1−t )) , (B.)
where the last step follows from spotting the beta integral [Abramowitz
& Stegun , §.].
So the prior parametric linear prevision is (let f :L R)
Tc( f |s, t ) := ∫ R f ξ · 2−s ·Γ(2·s)Γ(s·(1+t ))·Γ(s·(1−t )) · ( 11+coshξ )s ·exps (ξ · t ) dξ. (B.)
Using (.), (B.), and (B.), we can obtain the immediate prior










Γ(2·s+2) · Γ(s·(1+t )+1+z)Γ(s·(1+t )) · Γ(s·(1−t )+1−z)Γ(s·(1−t )) ;
we can rewrite this by using generalized binomial coefficients:
= 2
2|z| · 1(2·s+1)·(2·s) ·
(s·(1+t )+z
1+z




) · (s·(1−t )−z1−z ).
The posterior is obtained by the typical substitution (cf. §..).
Now all it takes to define imprecise-probabilistic inference models of
the type of (.)–(.) for Ternouilli sampling is to choose a number
of pseudocounts s inR>0 and a bounded subset of intT = intT = ]−1,1[.
As this is already a bounded set, the easiest choice is to takeU := intT
and start with a near-ignorance prior, unless there is so much prior
information about the Ternouilli process that would make it worthwhile
to specify bounds.
This subsection shows that, if none of the classical sampling mod-
els are a good fit for some problem, it might be worth a try to see if a
custom-made exponential family sampling model and the correspond-
ing (imprecise-probabilistic) inference models can be constructed.
X
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Lower & upper covariance
Die allgemeinen Naturgesetze sind durch Gleichungen
auszudrücken, die für alle Koordinatensysteme gelten,
d. h. die beliebigen Substitutionen gegenüber kovariant
(allgemein kovariant) sind.
Einstein [, p.]
The variance and covariance of random variables are important con-




to the theory of coherent lower previsions of the classical definition
of variance. In this appendix, which stands somewhat apart from the
rest of this thesis, we add a generalization of the classical definition of
covariance. (None of the results here are used elsewhere.)
G.. Lower & upper variance
Let us first sketch Walley’s [, §G] approach to defining lower and
upper variance.
Given a possibility space Ω and a linear prevision P on LΩ, the
variance varP :LΩ→R is the function defined for every gamble f on Ω
by
varP f = P ( f −P f )2
= P f 2− (P f )2. (G.)
Taking into account the topological assumptions made at the beginning
of §.., the second form makes it clear that, for any gamble f on Ω,
the function P : (PLΩ)lin ; varP f is continuous.
This definition can be rewritten as follows: for all real µ it holds that
varP f = P ( f −µ+µ−P f )2
and thus – because of the linearity of P – that
P ( f −µ)2 = varP f + (P f −µ)2,
Note that the second term in the right-hand side as a function of µ is
a parabola with minimum zero in P f ; the left-hand side is therefore
also an expression for a parabola, with the variance as a minimum, also
attained in P f . This leads to an alternative definition of the variance:
µP f
varP f =minµ:RP ( f −µ)2. (G.)
This alternative definition gives us the inspiration we need for the
definition of lower and upper variance. To wit, for any given coherent
221
lower prevision P onLΩ, the lower variance varP :LΩ→R and upper
variance varP :LΩ→R are defined by
varP f =minµ:RP ( f −µ)2, (G.)
varP f =minµ:RP ( f −µ)2. (G.)
These definitions for lower and upper variance and the rewritten defini-
tion of variance itself can be seen as optimization problems.
We must still justify using minimum operators and not infimum
operators in (G.) and (G.). To this end, let P : {P ,P }, so we can do a
parallel derivation for both cases. Furthermore, let ε :=µ−P f , then we
can write
P ( f −µ)2 = P ( f −P f −ε)2
≥ P ( f −P f )2+ε2+P (−2 ·ε · ( f −P f ))
≥ P ( f −P f )2+ε2 if ε≤ 0
> P ( f −P f )2 if ε< 0, i.e., if µ< P f . (G.)
The first inequality follows from superadditivity (.) or mixed superad-
ditivity, the conjugate version of mixed subadditivity (.). An entirely
similar derivation, now with ε := P f −µ, gives us
P ( f −µ)2 > P ( f −P f )2 if ε< 0, i.e., if µ> P f . (G.)
Together with the fact that [P f ,P f ] is compact and that P ( f −µ)2 is a
continuous function of µ, (G.) and (G.) show that, for both the case of
the lower and upper variance, a minimum is attained in a µ that belongs
to [P f ,P f ].
With his variance envelope theorem, Walley [, §G] shows that
this definition is equivalent to the one that would be obtained by taking
the lower and upper variance as the lowest and highest variance attained
by the elements of the credal setMP . Explicitly, he proves that
varP f =minP :MP varP f , (G.)
varP f =maxP :MP varP f . (G.)
Considering the equivalence as uncertainty model of a coherent lower
prevision and its credal set, it would be nice if we could let this kind
of result also hold for a generalized definition of covariance. This will
indeed be the case; but, in the next subsection, we first try to propose a
direct definition, i.e., not in terms of the credal set.
G.. Covariance as an optimization problem
The approach to obtaining a generalized definition for covariance runs
parallel to the one used for variance.
 Lower & upper covariance
We again start from the classical definition. So, consider a possibility
spaceΩ and a linear prevision P onLΩ, the covariance covP :(LΩ)2 →R
is the function defined for every pair of gambles f and g on Ω by
covP ( f , g )= P
(
( f −P f ) · (g −P g ))
= P ( f · g )−P f ·P g . (G.)
Again, the second form makes it clear that, for any pair of gambles f
and g on Ω, the function P : (PLΩ)lin ; covP ( f , g ) is continuous.
We again rewrite this as an optimization problem: for all real µ and ν
covP ( f , g )= P
(




( f −µ) · (g −ν))= covP ( f , g )+ (P f −µ) · (P g −ν).
The second term of the right-hand side is the expression in µ,ν for a
hyperbolic paraboloid (or saddle surface); the same therefore again
holds for the left-hand side. Its saddle point P f ,P g can be reached using
a minimax (or maximin) operator. This is clearer after a substitution and
some rewriting: let α,β :R2 be such that µ=α+β and ν=α−β, then it
holds for all α,β :R2 that
P
(
( f +g2 −α)2− (
f −g
2 −β)2
)= covP ( f , g )+ (P f +g2 −α)2− (P f −g2 −β)2,






(Darker is higher.) covP ( f , g )=minα:Rmaxβ:RP
(





covP ( f , g )=maxβ:Rminα:RP
(





Because P is linear and its argument is the sum of terms in either α or β,
it is the same whether we use a maximin or minimax operator.
Proposing a definition for lower covariance covP : (LΩ)2 →R and
upper covariance covP : (LΩ)2 →Rwould ideally have consisted of just
replacing the linear prevision P onLΩ with some coherent lower pre-
vision P onLΩ (or its conjugate upper prevision P ). However, the fact
that we have two operators to choose from leaves us with a dilemma: as
neither P or P is linear, does it matter which operator to use for the defi-
nition of lower and upper covariance? Perhaps working with credal sets
can shed some light on this issue and clarify which of the two choices
should be taken (if they do not turn out to be equivalent). This is the
topic of the next subsection.
However, because it follows from both (G.) and (G.) and the lin-
earity of P that
covP ( f , g )=minα:RP ( f +g2 −α)2−minβ:RP (
f −g
2 −β)2
= varP f +g2 −varP
f −g
2 , (G.)
Lower & upper covariance 
there is one thing we can already say: Independently of the operator, us-
ing the same reasoning that led to (G.) and (G.), it follows that the
minimizing α belongs to [P f +g2 ,P
f +g
2 ] and – after invoking conjugacy –
that the maximizing β belongs to [P f −g2 ,P
f −g
2 ].
G.. The covariance envelope theorem
Even though we do not yet have a direct definition of lower and upper
covariance, an indirect definition is given by requiring the covariance
envelope theorem to hold. To wit, that for any possibility space Ω, any
coherent lower prevision P onLΩ, and any two gambles f and g on Ω
it holds that
covP ( f , g )=minP :MP covP ( f , g ),
covP ( f , g )=maxP :MP covP ( f , g ).
(G.)
(G.)
Due to the compactness ofMP and the continuity of the covariance as a
function of P , the minimum and maximum are attained, so this theorem
is sensible as an indirect definition. The minimum and maximum above
are not necessarily attained in an extreme point ofMP , in contrast to
the situation for lower previsions (.).





with just a mini-
mization operator –
takes a central role.
covariance, it becomes clear we must investigate whether the maximin
and minimax operator encountered there can be interchanged with the
maximum or minimum over P encountered in (G.) and (G.). Let us
write this more explicitly. First define the convex functions
u :=α :R ; ( f +g2 −α)2, v :=β :R ; (
f −g
2 −β)2,
then the question is: Which, if any, of the following statements can we
ascertain to be true:
minP :MP covP ( f , g )=minα:Rmaxβ:RminP :MP P (uα− vβ),
minP :MP covP ( f , g )=maxβ:Rminα:RminP :MP P (uα− vβ),
maxP :MP covP ( f , g )=minα:Rmaxβ:RmaxP :MP P (uα− vβ),
maxP :MP covP ( f , g )=maxβ:Rminα:RmaxP :MP P (uα− vβ)?
First of all, note that consecutive minimum operators or consecutive
maximum operators can always be interchanged.
Whether the interchange of a minimum and a maximum operator is
allowed, can only be checked after a more thorough study of the func-
tions involved: As function application is a linear operation, P (uα−vβ) is
linear in P (and thus both convex and concave); as P is linear, P (uα−vβ)
is convex in α and concave in β. Furthermore, P (uα− vβ) is continuous
in α, β, and P . Together with the fact that the maximum or minimum is
always attained in some convex compact set, this is enough to do a first
operator interchange, i.e., we can apply the minimax theorem [Walley
 Lower & upper covariance
, §E] if needed. We find the following modified statements:
minP :MP covP ( f , g )=minα:RminP :MP maxβ:RP (uα− vβ),
minP :MP covP ( f , g )=maxβ:RminP :MP minα:RP (uα− vβ),
maxP :MP covP ( f , g )=minα:RmaxP :MP maxβ:RP (uα− vβ),
maxP :MP covP ( f , g )=maxβ:RmaxP :MP minα:RP (uα− vβ).
As maximizing a convex operation and minimizing is a concave
operation, maxβ:RP (uα− vβ) is convex as a function of P and α and
minα:RP (uα−vβ) is concave as a function of P and β. This means that a
second application of the maximin theorem is not possible, and a second
interchange is not generally possible for all cases. We can therefore only
be sure about the first and last of the initial statements; to wit,
minP :MP covP ( f , g )=minα:Rmaxβ:RP (uα− vβ),
maxP :MP covP ( f , g )=maxβ:Rminα:RP (uα− vβ).
Thus, the covariance envelope theorem implies a direct definition of
lower and upper covariance, the starting point of the next subsection.
G.. Definition, a property & discussion
Given some possibility spaceΩ and a coherent lower prevision P onLΩ,
the lower and upper covariance covP : (LΩ)2 →R and covP : (LΩ)2 →R
are defined – for any pair of gambles f and g on Ω – by
covP ( f , g )=minα:Rmaxβ:RP
(





covP ( f , g )=maxβ:Rminα:RP
(







Note that this definition reduces to the one for lower and upper variance
when g = f ; it also reduces to the classical definition for linear previsions,
because they are, well, linear.
An interesting property of classical covariance is that it can be written
as a difference of two variances (G.). For our generalized definition,





2 )≤ covP ( f , g )
≤min{varP ( f +g2 )−varP ( f −g2 ),varP ( f +g2 )−varP ( f −g2 )}
≤max{varP ( f +g2 )−varP ( f −g2 ),varP ( f +g2 )−varP ( f −g2 )}
≤ covP ( f , g )≤ varP ( f +g2 )−varP (
f −g
2 ). (G.)
These inequalities are obtained starting from the definitions of lower
and upper covariance (G.) and (G.). They are related to lower and
upper variance (G.) and (G.) by using superadditivity (.) and
mixed subadditivity (.).
Lower & upper covariance 
The derivation given in this section is an interesting example of the
use of the properties of coherent lower previsions and of their credal set.
However, something is still lacking: What is the meaning of lower and up-
per variance and lower and upper covariance? An intuitive interpretation
is the one typically given to their precise counterparts:
(i) variance is a statistic describing a belief about the ‘spread’ of a
gamble,
(ii) covariance is a statistic describing a belief about the ‘similarity’ of
two gambles.
I have found no satisfactory behavioral interpretation; they could be
seen as prices, but trying to say for what leads to all too convoluted
explanations. Perhaps variance and covariance should just be seen as
useful for the description of probability density or mass functions, and
any ‘generalization’ as mathematically interesting at most.
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 Exponential prevision – Interpretation
regular, , 

















Extreme point, , 
-s of a credal set, 
Extreme ray, 



































































































Lower envelope theorem, , 


























































































































Pseudocounts, , , 
Pseudomean, 











Robust Bayesian analysis – Wishart prevision 







































































Von Mises prevision, 




244 Index of symbols
This index of symbols is ordered topically. All but the last topic contain
symbols for fixed concepts; e.g., the set of reals R and the generalized
gamma function Γ••. The last topic – naturally at the back of the index –
contains generically used symbols; e.g., Ω for some possibility space
and f • for some function. For functions, the possible arguments and
parameters are indicated using the placeholder •. Page references, if
present, point to a definition or a first or important use.
We have not indexed variants of generic notation created by decorating
indexed symbols (using, e.g., primes or bars) or generic symbols that are
only used very locally.
reference cues, 
å previous recto page,









• := • definition, 
abstractions, 
• :• ;•,




general sets & set functions
|•| cardinality,
; empty set, 


























℘• power set, 
int• interior, 
cl• closure, , 
co• convex hull, , 
ext• extreme points, 
span• linear span, 
supp• support, 
general functions
id• identity map, 
|•| absolute value,p•,p• square root, 
〈•|•〉 scalar product, 
]• angle function, 
δ•• Kronecker delta, 
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•−1 function inverse, 


















• = • equality,
• ≤ • smaller,
• < • strictly smaller,
• ∈ • belongs to,
• ⊆ • subset,
• ⊂ • strict subset,
• ⊆⊂ • finite subset, 
• ⊂• strict finite subset,







• ∧ • conjunction, 











I •• •-order modified
Bessel function, 
gambles & sets of gambles
I • all indicators, 
I • indicator, 
L • all gambles, , 
•?, 
V• all polynomial gambles,

C• all continuous gam-
bles, 
L˘• all measurable gam-
bles, 
•˜ cylindrical extension, 
desirable
D• set of desirable
gambles from P
or P (•|B), , 
R• natural extension
ofD, P , or P (•|B), 
R• natural extension
ofD, P , or P (•|B), ,

R¯P regular extension
of P , 
marginally desirable
G• set of marginally
desirable gambles for




H • set of differences
of permuted gambles,












P • all previsions, 
M• credal set, 
lce• • least committal
extension, , , ,

mce• • maximally com-
mittal extension, 
lce•(•|•) least committal
extension, , , 
rce•(•|•) regular exten-
sion, 
slce• • separate least com-
mittal extension, 





asl• avoiding sure loss, ,
, 














































































vM(•|•,•) von Mises, 
















•∗ all finite sequences, 
ν• sequence length or
count vector size, 
C • counting map, , 

















W •• Markov, , 
E•,•,•• •, E•,•• • (canonical)
exponential family,
–



























• • d• integral, 
D• derivative, 




1 identity matrix, , ,
|•| determinant,
tr• trace, 
•ᵀ transposition, , ,















var• • variance, 
var•• lower variance, 
var•• upper variance, 














v , w polynomials,
numbers & vectors
α, β, λ, µ, ν (vectors of)
real numbers,
I , J ,K finite index sets,




ε mixing sequence, 




Ω,X ,Y ,Z possibility
or sample spaces, ,

A, B , C , D events,
E ,A ,B,C sets of
events,
ω, $, a, b, c elementary
events, 
X sequence of random
variables, 
x, y sample sequences,
z category or sample,
N sample sequence
length, 
n partial sample se-
quence length,
m, m count vectors,
ϑ, θ, t , t, r frequency
vectors,
s, s pseudocounts, ,
, , 
Mˇ count matrix, 
Fˇ frequency matrix, 
generic notation – generic notation 
Θ, T transition matrix,
, 
pi• permutation, , 
gambles & previsions
K ,N sets of gambles,

f •, g•, h• gambles,
R,D sets of desirable
gambles, 
Q set of previsions,
E•, P•, Q•, R• lower
previsions,
E•, P•, Q•, R• upper
previsions,





prevision, , , 






a• basic mass or den-
sity function, , 
τ• sufficient statistic
function, –
T set of means, –
Φ parameter space, ,



















U prior set of pseu-
domeans, 
classification
A attribute set, 
a attribute tuple, 
C set of classes, 
c, d, e classes, 
X
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